2011/11/17 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>

>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> Actually mechanism as such seems to me to be just a
> >> metaphor, even though it may be trivially true if every computation
> >> [can]
> >> belong to every experience, which appears to be true to me (since
> >> experiences are inseperably connected as one movement of
> >> consciousness).
> >
> > ?
> We always survive from the 1p of view, regardless how we are substituted
> (this is also a result of COMP as far as I am aware of).
> The question is, how do we personally feel to survive, and this question
> has
> no mechanistically determineable answer (as 1p experience is not
> computable).
>
> The question whether my ego self survives can also not be mechanistically
> determined, since it depends on what we identitify the local ego with and
> this question cannot be mechanistically determined (as it is a matter of
> taste or opinion). If I identify my ego with the computation 1+1=2, then I
> can survive in your pocket calculator,


o_O ??


> if I identify with some vague
> particular form of experience, we can't say whether I will survive, because
> my identification is too vague for that (I may still say "Yes, doctor",
> just
> hoping that some noncomputational component will naturally occur alongside
> the substitution).
>
> Therefore it is true that we, from the 1p, are related to all computations,
>

We are not related to all computations, only to the infinite set of
computations going through our current computational state.


> in an uncomputable way, but also from the 3p we are related to all
> computations, in an uncomputable way, unless we fix the 3p to be purely
> computational (which won't help us much in the experiental/physical world,
> since here there are no seperable computations).
> Saying "yes" does, by the way, not entail that we do that, since our 3p
> identification may shift, or be noncomputational, regardless whether we
> expect to survive a substitution (your step 8 leading to the conlusion just
> works if we assume materialism, which we don't have to do).
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> What you call Plantonia, I would simply call the virtual realm, or
> >> the dream
> >> realm (avoiding mathematical connotations).
> >
> > By Platonia I don't mean anymore than the set of true proposition of
> > arithmetic.
> > With mechanism, we need only a tiny effective (computer generable)
> > part of it, which correspond to the UD's work.
> If we talk of Platonia, we take a mathematical 3p view, but I am talking
> about 1p experience here, that's why calling it Platonia would be
> misleading.
>
> Sure, we can take the 3p view that the experience comes out of Platonia, or
> comes out of Symbolia (the set of all possible strings) or comes out of
> "O"-tonia (the abstract realm of the letter O) but either way we are then
> not talking about the 1p point of view, the realm of experience, which I
> was
> talking about.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> There are probably also infinite layers of virtuality (advanced
> >> dreamers of
> >> the far [potential] future may have heavily nested dreams - dreaming
> >> to have
> >> dreamt to have dreamt ... to have awoken to have awoken and then
> >> awaking).
> >> Ultimately reality in the metaphysical sense encompasses both
> >> "virtual" and
> >> "real".
> >
> > "real" is an indexical. It is just virtual seen from inside. From
> > "God"'s view, those have the same nature, although the sharable dreams
> > are more persistent, and can relate to very deep (necessary long)
> > computations.
> I agree, I am just calling the more sharable dreams "real" and the less
> sharable ones "virtual", in accordance with the every day usage of "real".
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>> You are reintroducing a suspect reality selection principle, similar
> >>> to the "wave collapse".
> >> The wave collapse is undoubtably real as a subjective phenomenon, I
> >> am not
> >> saying virtuality is objective.
> >> It is just a way to order experience. A virtual experience is one
> >> from which
> >> you awake into a more coherent one (without having to die). Virtual
> >> experience just start out of nowhere, but they also can be
> >> (relatively)
> >> started from normal reality.
> >
> > ? (not clear for me, sorry).
> The last sentence? I mean that a certain "virtual" experience may be
> already
> be experienced right now, but we can relatively start it by leaving our
> usual reality, experience the "virtual" experience and going back. This may
> be felt as entering (thus "starting" the experience) and leaving.
> It's like we didn't make a computer game, but we can start to play it.
>
> benjayk
> --
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