On Dec 1, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>> I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.
> >> If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
> >> life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
> > So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I
> > have no
> > doubt that this is true.
> OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning
> our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi
> operational way by the "yes doctor" thought experiment. Most people
> understand that they can survive with an artificial heart, for
> example, and with comp, the brain is not a privileged organ with
> respect to such a possible substitution.

This is the first problem. It's not that the brain has to be
privileged to make it impossible to simulate, no organ can be
simulated, it's just that it is possible to simulate some of the
functions of an organ to the extent that the person as a whole, i.e.
the inhabitant(s) of the brain, can't tell the difference.

The brain is a totally. different. story. First of all, you could have
a crowbar poking through your skull and not know it if the parts of
your brain that related to that awareness (and the pain thereof) were
damaged, so subjective accounts of success are not reliable. Secondly,
objective accounts are also unreliable owing to the privacy of
subjectivity. Finally, the brain being our only source of experience
at all, cannot be compared to anything else in the cosmos. No person
has ever existed outside of a brain as far as we know, so we cannot
presume that the brain itself or a person can be simulated. It simply
may not work that way at all. A person may be a continuity of
unreproducible material + semantic happenstance which builds upon
itself cumulatively and idiopathically.

We might be our brain and our brain may be much more than it appears
to us from the outside or the inside, but there is nothing to suggest
that there is a such thing as an arithmetic essence which is
independent of physics and is deterministic. It is only through our
brain-grounded subjectivity that we believe there is any such thing as
pattern or arithmetic. It's just one way that we make sense of our

> > It is also not an abstract
> > digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a
> > biological being
> > is physical and "spiritual" (meaning related to subjective conscious
> > experience beyond physicality and computability).
> But all universal machine have a link with something beyond
> physicality and computability. Truth about computability is beyond the
> computable. So your point is not valid.

Just because computational truth is rooted in non-comp doesn't mean
that it is the same non-comp as organic subjectivity.

> > Neither
> > can they be derived from it.
> Physicality can be derived. And has to be derived (by UDA). Both
> quanta and qualia.

I don't think qualia can be derived. I don't think a digital machine
can know the difference between visual qualia and aural qualia if they
yield the same functionality.

> Only the "geography" cannot be derived, but the
> physical laws can. You might elaborate why you think they can't.

Physical laws are a posteriori analytical abstractions based on our
shared experiences of concrete physical events. The laws in themselves
have no existence or power to physically bring anything into
existence. If I understand how gold is different from lead, that does
not give me the power to turn one into the other just be thinking
about it. You have to physically make the change.

> >> In the reasoning we use the fact that you are told in advance. That
> >> you cannot see the difference is the comp assumption.
> > Ah, OK. If you can't notice you are being substituted the very
> > statement
> > that you are being substituted is meaningless.
> Why? I can say yes to the doctor, and tell him that it seems that the
> artificial brain is 100% OK, because I don't notice the difference,
> and then he can show me a scan of my skull, and I can see the
> evidences for the artificial brain. So I can believe that I have
> perfectly survived with that digital brain.

If you have no memory, then you can't notice the difference. It
doesn't mean you have survived perfectly.

> > Unfortunately then we could as well base
> > the argument on "1+1=3" or "there are pink unicorn in my room even
> > though I
> > don't notice them", so it's worthless.
> This does not follow. We do have biological evidence that the brain is
> a Turing emulable entity. It is deducible from other independent
> hypothesis (like the idea that QM is (even just approximately)
> correct, for example).
> You don't seem to realize, a bit like Craig, that to define a non-comp
> object, you need to do some hard work.

No, it's only hard work because you are thinking about it the wrong
way. It's actually very easy, as hinted at by the simplicity of how it
is defined in the words natural languages 'I' 'Me' 'You', vous, tu,
je, etc.. All that has to be done is to realize that it is subjects
which are definable as non-comp, not objects. Only the concrete
realiism of subjective orientation is primary, genuine, and authentic.
All other epistemological conditions and computations are second order
frames of reference which cannot substitute for the subject.

> > I studied your proof. Of course your proof works if you assume the
> > conclusion at the start
> In that case the proof does not work, of course. I don't put the
> conclusion in the hypothesis, or show me where. Show me the precise
> line which makes you feeling so.

It's not your reasoning that is faulty, it's your initial assumptions.

> > I guess I will abandon the discussion, if in the next post you also
> > don't
> > bother to respond to anything essential I said.
> Let us try to agree on what is it that we disagree on. I see only that
> you are skeptical on comp, which is not a problem, (I am too). Indeed
> the whole point of the reasoning consists in showing that comp is
> refutable. My goal is to show that we can reason in that fundamental
> domain.

If you seek to refute comp using logic derived from comp, ie
linguistic-arithmetic sensibility then you are using evolved post-
limbic sense to address pre-limbic realism. It doesn't work because
comp is a manipulation of feeling through the abstraction of non-
feeling. To refute comp we have only to observe that we can tell a
qualitative difference between a cybernetic system and a human being,
between voluntary and involuntary impulses, concrete objects and
imaginary ideas. If comp were true, we would have to change our
bedsheets every night because we wouldn't know not to use the dream
bathroom. No part of us would be able to learn the difference.

> > Apparently you are
> > dogmatically insisting that everyone that criticizes your argument
> > doesn't
> > understand it and is wrong, and therefore you don't actually have to
> > inspect
> > what they are saying.
> On the contrary, I answer all objection of all kind.

I agree his objection is valid. You do indeed answer objections but
you insist that we come into your reality tunnel and challenge you
there. I give you a lot of credit for being much more willing to
consider other points of view than most, but you aren't very obliging
as far as being willing to translate your understanding into other,
more common-sense terms.

> I do not impose
> any view. But if the proof is not valid, you have to say at which line
> it becomes invalid.

It's invalid already because it frames the epistemological value in
literal, logical terms exclusively when the subject matter extends
specifically beyond that into notions of subjectivity itself. It is a
black and white TV that says 'all color seen on this TV is black and
white'. It's sleight of hand that takes color for granted a prioi so
that if I say, 'but I'm watching color on my TV', then you reply 'well
you don't have to believe in monochrome TV, and I respect that.'


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