Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> 2011/12/5 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >>>
>> >>>> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they will
>> >>>> never
>> >>>> be.
>> >>>
>> >>> That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
>> >>>
>> >> No. Correctly functioning means "good enough to be working", not
>> >> perfect.
>> >
>> > Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
>> > Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
>> No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit
>> your
>> conlusion.
>> Wikipedia says "A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses
>> discrete
>> (discontinuous) values.". That does not mean that digital system has no
>> other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may
>> matter in the substitution.
>> COMP does not say they can't matter.
> It does by definition.
Definition of what? Correct substitution level? It just says that there is a
working substitution level. It does not say it has to work perfectly, or
that only the right choice of the substitution level matters (indeed,
obviously it matter whether it is instantiated correctly).

Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>  The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
> fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
interact with the environment, it will be useless (because the computations
are too slow to use the input and give useful output). And the brain/body of
us interacts with the environment per definition of what a brain/body is.
Or, if your computer runs the expected computations, but fails 99,999%
percent of the time, it is also of no use. 
Or if your computer runs the expected computations, but doesn't correctly
transform analog and digital values. Say, for example you give it a sound
"Woooshhh..." that is represented as data XYZ and then is transformed by the
computation C which gives the digital output ABC, which is sent to your
screen, it will be useless.
We always need input/output, otherwise our brain can't interact with its
environment, making it useless.

COMP does not say only the digitalness matters. It says digital
substitution, but it does not say that only the digitalness of the
substitution matters. As said, digital means using discrete values, not
something were everything else but its discrete values does not matter (what
ever that would even mean, since we can't even absolutely differentiate
between discrete values and their physical anolog instantiation).
Also, we assume that doctor correctly implements the computations, and in
that implementation it may matter if his implementations takes care of the
non-computational aspect of the implementation.

If we take COMP to mean only the discrete values and their computations can
matter, then we already state the conlusion, since discrete values and their
computations are not physical, but abstract notions, so materialism (and
non-platonic-immaterialism) are excluded at the beginning.
But in this case the doctor can not possibly make a mistake (since the
physical instantiation can't matter, and so can't be wrong), but this means
that it doesn't matter at all what is being substituted and how.
That is a reductio ad absurdum of this interpretation of COMP, since it
obviously does matter whether we substitute our brain with a peanut or a
working device.

I don't get why it is not valid to show that the assumption is absurd to
refute the reasoning. You can't say "assuming [the latter form of] COMP" if
that assumption is absurd (well, you can but then your reasoning is as

Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >
>> >> A digital
>> >> computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct
>> >> substitution is
>> >> one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.
>> >
>> > You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to
>> > me.
>> I am splitting the hair if I am pointing out the most essential flaw in
>> the
>> argument?
>> I don't miss the notion of level. Correct substitution level means
>> working
>> substitution level, nowhere does it say it works perfectly.
> If there is a substitution level, then it is perfect by definition of
> substitution level. If it is not perfect, either it is not the correct
> substitution level or there are none.
Nowhere in COMP is substitution level defined as a level that works
perfectly. It works good enough for us to subjectively stay the same person.

If you insist COMP means there is a perfect substitution level, we get the
same problem as above (perfect substitution is not possible physically -
just according to the COMP conclusion -, so we can't substitute correctly,
or any abitrary substitution has no effect, which is absurd) and even if a
perfect substitution level existed, it would have to be correctly
implemented, which may include a non-computational aspect.

Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > You are playing with words. Sorry, but I get that feeling. Comp would
>> > have no sense if you were true here, and that contradict other
>> > statement you made. you still are unclear if you criticize comp, or
>> > the validity of the reasoning. You seem a bit wanting to be negative.
>> I am just being honest. My criticism can be conceived of a criticism of
>> comp
>> or your reasoning, because I argue that either comp is false or the
>> reasoning.
> His argument is not about comp validity but about the fact that you can't
> have computationalism true *and* materialism true. Both notion are
> incompatible. He does not says comp is true.
I know that. That's why I say his reasoning is invalid (in case we interpret
COMP as a meaningful assumption), *or* COMP is necessarily false (as shown
by the reductio ad absurdum above).
The only reason I include the latter option is that a reasoning that reasons
from an incoherent assumption is also practically not valid, since you can
"correctly" derive everything from an incohrent assumption.

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