# Re: The consciousness singularity

```Sorry for the spelling mistakes, please read:
```
```
That's not the point... if we are turing emulable *then* it exists a
*perfect* level of substitution *or* we are not turing emulable. The fact
that an imperfect chosen level would work does not change the fact that
*if*  we are turing emulable *then* there is a *perfect* level of
substitution.

2011/12/6 Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com>

>
>
> 2011/12/6 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>
>
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2011/12/5 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>>> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they
>> will
>> >> >>>> never
>> >> >>>> be.
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
>> >> >>>
>> >> >> No. Correctly functioning means "good enough to be working", not
>> >> >> perfect.
>> >> >
>> >> > Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
>> >> > Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
>> >> No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they fit
>> >> your
>> >> conlusion.
>> >> Wikipedia says "A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses
>> >> discrete
>> >> (discontinuous) values.". That does not mean that digital system has no
>> >> other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that may
>> >> matter in the substitution.
>> >> COMP does not say they can't matter.
>> >>
>> >
>> > It does by definition.
>> >
>> Definition of what? Correct substitution level?
>
>
> If you are turing emulable *then* there exists a *perfect* substitution
> level *or* the premice "you are turing emulable" is false.
>
>
>> It just says that there is a
>> working substitution level. It does not say it has to work perfectly, or
>> that only the right choice of the substitution level matters (indeed,
>> obviously it matter whether it is instantiated correctly).
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >  The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
>> > fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
>> >
>> It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
>> interact with the environment
>
>
> This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with the
> "simulated" brain, you *must* run at the same level. That does not preclude
> that the simulated brain can be run on any level, only interaction with you
> require a specific level... your level.
>
>
>> , it will be useless (because the computations
>> are too slow to use the input and give useful output). And the brain/body
>> of
>> us interacts with the environment per definition of what a brain/body is.
>> Or, if your computer runs the expected computations, but fails 99,999%
>> percent of the time, it is also of no use.
>> Or if your computer runs the expected computations, but doesn't correctly
>> transform analog and digital values. Say, for example you give it a sound
>> "Woooshhh..." that is represented as data XYZ and then is transformed by
>> the
>> computation C which gives the digital output ABC, which is sent to your
>> screen, it will be useless.
>> We always need input/output, otherwise our brain can't interact with its
>> environment, making it useless.
>>
>> COMP does not say only the digitalness matters.
>
>
> Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
> run/simulated on a digital computer.
>
>
>
>> It says digital
>> substitution, but it does not say that only the digitalness of the
>> substitution matters. As said, digital means using discrete values, not
>> something were everything else but its discrete values does not matter
>> (what
>> ever that would even mean, since we can't even absolutely differentiate
>> between discrete values and their physical anolog instantiation).
>> Also, we assume that doctor correctly implements the computations, and in
>> that implementation it may matter if his implementations takes care of the
>> non-computational aspect of the implementation.
>>
>> If we take COMP to mean only the discrete values and their computations
>> can
>> matter, then we already state the conlusion, since discrete values and
>> their
>> computations are not physical, but abstract notions, so materialism (and
>> non-platonic-immaterialism) are excluded at the beginning.
>> But in this case the doctor can not possibly make a mistake (since the
>> physical instantiation can't matter, and so can't be wrong), but this
>> means
>> that it doesn't matter at all what is being substituted and how.
>> That is a reductio ad absurdum of this interpretation of COMP, since it
>> obviously does matter whether we substitute our brain with a peanut or a
>> working device.
>>
>> I don't get why it is not valid to show that the assumption is absurd to
>> refute the reasoning. You can't say "assuming [the latter form of] COMP"
>> if
>> that assumption is absurd (well, you can but then your reasoning is as
>> absurd).
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >> A digital
>> >> >> computer is not defined to be always working, and a correct
>> >> >> substitution is
>> >> >> one where the computer works good enough, not perfectly.
>> >> >
>> >> > You miss the notion of level, and are splitting the hair, it seems to
>> >> > me.
>> >> I am splitting the hair if I am pointing out the most essential flaw in
>> >> the
>> >> argument?
>> >> I don't miss the notion of level. Correct substitution level means
>> >> working
>> >> substitution level, nowhere does it say it works perfectly.
>> >
>> > If there is a substitution level, then it is perfect by definition of
>> > substitution level. If it is not perfect, either it is not the correct
>> > substitution level or there are none.
>> Nowhere in COMP is substitution level defined as a level that works
>> perfectly. It works good enough for us to subjectively stay the same
>> person.
>>
>
> That's not the point... if we are turing emulable *then* the exists a
> *perfect* level of substitution or we are not turing emulable. The fact
> that an imperfect chosen level would work does not change the fact that
> *if*  we are turing emulable *then* the exists a *perfect* level of
> substitution.
>
>>
>> If you insist COMP means there is a perfect substitution level, we get the
>> same problem as above (perfect substitution is not possible physically -
>> just according to the COMP conclusion -, so we can't substitute correctly,
>> or any abitrary substitution has no effect, which is absurd) and even if a
>> perfect substitution level existed, it would have to be correctly
>> implemented, which may include a non-computational aspect.
>>
>>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> >> >
>> >> > You are playing with words. Sorry, but I get that feeling. Comp would
>> >> > have no sense if you were true here, and that contradict other
>> >> > statement you made. you still are unclear if you criticize comp, or
>> >> > the validity of the reasoning. You seem a bit wanting to be negative.
>> >> I am just being honest. My criticism can be conceived of a criticism of
>> >> comp
>> >> or your reasoning, because I argue that either comp is false or the
>> >> reasoning.
>> >>
>> >
>> > His argument is not about comp validity but about the fact that you
>> can't
>> > have computationalism true *and* materialism true. Both notion are
>> > incompatible. He does not says comp is true.
>> I know that. That's why I say his reasoning is invalid (in case we
>> interpret
>> COMP as a meaningful assumption), *or* COMP is necessarily false (as shown
>> by the reductio ad absurdum above).
>> The only reason I include the latter option is that a reasoning that
>> reasons
>> from an incoherent assumption is also practically not valid, since you can
>> "correctly" derive everything from an incohrent assumption.
>>
>> benjayk
>> --
>> View this message in context:
>> http://old.nabble.com/The-consciousness-singularity-tp32803353p32923587.html
>> Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.
>>
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>
>
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