Dear Bruno,

I've been following the list for a couple of months now and I sort of share
Piertz worries about randomness. Here is a summary of what I've understood
this far.

The UDA might imply lots of white rabbits but only those computations with
self-reference to have to be taken into account. In principle this
restriction might reduce the number of white rabbits to a reasonable
probability (compatible with QM). But whether this is the case remains to
be proved. Is this understanding correct?

I mean that if from UDA we get that the probability of me being converted
to a giraffe is let's say 50%. then UDA is false. Self-reference might
reduce this probability to 0.000000000001%, but we don't know whether this
is the case yet. Correct? Do you have an intuition of why this should be
the case?

Ricardo
El nov 19, 2011 9:49 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" <marc...@ulb.ac.be> escribió:

>
> On 19 Nov 2011, at 03:02, Pierz wrote:
>
>  In a previous post I launched a kamizake assault on UDA which was
>> justly cut to shreds on the basis of a number of misunderstandings on
>> my part, perhaps most crucially my conflation of information and
>> computation. I claimed that the UD cannot be distinguished from the
>> set of all possible information states and therefore from an infinite
>> field of static, within which all possible realities can be found,
>> none of which, however, have the slightest coherence. I also
>> mistakenly used the word 'random' to describe this bit field, which of
>> course is wrong. I should instead have used the word 'incoherent'.
>> Bruno and others quickly put me straight on these errors.
>>
>> I am still troubled however by the suspicion that UDA, by explaining
>> 'everything' (except itself - there is always that lacuna in any
>> explanatory framework) also explains nothing.
>>
>
> The UD is not proposed as an explanation per se. On the contrary UDA shows
> that it is a problem we met when we assume that the brain (or generalized
> brain) is Turing emulable.
>
>
>
>
>
>  Because the UD executes
>> every computation, it cannot explain why certain computations (say
>> Schroedinger's equation, or those of general relativity) are preferred
>> within our presenting reality.
>>
>
> That is basically my critics of Schmidhuber I have made on this list.
>
> I'm afraid that you miss the role of the first person indeterminacy.
> I will add explanation here asap. You have to follow UDA step by step: it
> is a proof (in the theory "mechanism"), so to refute UDA you have to say
> where it goes wrong. I insist: UDA is a problem, not a solution. Indeed it
> is a subproblem of the mind-body problem in the mechanist theory.
> AUDA will be the solution, or the embryo of the solution.
>
>
>
>
>
>  This very universality also insulates
>> it against disproof, since although it allows everything we see, it is
>> hard to conceive of something it would disallow.
>>
>
> Not at all. A priori it predicts everything *at once*. That is the "white
> rabbit problem".  We don't see white rabbits, or everything at once, so
> mechanism seems to be disproved by UDA. The point will be that such a quick
> disprove does not work, and when we do the math we see mechanism is not yet
> disproved, but that it predicts or explain the quantum weirdness.
>
>
>
>  David Deutsch's idea
>> of a good explanation is one that closely matches the structure of the
>> thing it describes, allowing for little variation. The vast variation
>> in the possible worlds where UDA could be invoked makes it a bad
>> explanation, in those terms.
>>
>
> You have just not (yet) understood the role of the 1/3 person pov
> distinction in the reasoning. UDA shows that physics is determined by a
> relative measure on computations. If this leads to predict that electron
> weight one ton then mechanism is disproved. UDA shows that physics is
> entirely reduce to computer science/number theory in a very specific and
> unique way (modulo a variation on the arithmetical definition of knowledge).
>
>
>
>
>> Of course the objection that nobody has yet found an application for
>> UDA, a concrete example of its usefulness, is more of an objection to
>> it as a scientific theory than a philosophical one.
>>
>
>
> UDA is a proof. Unless wrong, it is done. Asking for the use of the UDA is
> like asking for the use of the theorem saying that no numbers n and m are
> such that (n/m)^2 = 2.
> UDA shows a fact to be true and that we have to live with it. UDA shows
> that mechanism and materialism are (epistemologically) incompatible.
>
>
>
>  Still, I believe
>> there is an argument against it at the philosophical level. The UDA
>> invokes the notion of probability in relation to 1-p states on the
>> basis of the "infinite union of all finite portions of the UD in which
>> correct emulation occurs". Thus the indeterminacy of 1-p experience is
>> a function of the distribution of states within the observer’s
>> consistent histories. For instance, there’s a 20% chance of x
>> happening, if it happens within 20% of my consistent histories. Please
>> Bruno correct me if this is a misunderstanding.
>>
>
> No, here I mainly agree with you.
>
>
>
>
>> Now we know from QT there is a finite, if absurdly remote, probability
>> of my turning into a giraffe in the next minute. So the UD, if not to
>> contradict science as it stands, must allow this too. And indeed there
>> is no reason for it not to, since there must be computational pathways
>> that lead from human to giraffe - a sort of deep version of the
>> morphing algorithms used in CGI - or a simple arbitrary transform. In
>> fact there must be infinite such pathways leading to slight variations
>> on the giraffe theme, as well as to all other animals, inanimate
>> objects and so on - okay let’s leave out the inanimate objects since
