Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> I am just not arguing at all for what
>>>> your argument(s) seeks to refute.
>>> I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
>>> *believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable  
>>> that
>>> those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you feel
>>> like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say so.
>> The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
>> I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from  
>> comp,
>> they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and  
>> over
>> again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you  
>> don't
>> make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can  
>> matter) and
>> then saying it is equivalent to COMP.
> Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
> Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain, and  
> skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a  
> priori.
> I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only after  
> the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that  
> idea.
The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying. The only work for
a certain kind of materialism, not for "sufficiently magical materialism" or

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes  
>> nothing
>> magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
>> supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically  
>> related).
> I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical  
> materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp  
> + sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why  
> after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away with  
> Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are  
> pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is rarely  
> scientifically refutable, nor interesting.
Maybe here is our most important disagreement. Occam is meant to eliminate
too complicated possibilities. It is of no use to conlude that nothing
"magical" or rather, non-objectifiable is going on.
It is not at all "artificial". A car pushed by invisible discrete kangaroos
is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by some
mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been believed
for many centuries, and also is our actual experience. 
Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious things
at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the very basis
of your theory.

It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply eliminate all
possbilities that you don't like.
You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my favorite
mystery is acceptable).


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