2011/12/6 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
> On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
>> > fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer doesn't matter.
>> It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball computer that
>> interact with the environment
> This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact with the
> "simulated" brain, you *must* run at the same level. That does not preclude
> that the simulated brain can be run on any level, only interaction with you
> require a specific level... your level.
> A human being is not a closed system. So the "substitution level" for
> Bruno's argument to go thru could include digital simulation of a large
> part of the universe - or maybe all of it.
But if all the universe is needed, then computationalism is certainly false
and that would prevent any conscious AI and even if the argument could
still go through with the whole universe... it seems really like plain old
solipsism in that case.
Also, the argument is not about feasibility of capturing the consciousness
of a living person and puting it in a computer but about the concept and
the compatibility with materialism.
Yes, an environment is needed for consciousness, but I doubt that to
capture an existing consciousness (mind uploading) the level would be more
than neuronal or maybe atomic and hence the environment needed could be
feeded via input/output system without it being explicitely included
(weither the "real" one or a virtual one) in the captured consciousness.
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