On 17 Nov 2011, at 19:27, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Actually mechanism as such seems to me to be just a
metaphor, even though it may be trivially true if every computation
[can]
belong to every experience, which appears to be true to me (since
experiences are inseperably connected as one movement of
consciousness).

?
We always survive from the 1p of view, regardless how we are substituted
(this is also a result of COMP as far as I am aware of).
The question is, how do we personally feel to survive, and this question has
no mechanistically determineable answer (as 1p experience is not
computable).

OK. (with a favorable interpretation of the ambiguities)




The question whether my ego self survives can also not be mechanistically determined, since it depends on what we identitify the local ego with and this question cannot be mechanistically determined (as it is a matter of
taste or opinion).


But in the "yes doctor" we talk of surviving in the mundane sense. Your subjective life remains as intact as after any mundane medical operation, or lighter. The point here is that your consciousness remains unchanged, except for some waiting times, and possible anesthesia.





If I identify my ego with the computation 1+1=2,

May be your higher self can do that, but I doubt that your ego could. Usually the ego is the one having your memory and your particular life. Or you are talking about some highly non trivial computation of 1+1=2, with dummy subroutines generating your computational states in passing? A computation is not defined by its result, but by its sequences of relative states.



then I
can survive in your pocket calculator, if I identify with some vague
particular form of experience, we can't say whether I will survive, because my identification is too vague for that (I may still say "Yes, doctor", just hoping that some noncomputational component will naturally occur alongside
the substitution).

But this is no more saying yes *qua computatio*.




Therefore it is true that we, from the 1p, are related to all computations,
in an uncomputable way,

OK. But that indeterminacy concerns my immediate future instant. Like in "I am in Brussels and will be cut and paste in W and M, and I cannot be sure if I will feel to be in M or to be in W. As Quentin said, this is determined by the computation going through the relevant state of my (generalized) brain. The goal here is to formulate the mind body problem *in* the framework of the mechanist hypothesis.



but also from the 3p we are related to all
computations, in an uncomputable way, unless we fix the 3p to be purely computational (which won't help us much in the experiental/physical world,
since here there are no seperable computations).

That's too much unclear, sorry.


Saying "yes" does, by the way, not entail that we do that, since our 3p identification may shift, or be noncomputational, regardless whether we expect to survive a substitution (your step 8 leading to the conlusion just
works if we assume materialism, which we don't have to do).

?

The step 8 assume materialism and mechanism and leads to an absurdity. It is just an argument showing the following equivalent proposition:

mechanism --> not materialism
materialism --> not mechanism
(not mechanism) or (not materialism)
not (mechanism and materialism)

With materialism = weak materialism (the doctrine that there is primary matter (and that it has a relationship with consciousness: I use usually a weak form of Occam razor here).



Bruno Marchal wrote:

What you call Plantonia, I would simply call the virtual realm, or
the dream
realm (avoiding mathematical connotations).

By Platonia I don't mean anymore than the set of true proposition of
arithmetic.
With mechanism, we need only a tiny effective (computer generable)
part of it, which correspond to the UD's work.
If we talk of Platonia, we take a mathematical 3p view, but I am talking
about 1p experience here, that's why calling it Platonia would be
misleading.

Sure, we can take the 3p view that the experience comes out of Platonia, or comes out of Symbolia (the set of all possible strings) or comes out of "O"-tonia (the abstract realm of the letter O) but either way we are then not talking about the 1p point of view, the realm of experience, which I was
talking about.

OK, but that's my point. You should not have identify Platonia or the Virtual with the dream realm. The dream realm, including the sharable "physical" dreams, is something emerging from the point of view of the numbers + their (platonic, and defined by addition and multiplication) relations with each others.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

There are probably also infinite layers of virtuality (advanced
dreamers of
the far [potential] future may have heavily nested dreams - dreaming
to have
dreamt to have dreamt ... to have awoken to have awoken and then
awaking).


We are in that potential future, with a probability 0, 99999... = 1 - epsilon. This is a direct corollary of the invariance of the first person experience for the UD steps' delays.





Ultimately reality in the metaphysical sense encompasses both
"virtual" and
"real".

"real" is an indexical. It is just virtual seen from inside. From
"God"'s view, those have the same nature, although the sharable dreams
are more persistent, and can relate to very deep (necessary long)
computations.
I agree, I am just calling the more sharable dreams "real" and the less sharable ones "virtual", in accordance with the every day usage of "real".


Bruno Marchal wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

You are reintroducing a suspect reality selection principle, similar
to the "wave collapse".
The wave collapse is undoubtably real as a subjective phenomenon, I
am not
saying virtuality is objective.
It is just a way to order experience. A virtual experience is one
from which
you awake into a more coherent one (without having to die). Virtual
experience just start out of nowhere, but they also can be
(relatively)
started from normal reality.

? (not clear for me, sorry).
The last sentence? I mean that a certain "virtual" experience may be already be experienced right now, but we can relatively start it by leaving our
usual reality, experience the "virtual" experience and going back.

Ah OK. But comp is the idea that all experiences are virtual (and processed locally by the brain (itself a limit projection in the UD*). But with comp, and I guess with your theory, but not usually with materialism, the brain is more a filter of consciousness/reality than a creator or producer of consciousness/reality.



This may
be felt as entering (thus "starting" the experience) and leaving.
It's like we didn't make a computer game, but we can start to play it.

OK.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to