Bruno Marchal wrote:
> So uploading is not necessarily superfluous. It is vein if the  
> abstract goal is "immortality", but full of sense if the goal consists  
> in seeing the next soccer cup and your brain is too much ill to do it  
> 'naturally'.
But as soon as we upload ourselves, we can't make sure we uniquely interact
with our usual physical reality, since an uploaded digital mind could also
be part of a lot of dreamy realities (/simulations/virtual words) - except
if we assume materialism, which postulates there is an objective physical
wold (in which case we have no computational reason to suspect substitutions
will work, we would have to rely on blind faith).
Our brain avoids that by being a structure with a quite unique
instantiation, and a quite clear subjective dividing barrier to virtual
realities (I am not a/ in a computer).

That's why I don't buy COMP: As soon as we substitute ourselves, we will
inevitably change our subjective relative environment, making the
substitution fail. If we are a computer, we can subjectively interface much
more strongly with all the computers that our computational instantiation is
(could be) a part of and interfere with all the simulations that are hard to
dinstinguish from what goes on "your" computer. It's harder to dinstinguish
yourself from other simulated selfes than from other biological selves,
because of the natural biological barriers that we have, that computers
lack. And we can't assume we are able to find the right world we would like
to be in, without subjectively developing a brain (which will make the
substitution seem to never have happened).
We can only say YES if we assume there is no self-referential loop between
my instantiation and my environment (my instantiation influences what world
I am in, the world I am in influences my instantiation, etc...). But we
really have to assume such a loop exists if we are already part of the
matrix (since everything in the matrix is connected).
It matters how "our" computations are instantiated because of subjective
OK, we could say YES based on the faith that subjective self-reference will
develop a world for the digital brain that is similar to the old world
(though that seems very unlikely to me), but this is not YES qua computatio.


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