I think Evan Harris Walker makes the same point in The Physics of
Consciousness (a book that provides a very clear explanation of Bell's
theorem, though his speculations on the brain appear egregiously
wrong). I don't think though that the point you're making here is
quite the same as mine however. I will have to follow up the measure
theory mentioned by Bruno below to see how this apparent problem
actually isn't one.
You mention the Born rule. He was my great grandfather as it happens
but I didn't know there was a Born rule...
On Nov 19, 1:18 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 11/18/2011 6:02 PM, Pierz wrote:
> > So if there are infinite pathways where I turn into a giraffe, as
> > there must be, there is no way for my 1-p experience to select
> > probabilistically among these pathways. I can no longer say, if the
> > set of calculation pathways is infinite, that giraffe transformation
> > occurs in, say .000000001% of them, or 5%, or 99% of them.
> > This is not a problem for an Everett -type multiverse, in which the
> > universes are bound together by consistent physical laws which allow
> > one to speak of a proportion of universes in which event x occurs.
> I think you make good points. But it is also a problem for an Everett
> multiverse. If the
> Born rule says that two possible results are equally probable we may suppose
> the universe
> splits two, each with weight 1/2. But if the Born rule says that there are
> two possible
> results with probability 1/pi and (1-1/pi) are we to imagine an infinite
> number of each in
> the appropriate ratio? Or do we imagine that there are just two, but somehow
> they are
> marked with "weights"?
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