On Dec 2, 6:58 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
> >> OK. And comp assumes that we are not more than a computer, concerning
> >> our abilities to think, etc. This is what is captured in a quasi
> >> operational way by the "yes doctor" thought experiment. Most people
> >> understand that they can survive with an artificial heart, for
> >> example, and with comp, the brain is not a privileged organ with
> >> respect to such a possible substitution.
>
> > This is the first problem. It's not that the brain has to be
> > privileged to make it impossible to simulate, no organ can be
> > simulated, it's just that it is possible to simulate some of the
> > functions of an organ to the extent that the person as a whole, i.e.
> > the inhabitant(s) of the brain, can't tell the difference.
>
> That is your hypothesis. OK.

But do you have any ideas about why it might be valid or not?

>
> > Finally, the brain being our only source of experience
> > at all, cannot be compared to anything else in the cosmos.
>
> That is the neuro hypohesis. I don't need it, or trivialize it with
> the notion of 'generalized' brain (the portion of the physical reality
> which need to be simulated for keeping may consciousness unchanged
> locally).

I don't think it's a hypothesis though. The brain IS our only known
source of experience. We can change our experience by changing our
brain and vice versa. The same cannot be said for anything else in the
universe, can it? Not saying for sure that our experience could not
some day be exported to another medium (although of course I think
that medium would need to be isomorphic in substance to a high degree)
just that as far as we know now, the brain is incomparable as far as
we are concerned.

>
> > No person
> > has ever existed outside of a brain as far as we know, so we cannot
> > presume that the brain itself or a person can be simulated.
>
> I never presume. I assume. It is my working hypothesis.
>
> > It simply
> > may not work that way at all.
>
> Sure. But this can be said for any hypothesis (hypothesis = theory).
>
> > A person may be a continuity of
> > unreproducible material + semantic happenstance which builds upon
> > itself cumulatively and idiopathically.
>
> That is a speculation. That is possible, even in the comp theory.

Comp is speculation too. The question is whether it makes sense or
whether there are any specific objections from the start.

>
>
>
> > We might be our brain
>
> You contradict an old statement you made to me, according to which we
> own a brain (and are not a brain).

You're right. I am of two minds about it, hah. No, I do still think
that we own a brain just as we own our lives and both our lives (and
maybe our brain and our lives own us too), I'm just opening it up so
that if we want to say that we are our brain, we have no objective
reason why it isn't so.

The interior is the ontological opposite of the exterior so it isn't
appropriate to say that we literally are the brain as the brain looks
to us from the outside, but figuratively we are the interior of our
brain, body, you could even say home or family. We are our capacity to
influence and be influenced by our world, and the brain is the gateway
to that world. I say figuratively in the sense of multisense realism
though - as a concrete realism equal to that of the exterior, just
expressed as semantic entanglement through time rather than object
relations across space.

>
> > and our brain may be much more than it appears
> > to us from the outside or the inside, but there is nothing to suggest
> > that there is a such thing as an arithmetic essence which is
> > independent of physics and is deterministic.
>
> What is an arithmetic essence? I avoid essence.

Ok, what do you want to call it? Computation? What is the identity of
a UM made of?

>
> > It is only through our
> > brain-grounded subjectivity that we believe there is any such thing as
> > pattern or arithmetic. It's just one way that we make sense of our
> > world.
>
> OK.
> With comp, the contrary is true. It is our arithmetic-grounded
> subjectivity which makes us believe there is such thing as space,
> matter, brain, etc.

Right, but we know for a fact that changes to our brain can impact our
pattern recognition capacity. We don't know of anything that is for
sure grounded in arithmetic alone as a disembodied entity. Does comp
explain why all arithmetic subjects would always appear to be
associated with physical systems to other arithmetic subjects? To
suggest that arithmetic can simulate physics is one thing, but why
does it *have to* generate physics?

>
>
>
> >>> It is also not an abstract
> >>> digital computer (even according to COMP it isn't) since a
> >>> biological being
> >>> is physical and "spiritual" (meaning related to subjective conscious
> >>> experience beyond physicality and computability).
>
> >> But all universal machine have a link with something beyond
> >> physicality and computability. Truth about computability is beyond
> >> the
> >> computable. So your point is not valid.
>
> > Just because computational truth is rooted in non-comp doesn't mean
> > that it is the same non-comp as organic subjectivity.
>
> What is organic subjectivity, and why would that be non-comp?
> Here it seems to me that Statis has convincingly explains that adding
> a non-comp element in matter does not help. I gave other reason (comp
> makes matter itself non-comp).

Organic subjectivity would be subjectivity which arises organically
through organic matter. I'm not adding a non-comp element in 'matter',
I'm suggesting that matter and subjectivity share a common sense which
is both comp and non-comp.