>> they possess no consciousness as far as we know, therefore no 1-p
>> experience.
>>
>> Of course, these pathways are an extreme minority compared to the ones
>> in which I retain my present form, behaving as we would expect on the
>> basis of the past.
>>
>
> "Of course"?
> No, what UDA shows is that it is not obvious, and that computer science
> can show it false, and so refute mechanism. But the math shows that such a
> refutation, if it exists, is not trivial at all, and the logic of
> self-reference shows that we are led to absurdities, not contradiction
> (yet), and the absurdities are quite similar to the quantum weirdness that
> we can "observe" (non locality, indeterminacy, many worlds/dreams/states,
> symmetry at the bottom, etc.)
>
>
>
>  But here’s where I see the problem. In a
>> mathematical platonia we cannot make such a statement. The notion of
>> probability within an infinite set is untenable.
>>
>
> On the contrary. Probability calculus and measure theory have been
> invented to put measure on infinite spaces.
>
>
>
>
>  It is analogous to
>> expecting that a number selected at random from the set of natural
>> numbers is more likely to be divisible by 2 than by, say, a million.
>> This is only the case of the set is ordered to appear this way, eg
>> 1,2,3,4... If we write the set thusly: 1, 1 million, 2 million, 3
>> million, 2, 4 million, 5  million, 6 million, 3, 7 million.... etc
>> then our expectation breaks down.
>>
>
> You can use the usual Lebesgue measure on the real.
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/**Lebesgue_measure<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebesgue_measure>
>
> Think about the repeated self-duplication. It shows that self-duplication
> is a Bernouilli experience, so that in the limit (which define the
> uncertainty domain for the first person experience), we can use the usual
> normal distribution based on e^(- x^2) with the normalisation factor.
>
>
>
>
>
>> So if there are infinite pathways where I turn into a giraffe, as
>> there must be, there is no way for my 1-p experience to select
>> probabilistically among these pathways. I can no longer say, if the
>> set of calculation pathways is infinite, that giraffe transformation
>> occurs in, say .000000001% of them, or 5%, or 99% of them.
>>
>
> Yes, you can. The problem is that the UD does not just iterate
> self-multiplication (random noise), but it mixes it in a highly non trivial
> way with infinitely many computations.
>
>
>
>
>> This is not a problem for an Everett -type multiverse, in which the
>> universes are bound together by consistent physical laws which allow
>> one to speak of a proportion of universes in which event x occurs.
>> However, in a mathematical platonia where all possible calculations
>> occur, and nothing outside of them, there can be no such ordering
>> principle.
>>
>
> If the Everett idea works, and is the solution, (which has not yet been
> completely proved) then the UDA conclusion is that the Everett simultion in
> the UD wins the "measure battle", and we HAVE to justify this from computer
> science alone.
>
> It would mean that the quantum computation are statistically more frequent
> than the non quantum computations. But this must be shown, or we miss the
> explanation of the origin of the physical laws, together with the
> distinction quanta/qualia that digital mechanism already explained (by the
> Solovay split between truth and proof).
>
>
>
>
>> I believe this same principle can be used to show that the
>> calculations of the UD must be disorderly. Consider some calculation c
>> which employs number n. In the UD there will also be a calculation
>> which instead uses the number n+1, another which uses n+2 etc. There
>> will also be calculations in which the ordering of the natural numbers
>> is rearranged in arbitrary ways such as my example above. Instead of
>> using simple n, the calculation will employ someFunction(n), where
>> someFunction() transforms the number as per my example, i.e. (in
>> pseudocode):
>>
>> if n modulo 4 = 0
>>        return n
>> else
>>        return (n-1) * 1,000,000
>>
>> Thus the UD cannot rely even on the ordering of natural numbers to
>> ‘prefer’ certain calculations, since the set of variants such as the
>> above will be infinite, and overwhelm calculations involving simple n.
>>
>
> This shows that the extraction of physics from numbers is not an easy
> task, but again, you have to take into account the non triviality of the 1
> and 3 pov relation, and of computer science and mathematical self-reference
> (G, G*, S4Grz, etc.) Then the shadows of why quanta and qualia already
> appear.
>
> Recently Eric Vandenbush (a guy who solved the first open problem in my
> thesis) has found an explanation why the UD leads necessarily to complex
> numbers for the measure problem (that's new! but I have yet to be entirely
> convinced).
>
> Pierz, I insist that the UD is not proposed as a solution, but as a
> problem for DM. It is shown to be  an unavoidable problem we have to solve
> if we keep digital mechanism in cognitive science. I am open that it will
> lead to a refutation of mechanism, but the contraidiction has not yet
> appear, and on the contrary, what we get is a similar "many-world" problem
> that the physicists encounter too. This confirms Digital Mechanism (DM)
> instead of refuting it. UDA just transforms the mind body problem into a
> mathematical body appearances problem.
>
> Bruno
>
> PS have you see that edot has become enet? I will come back on the UDA
> there too! Here is the link:
> http://www.entheogen-network.**com/forums/<http://www.entheogen-network.com/forums/>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/>
>
>
>
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