2011/11/12 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

>
> On 10 Nov 2011, at 14:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2011/11/10 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>
>
>>
>>
>> Spudboy100 wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > In a message dated 11/9/2011 7:27:48 AM Eastern Standard Time,
>> > benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com writes:
>> >
>> > Probably  the one that is most convincing is direct experience. Try
>> > meditation (my  favorite is just doing nothing while being aware not to
>> > snooze or think or  search for something to do,etc...), or, if you are a
>> > bit
>> > more daring and  very cautious and well informed, psychdelic drugs (eg
>> > Salvia, Mushrooms,  LSD, DMT) or suspend your belief that you are just a
>> > person for long enough  (then the reality of unity tends to reveal
>> itself
>> > spotaneously). If you are  in the right mindset and maybe a bit lucky
>> you
>> > can
>> > experience states in  which it is directly evident that there is
>> > fundamentally no other, just  this consciousness that you are.
>> >
>> >
>> > I see, Benjamin. But unless one takes these visions as a solipsism, I
>> > would
>> >  ask, what does this bring to the table? We humans are primates, and for
>> > most of  us primates, we are group animals. We need each other even
>> though
>> > we
>> > irritate  each other.
>> What I am describing can be said to be a kind of solipsism; only I exist,
>> but I being the consciousness that we all share,
>
>
> I can't make a meaning of that... we do not share a "consciousness", not
> in any definition of that term.
>
>
> Let me try, assuming mechanism. Would you agree that in the case you are
> cut and pasted in two different places, the resulting individuals share a
> common memory-past?
>

They share a common past memories, but as soon as they are "duplicated",
they do not share their consciousness, only past memories.


> From this we can make sense of "sharing a consciousness", and may be
> understand that personal identity is relative. Would the original, before
> the duplication, die in case one of the copy will die?
>
> I can understand that sharing consciousness can be felt as a meaningless
> notion, in case consciousness is defined by the first person experiences
> including memories,
>

That's how I would define it, consciousness is the first person experience.


>  but thought experiments can be imagined to defend the idea that we might
> survive amnesia (as it is commonly believed),
>

It's the same thing as death and playing with word. Using that definition
it is obvious then that death does not exists... and at the same time it is
meaningless.


> in which case the 'consciousness" we share might be the consciousness of
> the least common part to ... all Löbian machines, or even all universal
> machines?
>
> We never really know who we are, it seems to me, and that ignorance makes
> me open to the idea that "sharing consciousness" might make some sense.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> not "I" in the sense of me
>> as a person (which is usually meant when we are talking about solipsism).
>> We need others as an other to our personhood, but not as an other to us as
>> consciousness (which is what we really are, the person being more like
>> something we dress ourselves with). Otherness is the one seeing itself
>> from
>> different perspectives.
>>
>>
>> Spudboy100 wrote:
>> >
>> > At the end of the day, can one bring information, that
>> > would not,  logically, be known, otherwise? For instance, that Uncle,
>> > Bruno, left a  mathematical puzzle, he worked on, inscribed on page
>> 1273,
>> > in the
>> > 1999 edition  of ARS MATHEMATICA, in his old, study--something like
>> this,
>> > let us  say?
>> You mean in a paranormal way? There are many experiental results that
>> suggest so (even though its validity is disputed, but the criticism if
>> often
>> not vindicated, in my opinion), and a lot of astounding anecdotes. But it
>> might not work in the way we expect, in terms of consistency,
>> controllability and scope.
>>
>> benjayk
>> --
>> View this message in context:
>> http://old.nabble.com/The-consciousness-singularity-tp32803353p32818189.html
>> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
>>
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