>
>
>
> >>> Neither
> >>> can they be derived from it.
>
> >> Physicality can be derived. And has to be derived (by UDA). Both
> >> quanta and qualia.
>
> > I don't think qualia can be derived. I don't think a digital machine
> > can know the difference between visual qualia and aural qualia if they
> > yield the same functionality.
>
> You assert and reassert your non-comp hypothesis.
> Are you believing that comp is false?
> I don't care. I am not interested in debate on what is true or false.
> It is not my job.

You don't care what is true or false? Then what is your hypothesis
about? Science fiction? I reassert my hypothesis because I am looking
for someone to give me a valid reason why it isn't true. I do care,
and it is my job.

>
>
>
> >> Only the "geography" cannot be derived, but the
> >> physical laws can. You might elaborate why you think they can't.
>
> > Physical laws are a posteriori analytical abstractions based on our
> > shared experiences of concrete physical events.
>
> With comp, the notion of concrete physical event is vague, and relative.
> With non-comp, I don't know, given that you have not given a
> sufficiently precise theory in which I could make sense of word like
> "concrete".

Concrete is an event which can actually be experienced directly and
locally, rather than an abstract cognitive event, the local content of
which points to a hypothetical distal experience. We know that the
abstract can arise from the concrete but we have no reason at all to
imagine that anything concrete has arisen from pure abstraction.

>
> > The laws in themselves
> > have no existence or power to physically bring anything into
> > existence. If I understand how gold is different from lead, that does
> > not give me the power to turn one into the other just be thinking
> > about it. You have to physically make the change.
>
> I don't assume a primitive physical reality.

But you assume a primitive capacity for physics within arithmetic, so
what's the difference? If the arithmetic primitive never does anything
without a physical manifestation (as far as we are concerned), why not
just say that the physics and arithmetic and non-comp are the same
thing ultimately and call the primitive 'sense'? That's what I do.

>
>
>
> >>>> In the reasoning we use the fact that you are told in advance. That
> >>>> you cannot see the difference is the comp assumption.
> >>> Ah, OK. If you can't notice you are being substituted the very
> >>> statement
> >>> that you are being substituted is meaningless.
>
> >> Why? I can say yes to the doctor, and tell him that it seems that the
> >> artificial brain is 100% OK, because I don't notice the difference,
> >> and then he can show me a scan of my skull, and I can see the
> >> evidences for the artificial brain. So I can believe that I have
> >> perfectly survived with that digital brain.
>
> > If you have no memory, then you can't notice the difference. It
> > doesn't mean you have survived perfectly.
>
> Not in that thought experience.
>
>
>
> >>> Unfortunately then we could as well base
> >>> the argument on "1+1=3" or "there are pink unicorn in my room even
> >>> though I
> >>> don't notice them", so it's worthless.
>
> >> This does not follow. We do have biological evidence that the brain
> >> is
> >> a Turing emulable entity. It is deducible from other independent
> >> hypothesis (like the idea that QM is (even just approximately)
> >> correct, for example).
> >> You don't seem to realize, a bit like Craig, that to define a non-
> >> comp
> >> object, you need to do some hard work.
>
> > No, it's only hard work because you are thinking about it the wrong
> > way. It's actually very easy, as hinted at by the simplicity of how it
> > is defined in the words natural languages 'I' 'Me' 'You', vous, tu,
> > je, etc..
>
> ?
>
> > All that has to be done is to realize that it is subjects
> > which are definable as non-comp, not objects.
>
> Why non-comp? Non material perhaps, but why non-comp. You just
> reassert your non-comp hypothesis, without ever presenting the no-comp
> notion, with an arguent that they are non-comp. It looks like you are
> begging the question (something you did a lot in your replies to
> Stathis).

If subjectivity were comp, we would be only conscious of computation
at all times. There would be no need for pretty designs or abstraction
layers, it would just be functional code. What would be the point of
subjectivity in a comp universe? The non-comp notion is perception and
significance. Sensorimotive entanglement. Life being different from
death. Blue being different from green. These cannot be justified with
comp.

>
> > Only the concrete
> > realiism of subjective orientation is primary, genuine, and authentic.
>
> Do you assume this?

I try not to assume, I observe.

>
> > All other epistemological conditions and computations are second order
> > frames of reference which cannot substitute for the subject.
>
> The subject is non-comp, in the comp theory. No need to assume this.

Why not operate in reality instead of an inverted-reality theory?

>
>
>
> >>> I studied your proof. Of course your proof works if you assume the
> >>> conclusion at the start
>
> >> In that case the proof does not work, of course. I don't put the
> >> conclusion in the hypothesis, or show me where. Show me the precise
> >> line which makes you feeling so.
>
> > It's not your reasoning that is faulty, it's your initial assumptions.
>
> You talk like if you have a refutation of comp. We have yet to see it,
> without question begging.

I am the refutation of comp. I am doing no computation. I am sitting
at my desk. My universe is utterly devoid of computation at the
moment. If comp is true, then it must be explained how and why it
simulates the absence of itself, and what does it fill that void with?
Where does it get the colors I see?

