2011/11/17 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> Actually mechanism as such seems to me to be just a > >> metaphor, even though it may be trivially true if every computation > >> [can] > >> belong to every experience, which appears to be true to me (since > >> experiences are inseperably connected as one movement of > >> consciousness). > > > > ? > We always survive from the 1p of view, regardless how we are substituted > (this is also a result of COMP as far as I am aware of). > The question is, how do we personally feel to survive, and this question > has > no mechanistically determineable answer (as 1p experience is not > computable). > > The question whether my ego self survives can also not be mechanistically > determined, since it depends on what we identitify the local ego with and > this question cannot be mechanistically determined (as it is a matter of > taste or opinion). If I identify my ego with the computation 1+1=2, then I > can survive in your pocket calculator,
o_O ?? > if I identify with some vague > particular form of experience, we can't say whether I will survive, because > my identification is too vague for that (I may still say "Yes, doctor", > just > hoping that some noncomputational component will naturally occur alongside > the substitution). > > Therefore it is true that we, from the 1p, are related to all computations, > We are not related to all computations, only to the infinite set of computations going through our current computational state. > in an uncomputable way, but also from the 3p we are related to all > computations, in an uncomputable way, unless we fix the 3p to be purely > computational (which won't help us much in the experiental/physical world, > since here there are no seperable computations). > Saying "yes" does, by the way, not entail that we do that, since our 3p > identification may shift, or be noncomputational, regardless whether we > expect to survive a substitution (your step 8 leading to the conlusion just > works if we assume materialism, which we don't have to do). > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> What you call Plantonia, I would simply call the virtual realm, or > >> the dream > >> realm (avoiding mathematical connotations). > > > > By Platonia I don't mean anymore than the set of true proposition of > > arithmetic. > > With mechanism, we need only a tiny effective (computer generable) > > part of it, which correspond to the UD's work. > If we talk of Platonia, we take a mathematical 3p view, but I am talking > about 1p experience here, that's why calling it Platonia would be > misleading. > > Sure, we can take the 3p view that the experience comes out of Platonia, or > comes out of Symbolia (the set of all possible strings) or comes out of > "O"-tonia (the abstract realm of the letter O) but either way we are then > not talking about the 1p point of view, the realm of experience, which I > was > talking about. > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> There are probably also infinite layers of virtuality (advanced > >> dreamers of > >> the far [potential] future may have heavily nested dreams - dreaming > >> to have > >> dreamt to have dreamt ... to have awoken to have awoken and then > >> awaking). > >> Ultimately reality in the metaphysical sense encompasses both > >> "virtual" and > >> "real". > > > > "real" is an indexical. It is just virtual seen from inside. From > > "God"'s view, those have the same nature, although the sharable dreams > > are more persistent, and can relate to very deep (necessary long) > > computations. > I agree, I am just calling the more sharable dreams "real" and the less > sharable ones "virtual", in accordance with the every day usage of "real". > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> > >>> You are reintroducing a suspect reality selection principle, similar > >>> to the "wave collapse". > >> The wave collapse is undoubtably real as a subjective phenomenon, I > >> am not > >> saying virtuality is objective. > >> It is just a way to order experience. A virtual experience is one > >> from which > >> you awake into a more coherent one (without having to die). Virtual > >> experience just start out of nowhere, but they also can be > >> (relatively) > >> started from normal reality. > > > > ? (not clear for me, sorry). > The last sentence? I mean that a certain "virtual" experience may be > already > be experienced right now, but we can relatively start it by leaving our > usual reality, experience the "virtual" experience and going back. This may > be felt as entering (thus "starting" the experience) and leaving. > It's like we didn't make a computer game, but we can start to play it. > > benjayk > -- > View this message in context: > http://old.nabble.com/The-consciousness-singularity-tp32803353p32863888.html > Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.