On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.

I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable that
those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you feel
like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say so.
The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from comp, they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and over again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you don't make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can matter) and
then saying it is equivalent to COMP.

Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain, and skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a priori. I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only after the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that idea.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

(things are made of spatially defined and non-fuzzy
stuff, like bricks or something).

Weak materialism is the statement that primitive matter exists
ontologically. It might be fuzzy, non local, even magical, etc.
If it is like that, what is the difference to immaterialism?

The main difference is that matter (or physics) single out (or try to single out) one universal system, where comp explains that such a universal physical system has to be justified from a measure, on all computations, invariant for all universal machine points of view, which includes the working of an infinity of universal systems. The other difference is that by extracting physics from a computational measure constrained by the logic of self-reference, we get a natural distinction between qualia and quanta (even if quanta appears as special case of qualia by the first person plural nature of physical histories).

You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes nothing
magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically related).

I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp + sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away with Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is rarely scientifically refutable, nor interesting.



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