>
>
>
> >>> I guess I will abandon the discussion, if in the next post you also
> >>> don't
> >>> bother to respond to anything essential I said.
>
> >> Let us try to agree on what is it that we disagree on. I see only
> >> that
> >> you are skeptical on comp, which is not a problem, (I am too). Indeed
> >> the whole point of the reasoning consists in showing that comp is
> >> refutable. My goal is to show that we can reason in that fundamental
> >> domain.
>
> > If you seek to refute comp using logic derived from comp, ie
> > linguistic-arithmetic sensibility then you are using evolved post-
> > limbic sense to address pre-limbic realism. It doesn't work because
> > comp is a manipulation of feeling through the abstraction of non-
> > feeling.
>
> Dennett explains why you cannot assume intelligence to explain
> intelligence, like I think that we cannot assume matter to explain
> matter. Explaining anything X cannot assume X.

Right. That's why I say the idea of a logical refutation of comp is a
already an assumption of logic.

>
> > To refute comp we have only to observe that we can tell a
> > qualitative difference between a cybernetic system and a human being,
> > between voluntary and involuntary impulses, concrete objects and
> > imaginary ideas.
>
> This is the object of the discussion with Stathis. Sorry but I think
> Stathis win on this.

Don't be sorry, I don't care about opinions at all. Let me know if you
have a reason that Stathis argument is valid though. Are you saying
that we can't tell the difference between voluntary and involuntary
impulses?

>
> > If comp were true, we would have to change our
> > bedsheets every night because we wouldn't know not to use the dream
> > bathroom. No part of us would be able to learn the difference.
>
> ?

If comp were true, we should not wake up in the middle of the night to
pee, we should just pee while we continue our dream. There should be
no way that our body could find us to wake us up.

>
>
>
> >>> Apparently you are
> >>> dogmatically insisting that everyone that criticizes your argument
> >>> doesn't
> >>> understand it and is wrong, and therefore you don't actually have to
> >>> inspect
> >>> what they are saying.
>
> >> On the contrary, I answer all objection of all kind.
>
> > I agree his objection is valid. You do indeed answer objections but
> > you insist that we come into your reality tunnel and challenge you
> > there.
>
> Yes, that how we do in science. I am not pretending that my theory is
> true.
> you are the one pretending it is false.

I'm not pretending anything, I'm just saying that I think my
hypothesis makes more sense, therefore yours is less true since they
cover the same territory.

>So the proof is up to you. But
> instead, you assume at the start that comp is false. So you are just
> telling me that comp is false, that you stop at step zero. It is your
> right.

Why is it my right if comp were true?

>
> > I give you a lot of credit for being much more willing to
> > consider other points of view than most, but you aren't very obliging
> > as far as being willing to translate your understanding into other,
> > more common-sense terms.
>
> ? You might give specific example.

You refer back to your own work as the sole source material without
trying to adapt it to a common sense context. I guess you are only
interested in theory though so it doesn't matter. I only care about
reality so that is why we are at opposite ends of the continuum.

>
>
>
> >> I do not impose
> >> any view. But if the proof is not valid, you have to say at which
> >> line
> >> it becomes invalid.
>
> > It's invalid already because it frames the epistemological value in
> > literal, logical terms exclusively when the subject matter extends
> > specifically beyond that into notions of subjectivity itself.
>
> That's unfair, given that this is precisely shown to be true for
> machine.

That it is true for machines shows that machines are unconscious, not
that subjectivity arises from machines.

>
> > It is a
> > black and white TV that says 'all color seen on this TV is black and
> > white'. It's sleight of hand that takes color for granted a prioi so
> > that if I say, 'but I'm watching color on my TV', then you reply 'well
> > you don't have to believe in monochrome TV, and I respect that.'
>
> Your analogy makes sense ... if we assume non-comp.
>
> I think you are just asserting that comp is false, without ever trying
> to explain why you think so.

I explain why I think so over and over again. I experience no
computation unless I am counting. That must be explained. All qualia
and subjectivity is superfluous and redundant to functionalism and
mechanism. I give example after example, models, metaphors. It's
common sense. Pain is not a number. Blue is not a number. Even if you
can claim that it has a distant arithmetic cause, so what? Why turn it
into a non-arithmetic effect. Or if you just expand computation and
arithmetic to say that it includes everything, then why call it
computation at all? Call it sense or order or pattern or phenomena or
something.

> You oppose me as if I was saying that
> comp is true, but I don't. I certainly find it plausible, and the
> interest of comp is that it leads to precise statement which can be
> tested. My point is logical: comp gives a scientific (refutable)
> theology.

I agree with you. Comp does give a scientific theology, I'm just
pointing out that it is precisely wrong if you are trying to explain
reality. It's almost exactly right, but it is upside down if you want
to really make sense of the biggest big picture we can see.

Craig

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