Bruno Marchal wrote: > > So uploading is not necessarily superfluous. It is vein if the > abstract goal is "immortality", but full of sense if the goal consists > in seeing the next soccer cup and your brain is too much ill to do it > 'naturally'. But as soon as we upload ourselves, we can't make sure we uniquely interact with our usual physical reality, since an uploaded digital mind could also be part of a lot of dreamy realities (/simulations/virtual words) - except if we assume materialism, which postulates there is an objective physical wold (in which case we have no computational reason to suspect substitutions will work, we would have to rely on blind faith). Our brain avoids that by being a structure with a quite unique instantiation, and a quite clear subjective dividing barrier to virtual realities (I am not a/ in a computer).
That's why I don't buy COMP: As soon as we substitute ourselves, we will inevitably change our subjective relative environment, making the substitution fail. If we are a computer, we can subjectively interface much more strongly with all the computers that our computational instantiation is (could be) a part of and interfere with all the simulations that are hard to dinstinguish from what goes on "your" computer. It's harder to dinstinguish yourself from other simulated selfes than from other biological selves, because of the natural biological barriers that we have, that computers lack. And we can't assume we are able to find the right world we would like to be in, without subjectively developing a brain (which will make the substitution seem to never have happened). We can only say YES if we assume there is no self-referential loop between my instantiation and my environment (my instantiation influences what world I am in, the world I am in influences my instantiation, etc...). But we really have to assume such a loop exists if we are already part of the matrix (since everything in the matrix is connected). It matters how "our" computations are instantiated because of subjective self-reference. OK, we could say YES based on the faith that subjective self-reference will develop a world for the digital brain that is similar to the old world (though that seems very unlikely to me), but this is not YES qua computatio. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/The-consciousness-singularity-tp32803353p32876158.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.