2011/12/5 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>

>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they will
> >>>> never
> >>>> be.
> >>>
> >>> That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
> >>>
> >> No. Correctly functioning means "good enough to be working", not
> >> perfect.
> >
> > Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
> > Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
> No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit
> your
> conlusion.
> Wikipedia says "A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses discrete
> (discontinuous) values.". That does not mean that digital system has no
> other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may
> matter in the substitution.
> COMP does not say they can't matter.
>

It does by definition. The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.

>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> Digital means based on discrete values, not only consisting of
> >> discrete
> >> values (otherwise there could be no digital computers, since they
> >> rely on
> >> non-discrete functioning of their parts).
> >
> > In which theory. The assumptions are neutral on physics. Here, you are
> > not, so i suspect you work in some non defined theory.
> What? We have to rely on some basic agreement of what the words used in the
> argument mean, and this happens to be the agreement we use in our language
> (digital means based on discrete values). This has little to do with a
> specific theory.
> If we don't presuppose any physics (even not in a practical sense), we
> can't
> substitute a physical object (our brain), since "physical object" is
> undefined, so COMP is meaningless, and in this case this is not a question
> of lack of faith in the possbility of a correct substitution.
> So if you want to eliminate any practical notion of physics in the
> argumentation, you invalidate the COMP assumption, because it would state a
> totally undefined thing (substituting a physical object).
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> A digital
> >> computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct
> >> substitution is
> >> one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.
> >
> > You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to
> > me.
> I am splitting the hair if I am pointing out the most essential flaw in the
> argument?
> I don't miss the notion of level. Correct substitution level means working
> substitution level, nowhere does it say it works perfectly.


If there is a substitution level, then it is perfect by definition of
substitution level. If it is not perfect, either it is not the correct
substitution level or there are none.


> Indeed it can't
> work perfectly, as we all plainly observe in the physical world, no device
> works perfectly.
> You misrepresent the notion of level that is defined in the argument with
> your imagination of what a level is supposed to be (the right level is the
> perfect instantiation of the right turing emulable states).
>
> It seems you just get defensive because you realize your argument doesn't
> work. I see that it is important for you, but if you want to be honest,
> that
> is no good reason to ignore criticism.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> And if you do
> >> remain relatively invariant, it is only because you choose to define
> >> yourself in a way that you are still yourself after a certain change
> >> in
> >> experience, but that is just a matter of opinion, and it means that
> >> is just
> >> a matter of opinion whether you survive a substitution - but then we
> >> can
> >> only conclude that we may survive no substitution (if we don't
> >> believe YES
> >> doctor) or we survive every substitution (!) or something inbetween
> >> - a
> >> pretty weak conclusion.
> >
> > You are playing with words. Sorry, but I get that feeling. Comp would
> > have no sense if you were true here, and that contradict other
> > statement you made. you still are unclear if you criticize comp, or
> > the validity of the reasoning. You seem a bit wanting to be negative.
> I am just being honest. My criticism can be conceived of a criticism of
> comp
> or your reasoning, because I argue that either comp is false or the
> reasoning.
>

His argument is not about comp validity but about the fact that you can't
have computationalism true *and* materialism true. Both notion are
incompatible. He does not says comp is true.


