2011/11/13 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

>
> On 12 Nov 2011, at 23:11, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> 2011/11/12 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>
>>
>> On 10 Nov 2011, at 14:51, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> 2011/11/10 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Spudboy100 wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > In a message dated 11/9/2011 7:27:48 AM Eastern Standard Time,
>>> > benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com writes:
>>> >
>>> > Probably  the one that is most convincing is direct experience. Try
>>> > meditation (my  favorite is just doing nothing while being aware not to
>>> > snooze or think or  search for something to do,etc...), or, if you are
>>> a
>>> > bit
>>> > more daring and  very cautious and well informed, psychdelic drugs (eg
>>> > Salvia, Mushrooms,  LSD, DMT) or suspend your belief that you are just
>>> a
>>> > person for long enough  (then the reality of unity tends to reveal
>>> itself
>>> > spotaneously). If you are  in the right mindset and maybe a bit lucky
>>> you
>>> > can
>>> > experience states in  which it is directly evident that there is
>>> > fundamentally no other, just  this consciousness that you are.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > I see, Benjamin. But unless one takes these visions as a solipsism, I
>>> > would
>>> >  ask, what does this bring to the table? We humans are primates, and
>>> for
>>> > most of  us primates, we are group animals. We need each other even
>>> though
>>> > we
>>> > irritate  each other.
>>> What I am describing can be said to be a kind of solipsism; only I exist,
>>> but I being the consciousness that we all share,
>>
>>
>> I can't make a meaning of that... we do not share a "consciousness", not
>> in any definition of that term.
>>
>>
>> Let me try, assuming mechanism. Would you agree that in the case you are
>> cut and pasted in two different places, the resulting individuals share a
>> common memory-past?
>>
>
> They share a common past memories, but as soon as they are "duplicated",
> they do not share their consciousness, only past memories.
>
>
> "pure consciousness" is what is invariant through the change of memories.
>

I'm not sure it is meaningful. I call that 1st person experience.
Consciousness has a subject.


> That consciousness is a first person experience that we can share, despite
> we cannot communicate it. It is hard to convey because we are used to
> believe that consciousness has always a content. Exercises like staying
> lucid during sleep, or using some dissociative drugs, can help to give a
> sense to such a consciousness without any explicit experience and identity.
>
>
>
>
>
>> From this we can make sense of "sharing a consciousness", and may be
>> understand that personal identity is relative. Would the original, before
>> the duplication, die in case one of the copy will die?
>>
>> I can understand that sharing consciousness can be felt as a meaningless
>> notion, in case consciousness is defined by the first person experiences
>> including memories,
>>
>
> That's how I would define it, consciousness is the first person experience.
>
>
>>  but thought experiments can be imagined to defend the idea that we
>> might survive amnesia (as it is commonly believed),
>>
>
> It's the same thing as death and playing with word. Using that definition
> it is obvious then that death does not exists... and at the same time it is
> meaningless.
>
>
> I didn't say "total amnesia".
>

Then I'm ok, you can survive losing memories, but you cannot survive
forgetting everything.


> It is obvious that we can survive amnesia, if only because this happens
> everyday. We do forget many things all the time, if only most night dream
> experiences. Some people can forget complete hours or larger time period in
> a car crash, and we don't say that they are dead.
>
> Now imagine someone, Arthur, say, who is cut in B, and paste in W. Imagine
> also that a backup of Arthur's teleported state has been done in B. Imagine
> that Arthur dies in an accident at W, some month after that teleportation.
> Other persons, in B, decide to re-instantiate that person from the old
> backup in B. Would you say that Arthur died?
>

That arthur + 1 month died. All of its month of experiences is lost... A
younger version of that arthur is still alive.

If the "no cul de sac" is ok for a continuation with total amnesia, then it
is not even false, but as I said devoid of content, meaningless.

Strictly speaking this is equivalent with Arthur becoming amnesic of the
> month-life experience in W.
>

Yes and it is lost.


> Personally I would not say that he died, just that he lost some memories.
> If not, then we die everyday.
>

We are not aware of everything and don't remember everything, death is the
lost of personhood. If when you talk about "immortality" and you allow that
through total amnesia... then it's just word playing not "immortality".

Quentin


>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>> in which case the 'consciousness" we share might be the consciousness of
>> the least common part to ... all Löbian machines, or even all universal
>> machines?
>>
>> We never really know who we are, it seems to me, and that ignorance makes
>> me open to the idea that "sharing consciousness" might make some sense.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> not "I" in the sense of me
>>> as a person (which is usually meant when we are talking about solipsism).
>>> We need others as an other to our personhood, but not as an other to us
>>> as
>>> consciousness (which is what we really are, the person being more like
>>> something we dress ourselves with). Otherness is the one seeing itself
>>> from
>>> different perspectives.
>>>
>>>
>>> Spudboy100 wrote:
>>> >
>>> > At the end of the day, can one bring information, that
>>> > would not,  logically, be known, otherwise? For instance, that Uncle,
>>> > Bruno, left a  mathematical puzzle, he worked on, inscribed on page
>>> 1273,
>>> > in the
>>> > 1999 edition  of ARS MATHEMATICA, in his old, study--something like
>>> this,
>>> > let us  say?
>>> You mean in a paranormal way? There are many experiental results that
>>> suggest so (even though its validity is disputed, but the criticism if
>>> often
>>> not vindicated, in my opinion), and a lot of astounding anecdotes. But it
>>> might not work in the way we expect, in terms of consistency,
>>> controllability and scope.
>>>
>>> benjayk
>>> --
>>> View this message in context:
>>> http://old.nabble.com/The-consciousness-singularity-tp32803353p32818189.html
>>> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
>>>
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>>
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