Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
> 2011/12/6 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>
>> Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> >
>> > 2011/12/5 benjayk <benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com>
>> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > On 04 Dec 2011, at 16:39, benjayk wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>>> The steps rely on the substitution being "perfect", which they
>> will
>> >> >>>> never
>> >> >>>> be.
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> That would contradict the digital and correct level assumption.
>> >> >>>
>> >> >> No. Correctly functioning means "good enough to be working", not
>> >> >> perfect.
>> >> >
>> >> > Once the level is chosen, it is perfect, by definition of digital.
>> >> > Either you miss something or you are playing with words.
>> >> No, you miss something. You choose to define the words so that they
>> fit
>> >> your
>> >> conlusion.
>> >> Wikipedia says "A digital system[1] is a data technology that uses
>> >> discrete
>> >> (discontinuous) values.". That does not mean that digital system has
>> no
>> >> other relevant parts that don't work with discrete values, and that
>> may
>> >> matter in the substitution.
>> >> COMP does not say they can't matter.
>> >>
>> >
>> > It does by definition.
>> >
>> Definition of what? Correct substitution level?
> If you are turing emulable *then* there exists a *perfect* substitution
> level *or* the premice "you are turing emulable" is false.
There exists no premise "you are turing emulable".
COMP as defined by Bruno in his UDA says that we can be substituted by a
correct digital substitution (let's call that COMP1). That doesn't mean that
we have to be perfectly turing emulable. You can substitute a heart with an
artificial heart, that doesn't mean that the artificial heart works exactly
like the biological heart.
As Bruno, you assume the conlusion additionally to COMP1.

If we assume at the start that we are in a turing emulable state (let's call
it COMP2), we don't have to derive that this means that we can't be material
(and thus the world we are in can't be fully material also), since a turing
emulable state is per definition a state of an abstract machine, not of a
physical system.

But then the reasoning is not deriving anything. At most, it explains the
hypothesis. I am not saying it is not good in this, Brunos steps explain
well what it would mean if we are in a emulable state, but then Brunos
argument is just not what Bruno claims it is (if we say yes to an digital
substitution his conclusion follows).

Quentin Anciaux-2 wrote:
>> , it will be useless (because the computations
>> are too slow to use the input and give useful output). And the brain/body
>> of
>> us interacts with the environment per definition of what a brain/body is.
>> Or, if your computer runs the expected computations, but fails 99,999%
>> percent of the time, it is also of no use.
>> Or if your computer runs the expected computations, but doesn't correctly
>> transform analog and digital values. Say, for example you give it a sound
>> "Woooshhh..." that is represented as data XYZ and then is transformed by
>> the
>> computation C which gives the digital output ABC, which is sent to your
>> screen, it will be useless.
>> We always need input/output, otherwise our brain can't interact with its
>> environment, making it useless.
>> COMP does not say only the digitalness matters.
> Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
> run/simulated
> on a digital computer.
Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno, because it
doesn't state that we ourselves can be run on a computer, just that our body
can be substituted): A digital computer consists not only of the turing
emulable states it works with. It does way more than that, since it is a
physical object and has to have some parts that transfrom the states (which
work with analog means like voltage), and receive (analog) input and output.
And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are done
and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and output, but in
this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and output a
brain or body can't work.
Only digital input and output doesn't work, because (even according to
Brunos conlusion) the physical world is not purely digital, so a digital
input and output is of no use.
And if we even grant that the external world can mysteriously give the right
digital input and do something with the output, then we create an additional
mysterious non-computational force that matters to what happens (because it
determines whether the digital brain receives the right input and output).
But according to Brunos conlusion this can't be, as we are supposedly *only*
related to computations.
One could argue that this outside could be infinite sheafs of computations,
but they don't give a output to the brain, so this doesn't seem to work,
either. The only way the could give an output if they have something else to
determine what output to give, for example a distribution on the sheat of
computations that say that with probability 90% the result of the first
computation of the sheat is the output, with probability 9% the result of
the second computation,etc.... - but in this case we need something beyond
the infinite computations to determine the measure of the outputs and this
again can't be determined through computations, so it is non-computational,
which is not compatible with what Brunos conclusion says. I don't know,
maybe Bruno is admitting that the measure can't be computationally
determined, but in this case the very most important thing about what
determines experience remains completely uncomputational. Without a measure,
everything could or could not happen - we don't have any way to determine
what happens at all (except to say that it is undetermined).
If Brunos conclusion means "our experience is related to computations, but
99,99999...% to something entirely beyond computations" he should write
that, and not say as a side note that there is a tiny non-computational
aspect or something like that.
In this case his conlusion is that of non-computational immaterialism with
an tiny computational aspect, which I agree with. But he doesn't present his
result as such.
For example he says we can determine physical laws from computational laws,
but all he ever derived, as far as I know, is that experience follows
quantum logic, which is just a statement about our ignorance, not a physical
law as one would normally understand it.

View this message in context: 
Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com.

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to