On 01 Dec 2011, at 20:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 1, 10:39 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 29 Nov 2011, at 18:44, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:

I only say that I do not have a perspective of being a computer.

If you can add and multiply, or if you can play the Conway game of
life, then you can understand that you are at least a computer.
So, then I am computer or something more capable than a computer? I
have no
doubt that this is true.

OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning
our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi
operational way by the "yes doctor" thought experiment. Most people
understand that they can survive with an artificial heart, for
example, and with comp, the brain is not a privileged organ with
respect to such a possible substitution.

This is the first problem. It's not that the brain has to be
privileged to make it impossible to simulate, no organ can be
simulated, it's just that it is possible to simulate some of the
functions of an organ to the extent that the person as a whole, i.e.
the inhabitant(s) of the brain, can't tell the difference.

That is your hypothesis. OK.




The brain is a totally. different. story. First of all, you could have
a crowbar poking through your skull and not know it if the parts of
your brain that related to that awareness (and the pain thereof) were
damaged, so subjective accounts of success are not reliable.

OK. (I insist often on this. It is provable assuming comp, but if you want assume this in your non-comp theory, it is OK).



Secondly,
objective accounts are also unreliable owing to the privacy of
subjectivity.

I agree.




Finally, the brain being our only source of experience
at all, cannot be compared to anything else in the cosmos.

That is the neuro hypohesis. I don't need it, or trivialize it with the notion of 'generalized' brain (the portion of the physical reality which need to be simulated for keeping may consciousness unchanged locally).




No person
has ever existed outside of a brain as far as we know, so we cannot
presume that the brain itself or a person can be simulated.

I never presume. I assume. It is my working hypothesis.




It simply
may not work that way at all.

Sure. But this can be said for any hypothesis (hypothesis = theory).



A person may be a continuity of
unreproducible material + semantic happenstance which builds upon
itself cumulatively and idiopathically.

That is a speculation. That is possible, even in the comp theory.




We might be our brain

You contradict an old statement you made to me, according to which we own a brain (and are not a brain).




and our brain may be much more than it appears
to us from the outside or the inside, but there is nothing to suggest
that there is a such thing as an arithmetic essence which is
independent of physics and is deterministic.

What is an arithmetic essence? I avoid essence.





It is only through our
brain-grounded subjectivity that we believe there is any such thing as
pattern or arithmetic. It's just one way that we make sense of our
world.

OK.
With comp, the contrary is true. It is our arithmetic-grounded subjectivity which makes us believe there is such thing as space, matter, brain, etc.






It is also not an abstract
digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a
biological being
is physical and "spiritual" (meaning related to subjective conscious
experience beyond physicality and computability).

But all universal machine have a link with something beyond
physicality and computability. Truth about computability is beyond the
computable. So your point is not valid.

Just because computational truth is rooted in non-comp doesn't mean
that it is the same non-comp as organic subjectivity.

What is organic subjectivity, and why would that be non-comp?
Here it seems to me that Statis has convincingly explains that adding a non-comp element in matter does not help. I gave other reason (comp makes matter itself non-comp).






Neither
can they be derived from it.

Physicality can be derived. And has to be derived (by UDA). Both
quanta and qualia.

I don't think qualia can be derived. I don't think a digital machine
can know the difference between visual qualia and aural qualia if they
yield the same functionality.

You assert and reassert your non-comp hypothesis.
Are you believing that comp is false?
I don't care. I am not interested in debate on what is true or false. It is not my job.




Only the "geography" cannot be derived, but the
physical laws can. You might elaborate why you think they can't.

Physical laws are a posteriori analytical abstractions based on our
shared experiences of concrete physical events.

With comp, the notion of concrete physical event is vague, and relative.
With non-comp, I don't know, given that you have not given a sufficiently precise theory in which I could make sense of word like "concrete".



The laws in themselves
have no existence or power to physically bring anything into
existence. If I understand how gold is different from lead, that does
not give me the power to turn one into the other just be thinking
about it. You have to physically make the change.


I don't assume a primitive physical reality.





In the reasoning we use the fact that you are told in advance. That
you cannot see the difference is the comp assumption.
Ah, OK. If you can't notice you are being substituted the very
statement
that you are being substituted is meaningless.

Why? I can say yes to the doctor, and tell him that it seems that the
artificial brain is 100% OK, because I don't notice the difference,
and then he can show me a scan of my skull, and I can see the
evidences for the artificial brain. So I can believe that I have
perfectly survived with that digital brain.

