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That's not the point... if we are turing emulable *then* it exists a *perfect* level of substitution *or* we are not turing emulable. The fact that an imperfect chosen level would work does not change the fact that *if* we are turing emulable *then* there is a *perfect* level of substitution. 2011/12/6 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> > > > 2011/12/6 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> > >> >> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: >> > >> > 2011/12/5 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >>> >> >> >>>> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they >> will >> >> >>>> never >> >> >>>> be. >> >> >>> >> >> >>> That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption. >> >> >>> >> >> >> No. Correctly functioning means "good enough to be working", not >> >> >> perfect. >> >> > >> >> > Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital. >> >> > Either you miss something or you are playing with words. >> >> No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit >> >> your >> >> conlusion. >> >> Wikipedia says "A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses >> >> discrete >> >> (discontinuous) values.". That does not mean that digital system has no >> >> other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may >> >> matter in the substitution. >> >> COMP does not say they can't matter. >> >> >> > >> > It does by definition. >> > >> Definition of what? Correct substitution level? > > > If you are turing emulable *then* there exists a *perfect* substitution > level *or* the premice "you are turing emulable" is false. > > >> It just says that there is a >> working substitution level. It does not say it has to work perfectly, or >> that only the right choice of the substitution level matters (indeed, >> obviously it matter whether it is instantiated correctly). >> >> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: >> > >> > The only thing that matter is digitalness... the >> > fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter. >> > >> It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that >> interact with the environment > > > This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with the > "simulated" brain, you *must* run at the same level. That does not preclude > that the simulated brain can be run on any level, only interaction with you > require a specific level... your level. > > >> , it will be useless (because the computations >> are too slow to use the input and give useful output). And the brain/body >> of >> us interacts with the environment per definition of what a brain/body is. >> Or, if your computer runs the expected computations, but fails 99,999% >> percent of the time, it is also of no use. >> Or if your computer runs the expected computations, but doesn't correctly >> transform analog and digital values. Say, for example you give it a sound >> "Woooshhh..." that is represented as data XYZ and then is transformed by >> the >> computation C which gives the digital output ABC, which is sent to your >> screen, it will be useless. >> We always need input/output, otherwise our brain can't interact with its >> environment, making it useless. >> >> COMP does not say only the digitalness matters. > > > Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be > run/simulated on a digital computer. > > > >> It says digital >> substitution, but it does not say that only the digitalness of the >> substitution matters. As said, digital means using discrete values, not >> something were everything else but its discrete values does not matter >> (what >> ever that would even mean, since we can't even absolutely differentiate >> between discrete values and their physical anolog instantiation). >> Also, we assume that doctor correctly implements the computations, and in >> that implementation it may matter if his implementations takes care of the >> non-computational aspect of the implementation. >> >> If we take COMP to mean only the discrete values and their computations >> can >> matter, then we already state the conlusion, since discrete values and >> their >> computations are not physical, but abstract notions, so materialism (and >> non-platonic-immaterialism) are excluded at the beginning. >> But in this case the doctor can not possibly make a mistake (since the >> physical instantiation can't matter, and so can't be wrong), but this >> means >> that it doesn't matter at all what is being substituted and how. >> That is a reductio ad absurdum of this interpretation of COMP, since it >> obviously does matter whether we substitute our brain with a peanut or a >> working device. >> >> I don't get why it is not valid to show that the assumption is absurd to >> refute the reasoning. You can't say "assuming [the latter form of] COMP" >> if >> that assumption is absurd (well, you can but then your reasoning is as >> absurd). >> >> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: >> > >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> > >> >> >> A digital >> >> >> computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct >> >> >> substitution is >> >> >> one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly. >> >> > >> >> > You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to >> >> > me. >> >> I am splitting the hair if I am pointing out the most essential flaw in >> >> the >> >> argument? >> >> I don't miss the notion of level. Correct substitution level means >> >> working >> >> substitution level, nowhere does it say it works perfectly. >> > >> > If there is a substitution level, then it is perfect by definition of >> > substitution level. If it is not perfect, either it is not the correct >> > substitution level or there are none. >> Nowhere in COMP is substitution level defined as a level that works >> perfectly. It works good enough for us to subjectively stay the same >> person. >> > > That's not the point... if we are turing emulable *then* the exists a > *perfect* level of substitution or we are not turing emulable. The fact > that an imperfect chosen level would work does not change the fact that > *if* we are turing emulable *then* the exists a *perfect* level of > substitution. > >> >> If you insist COMP means there is a perfect substitution level, we get the >> same problem as above (perfect substitution is not possible physically - >> just according to the COMP conclusion -, so we can't substitute correctly, >> or any abitrary substitution has no effect, which is absurd) and even if a >> perfect substitution level existed, it would have to be correctly >> implemented, which may include a non-computational aspect. >> >> >> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote: >> > >> >> > >> >> > You are playing with words. Sorry, but I get that feeling. Comp would >> >> > have no sense if you were true here, and that contradict other >> >> > statement you made. you still are unclear if you criticize comp, or >> >> > the validity of the reasoning. You seem a bit wanting to be negative. >> >> I am just being honest. My criticism can be conceived of a criticism of >> >> comp >> >> or your reasoning, because I argue that either comp is false or the >> >> reasoning. >> >> >> > >> > His argument is not about comp validity but about the fact that you >> can't >> > have computationalism true *and* materialism true. Both notion are >> > incompatible. He does not says comp is true. >> I know that. That's why I say his reasoning is invalid (in case we >> interpret >> COMP as a meaningful assumption), *or* COMP is necessarily false (as shown >> by the reductio ad absurdum above). >> The only reason I include the latter option is that a reasoning that >> reasons >> from an incoherent assumption is also practically not valid, since you can >> "correctly" derive everything from an incohrent assumption. >> >> benjayk >> -- >> View this message in context: >> http://old.nabble.com/The-consciousness-singularity-tp32803353p32923587.html >> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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