> So it might be that your reasoning cannot directly be shown false, if you
> insist that COMP is meaningless.
> You seem to do that above, as you want to eliminate all notions of
> physicality, but then we can't substitute a physical brain anymore, so COMP
> becomes meaningless.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Also: How does your reasoning show that we can't survive every
> >> substitution?
> >
> > Nowhere the reasoning shows that. On the contrary, I have very often
> > presented the conclusion partially by saying: if you can survive (in
> > the usual clinical sense) with a concrete digital brain, then you will
> > survive no matter what.
> OK. Then your argument refutes COMP. If I survive every substitution, there
> can be no correct substitution level, and no non-abitrary description of my
> parts. All levels would be correct and all descriptions correct, but that
> is
> not only absurd, but also makes it impossible to choose the correct one.
> But if COMP is false, your conclusion does not follow, obviously.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> but only *if done in the correct non-computational way*,
> >
> > And that would just contradict directly the comp *assumption*. You are
> > (again) shifting from a theory to another.
> No. COMP does not state that only the computations matter. The doctor also
> has to make the right artificial body, and you can't assume that only the
> abstract computations involved matter in that.
> If, for example, you substitute the brain with an artificial brain doing
> the
> right computations, but too slowly, the patient won't survive as he used
> to.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> And since we know that the brain has do to
> >> with emotions, is unreasonable that it strictly follows laws
> >> (including
> >> comptutational laws).
> >
> > At all levels? Then comp is false.
> No. We can still say YES because we believe that an approximate
> substitution
> will still work.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Unfortunately we live in a world of dogmatic scientism, materialism
> >> and
> >> rationalism (but also in a world of irrationality and superstition and
> >> dogmatic religion) and that's the only reason that many people
> >> assume those
> >> things.
> >
> > Assuming clear hypothesis is good, if only to be shown wrong by nature
> > or by peer reviewers. You seem to argue against science. (As you often
> > did some time ago).
> I am not against assuming these things as hypothesis, I am against not
> taking any other possibility into account.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> It is even more obvious in step 3: "The description
> >>>> encoded at Brussels after the reading-cutting process is just the
> >>>> description of a state of some
> >>>> Turing machine, giving  that we assume comp. So its description
> >>>> can be
> >>>> duplicated, and  the
> >>>> experiencer  can be  reconstituted  simultaneously  at two different
> >>>> places,  for  example
> >>>> Washington and Moscow". This assumes we work precisely like an
> >>>> abstract
> >>>> turing machine,
> >>>
> >>> Like a concrete Turing machine.
> >> But a concrete Turing machine does not work like an abstract turing
> >> machine.
> >
> > It does. if that was not the case, the notion of substitution level
> > would have no sense.
> Your argument is very clever. "My conclusion is true, because the notion
> used in the assumption can make no sense other than the way I need it to be
> to make the argument true". Prove that a substitution level makes no sense
> if a concrete machine does not work like a turing machine.
> Sure, the substitution level can not be absolute in that case, but that is
> not required for the argument.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> but the computer is not
> >> (and does not work) the same as the model. You confuse an actual thing
> >
> > Such a notion need a theory, which you have not given.
> You don't precisely define all your notions in your argumentation as well
> (define "faith" or "doctor" or "I" or "what I consider myself to be").
> If your argument were valid, your argumentation would fail at the start.
>
> This is just a bullshit argument. We can never precisely define everything
> used in an argument. If you define everything in terms of numbers (I doubt
> you can do that, but anyway), you will be unable to give a definition of
> numbers (or 0), and according to your argument, all your argumentation
> would
> be invalid.
> It is enough that we can agree on the basic meaning of the terms, and it
> shouldn't be too hard to *conceive* (only that is required) of a difference
> of model and actuality.
>
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >>
> >>
> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>
> >>> 1) Exact computational states or slightly changed one, after the
> >>> recovering, are not relevant for the issue, and this is made clear at
> >>> step seven, given that the robust universe running the concrete UD
> >>> just goes through all those computational states, in all histories.
> >>> The relevant points are only the first person indeterminacy, and its
> >>> many invariance for some third person changes.
> >> Step 7 does not even adress the issue that I am pointing at.
> >> You write "With  comp, when  we  are  in  the  state  of  going  to
> >> drop
> >> the  pen, we  are  in  a  Turing emulable  state. ". That's simply
> >> not the
> >> assumption.
> >
> > ?
> Well, where in the assumption is that statement made?
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> COMP just says that a substitution with an (actual) computer can
> >> work, not that the substitution works due to us being in a turing
> >> emulable
> >> state -
> >
> > Of course it is. That is why I use often the expression "qua
> > computatio". It means I survive in virtue of the fact that the
> > relevant computation is physically implemented.
> But the assumption does not say that this is the only requirement.
> Obviously
> is also has to be *correctly* implemented.
> Also, COMP does simply not state we are in a turing emulable state, it just
> states that there is exists a description of my level that, if correctly
> implemented, gives an acceptable result. Even if we take that description
> to
> mean a description in terms of a "computational state", COMP doesn't say we
> are in that state, just that we can be described by being in that state.
> Just as a sky can be described to be cloudy, but the sky is prefectly
> described by us stating that it is "cloudy".
> You confuse description with state, apparently.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> it doesn't say why exactly the substition works (beyond being
> >> functionally correct). We can say YES because we are emulable
> >> enough, *even
> >> though* we are not in a precisely emulable state.
> >
> > We are exactly emulable at the substitution level.
> Prove that, or show where in the COMP assumption this is stated.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> You can't presuppose that a substitution can only work if we are
> >> precisely
> >> determined through a computational state.
> >
> > Of course.
> You can presume this, but then your reasoning is dependent on this
> additional assumption. COMP does not make it. Or show it.
> You still haven't studied your assumption ;).
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> You plainly miss all alternative conclusion that are not your
> >> conclusion or
> >> commonly given alternatives.
> >
> > Which one (saving materialism)?
> Immaterialist-"computations *can* be valid descriptions"ism.
> We can be Immaterialist-"non-computationalist" and still be
> computationalist
> in the sense of COMP (agreeing that our brain can be digitally
> substituted).
> In this case we state that our brain can be described in terms of
> computations, and this description can be used to build a computer to
> substitute our brain, but our experience is not only related to the
> computations going on, but also to the way it is instantiated.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> I am just not arguing at all for what
> >> your argument(s) seeks to refute.
> >
> > I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
> > *believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable that
> > those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you feel
> > like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say so.
> The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
> I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from comp,
> they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and over
> again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you don't
> make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can matter)
> and
> then saying it is equivalent to COMP.
>
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> (things are made of spatially defined and non-fuzzy
> >> stuff, like bricks or something).
> >
> > Weak materialism is the statement that primitive matter exists
> > ontologically. It might be fuzzy, non local, even magical, etc.
> If it is like that, what is the difference to immaterialism?
> You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes nothing
> magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
> supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically related).
>
> benjayk
> --
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