On 06 Dec 2011, at 21:04, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/6/2011 11:27 AM, benjayk wrote:
Yes it says... Computationalism is the theory that you can be
>  run/simulated
>  on a digital computer.
Even if it does (it is not exactly COMP as defined by Bruno, because it doesn't state that we ourselves can be run on a computer, just that our body can be substituted): A digital computer consists not only of the turing emulable states it works with. It does way more than that, since it is a physical object and has to have some parts that transfrom the states (which work with analog means like voltage), and receive (analog) input and output.

It is essentially consciousness that is being reproduced. If consciousness arises from the brain performing certain computations, then those computations could be performed to any desired degree of precision by a digital computer; and saying "Yes" to the doctor is betting that the instantiating those computations will necessarily instantiate consciousness (the naturalist hypothesis - there is no magic).

OK. And saying yes to a doctor asks only for Turing emulability at some level. It does not presuppose that such an emulation can be only arithmetical or immaterial. That necessity is handled by the Movie Graph Argument (MGA, step 8(*) of UDA).

Yes doctor is basically the "naturalist hypothesis", at least for an a priori materialist, but then step 8 shows that nature and Matter are themselves necessarily machine's mental construct, so, to be neutral, I would probably prefer to call that the "rationalist hypothesis".

(*) http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html

And because of that, we can't assume that it only matters that the
computations are being done, but it may matter how the computations are done
and how they are being interfaced with the environment.
One could define computer more narrowly to exclude input and output, but in this case a substitution is impossible, because without input and output a
brain or body can't work.

Yes, that's why I think the "level of substitution" might be a whole universe. Tegmark's argument that the brain is essentially classical only shows that you could replace a brain with a digital computer IF you still have the rest of the universe to interact with.

Hmm... In that case, the brain (the generalized brain) *is* the universe. If you can replace the brain (the biological one in the skull) and if I survive by the fact that such an artificial brain run (physically, say) the right computation, then the "rest of the physical universe" (whatever that is) is an average of some sort on all computations (physical or not by step 8) going through my actual brain state.



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