2011/11/3 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>

>
>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> >> You picture consciousness as something inherently personal. But you can
> >> be
> >> conscious without there being any sense of personhood, or any experience
> >> related to a particular person (like in meditation). So that assumption
> >> doesn't seems to be true.
> >>
> >>  Also you think that memory has to be conserved in order for the
> >> experience
> >> to continue consistently. This is also not true, we can experience
> things
> >> that are totally disconnected from all memories we have, yet still it is
> >> the
> >> I (not the "I") that experiences it. For example on a drug trip, you can
> >> literally forget every trace of what your life was like, in terms of any
> >> concretely retrievable memory (you can even forget you are human or an
> >> animal). So why can't we lose any *concrete* memory after death and
> >> experience still continues consistently (and if it does you have to
> >> surive
> >> in some way - it makes no sense to have a continuous experience while
> you
> >> totally die).
> >> You also don't remember being an infant (probably), yet you were that
> >> infant
> >> and are still here.
> >> Saying that we are the sum of our memory is very simplistic and just
> >> isn't
> >> true in terms of how we experience (you remember almost nothing of what
> >> you
> >> have experienced).
> >>
> >> So if you say it is death, you only refer to a superficial aspect of the
> >> person, namely their body and explicit memory. Sure, we tend to
> indentify
> >> with that, but that doesn't mean that there isn't something much more
> >> important. The particular person may just be an expression of something
> >> deeper, which is conserved, and is the real essence of the person, and
> >> really all beings: Their ability to consciously, consistently
> experience.
> >> We tend to find that scary, as it makes us part of something so much
> >> greater
> >> that all our attachments, possesions, achievements, memory, beliefs and
> >> security are hardly worth anything at all, in the big picture. But if
> >> they
> >> aren't, what are we then? Since most of us have not yet looked deeper
> >> into
> >> ourselves than these things, we feel immensly treatened by the idea that
> >> this is not at all what is important about us. It (apparently) reduces
> us
> >> to
> >> nothing.
> >> But isn't it, when we face it from a more open perspective, tremendously
> >> liberating and exciting? By confronting that, we can free us from all
> >> these
> >> superficial baggage like things and relations and identity (freeing
> >> mentally
> >> speaking, of course), and see the true greatness of what we are which is
> >> beyond all of this. And this is immortal, with death merely being a
> >> relative
> >> end, just like sleeping.
> >>
> >> benjayk
> >>
> >
> > Well if immortality is something which do not preseve the person... then
> > it
> > is death.
> For the person. The point is that if I don't consider the person to be what
> is most important about me, than I don't die at all. Immortality may be
> immortality of I (consciousness)


I don't understand what you mean by consciousness. Without a notion of
self, it is meaningless.



> , not immortality of "I" (personality).
>

There is no soul... so unless what you mean is soul, it is meaningless. And
if you mean soul, I don't believe in soul.


> It is death for some aspect,


For all aspect.


> but just as you don't call it death when some
> cells of you die,


Your comparison is not relevant for the case at hand.


> there is no need to consider it death when the person you
> consider to be right now dies.


Well most of the people do.


> It is just material death,


Death is always material.


> but not death of
> what you really are.


And what it is ? What I really am is me.


> This can't die,


Sure if personhood is erased, it dies.


> as is not even subject to time (even
> though it can utilize time).
>

Well unless you have proof about the existence of souls, it is meaningless,
consciousness needs time.


>
>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> >  If not, what is the difference between your consciousness and
> > mine or any other...
> There is no difference, as there is no your and mine consciousness.
>

You don't use consciousness in the commen sense it is used.



> Consciousness can not be owned, and can not be divided into pieces. There
> is
> just consciousness.
> It is very easily experientally confirmable: Do you ever experience
> anything
> other than this consciousness? Can you ever find an owner of consciousness,
> which is not just another appearance in consciousness? No, so why would we
> assume that another consciousess or an owner of consciousness exists? We
> can't infer that other "consciousnesses" exist by observation of other
> people, because we can only infer that other people exist, not that they
> have another consciousness. There is no evidence for this at all.
>
> We can speak of your consciousness and my consciousness on a relative
> level,
> meaning one particular expression of consciousness and another particular
> expression. But this is a relative distinction, and there are contexts
> where
> this distinction makes little or no sense, like when we die or when we are
> in objectless and perceptionless meditation.
>
>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> >  what is *preserved* ?
> Continuity of consciousness.
>
>
There is no continuity without self.


>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> > Immortality still means what it means, what you're talking about is not
> > immortality. If nothing is preserved (no memories) then nothing is left
> > and
> > I don't care.
> But is is not true that nothing is preserved. I already gave an example
> that
> even without explicit memory something more essential than memory can be
> conserved.
>

No your example is wrong. Taking it to the limit, you never have memories,
because at no point do you remember everything. The point is that you can
remember your own memories.


> If you don't care, you are just being superficial with regards to what you
> are.
>
>
I don't thing so, what is important to me is me in the event of dying. I
don't care if a not me stays.


>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> > When you take drug and "forget"... you then remember when the effects
> > stop,
> > proving you still have your memory.
> That's beside the point. What's important is that we can experience total
> memory loss, while still being there. Why would it be important whether you
> later concretely remember something or not? That seem irrelevant to the
> continuity of experience.
>
>
> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> >
> > A person who would forget everything... it's the same thing as she had
> > died.
> Only for an external person. For the subject, it may rather feel like just
> being born.
> Yes, it is true that all of which superficially makes the person this
> person
> vanishes, but there is no need to reduce the subject to the superficial
> expression of a particular personality. You take for granted that the way
> we
> think about ourselves is true to what we really are.
>
> benjayk
> --
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> http://old.nabble.com/QTI%2C-Cul-de-sacs-and-differentiation-tp32721336p32773084.html
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>
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