If you have no memory, then you can't notice the difference. It
doesn't mean you have survived perfectly.

Not in that thought experience.





Unfortunately then we could as well base
the argument on "1+1=3" or "there are pink unicorn in my room even
though I
don't notice them", so it's worthless.

This does not follow. We do have biological evidence that the brain is
a Turing emulable entity. It is deducible from other independent
hypothesis (like the idea that QM is (even just approximately)
correct, for example).
You don't seem to realize, a bit like Craig, that to define a non- comp
object, you need to do some hard work.

No, it's only hard work because you are thinking about it the wrong
way. It's actually very easy, as hinted at by the simplicity of how it
is defined in the words natural languages 'I' 'Me' 'You', vous, tu,
je, etc..

?



All that has to be done is to realize that it is subjects
which are definable as non-comp, not objects.

Why non-comp? Non material perhaps, but why non-comp. You just reassert your non-comp hypothesis, without ever presenting the no-comp notion, with an arguent that they are non-comp. It looks like you are begging the question (something you did a lot in your replies to Stathis).



Only the concrete
realiism of subjective orientation is primary, genuine, and authentic.

Do you assume this?




All other epistemological conditions and computations are second order
frames of reference which cannot substitute for the subject.

The subject is non-comp, in the comp theory. No need to assume this.






I studied your proof. Of course your proof works if you assume the
conclusion at the start

In that case the proof does not work, of course. I don't put the
conclusion in the hypothesis, or show me where. Show me the precise
line which makes you feeling so.

It's not your reasoning that is faulty, it's your initial assumptions.

You talk like if you have a refutation of comp. We have yet to see it, without question begging.






I guess I will abandon the discussion, if in the next post you also
don't
bother to respond to anything essential I said.

Let us try to agree on what is it that we disagree on. I see only that
you are skeptical on comp, which is not a problem, (I am too). Indeed
the whole point of the reasoning consists in showing that comp is
refutable. My goal is to show that we can reason in that fundamental
domain.

If you seek to refute comp using logic derived from comp, ie
linguistic-arithmetic sensibility then you are using evolved post-
limbic sense to address pre-limbic realism. It doesn't work because
comp is a manipulation of feeling through the abstraction of non-
feeling.

Dennett explains why you cannot assume intelligence to explain intelligence, like I think that we cannot assume matter to explain matter. Explaining anything X cannot assume X.



To refute comp we have only to observe that we can tell a
qualitative difference between a cybernetic system and a human being,
between voluntary and involuntary impulses, concrete objects and
imaginary ideas.

This is the object of the discussion with Stathis. Sorry but I think Stathis win on this.



If comp were true, we would have to change our
bedsheets every night because we wouldn't know not to use the dream
bathroom. No part of us would be able to learn the difference.

?





Apparently you are
dogmatically insisting that everyone that criticizes your argument
doesn't
understand it and is wrong, and therefore you don't actually have to
inspect
what they are saying.

On the contrary, I answer all objection of all kind.

I agree his objection is valid. You do indeed answer objections but
you insist that we come into your reality tunnel and challenge you
there.

Yes, that how we do in science. I am not pretending that my theory is true. you are the one pretending it is false. So the proof is up to you. But instead, you assume at the start that comp is false. So you are just telling me that comp is false, that you stop at step zero. It is your right.





I give you a lot of credit for being much more willing to
consider other points of view than most, but you aren't very obliging
as far as being willing to translate your understanding into other,
more common-sense terms.

? You might give specific example.





I do not impose
any view. But if the proof is not valid, you have to say at which line
it becomes invalid.

It's invalid already because it frames the epistemological value in
literal, logical terms exclusively when the subject matter extends
specifically beyond that into notions of subjectivity itself.

That's unfair, given that this is precisely shown to be true for machine.



It is a
black and white TV that says 'all color seen on this TV is black and
white'. It's sleight of hand that takes color for granted a prioi so
that if I say, 'but I'm watching color on my TV', then you reply 'well
you don't have to believe in monochrome TV, and I respect that.'

Your analogy makes sense ... if we assume non-comp.

I think you are just asserting that comp is false, without ever trying to explain why you think so. You oppose me as if I was saying that comp is true, but I don't. I certainly find it plausible, and the interest of comp is that it leads to precise statement which can be tested. My point is logical: comp gives a scientific (refutable) theology.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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