On 12/6/2011 11:27 AM, benjayk wrote:
Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
> on a digital computer.
Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno, because it
doesn't state that we ourselves can be run on a computer, just that our body
can be substituted): A digital computer consists not only of the turing
emulable states it works with. It does way more than that, since it is a
physical object and has to have some parts that transfrom the states (which
work with analog means like voltage), and receive (analog) input and output.
It is essentially consciousness that is being reproduced. If consciousness arises from
the brain performing certain computations, then those computations could be performed to
any desired degree of precision by a digital computer; and saying "Yes" to the doctor is
betting that the instantiating those computations will necessarily instantiate
consciousness (the naturalist hypothesis - there is no magic).
And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are done
and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and output, but in
this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and output a
brain or body can't work.
Yes, that's why I think the "level of substitution" might be a whole universe. Tegmark's
argument that the brain is essentially classical only shows that you could replace a brain
with a digital computer IF you still have the rest of the universe to interact with.
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