On 11/20/2011 2:56 PM, Johnathan Corgan wrote:
Quoting Bruno Marchal:
"UDA shows that physics is determined by a relative measure on
computations. If this leads to predict that electron weight one ton
then mechanism is disproved. UDA shows that physics is entirely reduce
to computer science/number theory in a very specific and unique way
(modulo a variation on the arithmetical definition of knowledge)."
Bruno--could you please elaborate on this? It's a claim you've
(credibly) made many times, and it would be useful to go the next
I understand that the UDA argument and first-person indeterminacy
demonstrates that there are an infinite number of paths through the
execution of the UDA that may result in the present 1-pov experience.
Since physics, when described from a 1-pov, is merely (!) the
explanation of the regularities in those 1-povs, it should be possible
to mathematically translate from "computational steps of the UDA" to
"laws of physics."
One of the best-confirmed formulations of physics has been quantum
mechanics. And indeed, as far as I can tell, QM does not contradict
your theory--but how would QM "emerge" from your more fundamental
notions of computationalism and mechanism?
Is this the forefront of your theory, or has work been done to reduce
the explanatory gap between, say, modal logics and the Schrodinger
Let me ask this in a very different way. Suppose you had at your
disposal the a fixed but large amount of funding and researchers to
pursue a reformulation of QM based on the work you've done so far.
How would you organize the effort? What would you prioritize first?
What sub-portions of your theory would be amenable to be parceled out
as individual problems to go off and solve?
No pressure :-)
I would like to add that the most important aspect of QM is the
non-distributivity of the logic involved. This translates to the
nonexistence of a unique partition of observables into a unique set of
mutually commuting quantities over (or on) the set of all possible
observables. What I would like to know, other than the answer to
Johnathan's question, is how do we bridge the gap between computations,
which by UDA seems arbitrarily composable and thus distributive, to the
non-distributive property of QM. If QM emerges from computations,
exactly how does this happen?
It can easily be shown that there will always be distributive
subsets on the set of observables as the set of Abelian (commutative)
von Neumann algebras... But to see things this way points against the
idea that we can derive QM from computations and toward the idea that we
can derive computations from QM. In other words, while physics does nto
seem to be derivable from number theory, we need number theory to do
physics. Why work so hard try to derive all from computations when we
obviously need both the numbers and the "stuff" to do physics. As I see
it, a duality of sorts between matter and mind is inevitable. The hard
part is getting people to see the error of the assumption of substance
What I see in your result is an argument against the notion of
"fundamental substance" not against the material world per se.
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