On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:

I am just not arguing at all for what
your argument(s) seeks to refute.

I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent reason to
*believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable
that
those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you feel like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say so.
The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from
comp,
they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and
over
again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you
don't
make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can
matter) and
then saying it is equivalent to COMP.

Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain, and
skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a
priori.
I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only after
the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that
idea.
The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.

Explain this in detail. Please.



The only work for
a certain kind of materialism, not for "sufficiently magical materialism" or
non-platonic-immaterialism.





It can't work for everything which might make you doubt you will survive a digital substitution qua computation, that is in virtue a machine do the right corresponding computation.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes
nothing
magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically
related).

I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical
materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp
+ sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why
after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away with
Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are
pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is rarely
scientifically refutable, nor interesting.
Maybe here is our most important disagreement. Occam is meant to eliminate
too complicated possibilities. It is of no use to conlude that nothing
"magical" or rather, non-objectifiable is going on.
It is not at all "artificial". A car pushed by invisible discrete kangaroos is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by some mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been believed
for many centuries, and also is our actual experience.

I agree.
This is not jeopardized at all with comp. On the contrary it is shown that all universal machines can see something mysterious and they can realize their respective limitations, and transcend them in variate ways. Of course this is more AUDA than UDA. (Some amount of theoretical computer science is needed, but I can explain or give references).

Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious things at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the very basis
of your theory.

It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply eliminate all
possbilities that you don't like.

Proving eliminate possibilities by definition. In the frame of some assumption.

Bruno


You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my favorite
mystery is acceptable).

benjayk

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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