On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:

You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my favorite
mystery is acceptable).

This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.

Quentin and Brent(*), and myself, have patiently debunked your "refutation". You might just ask for explanation if you still miss the point.

It is a modest (yet radical) point, and it has been indeed criticized as being trivial, tautological a long time ago. That's why I have done AUDA, which is UDA for the "dummies" (with the "dummies" played by the Löbian machine). This illustrates at the least how non trivial the problem is.

With Occam, we can't eliminate the mystery.

Occam eliminates only the ad hoc hypothesis used for making a theory wrong. Occam eliminates the collapse of the wave packet, for example, because the collapse is made only to make QM false when applied to the observers. (To avoid many realities).

Likewise Occam eliminates primitive matter if the appearance of matter can be (or has to be) explained in a conceptual simpler theory. And my point is double:

1) if we assume comp then it has to be the case that arithmetic (or combinator, ...) is the simpler theory. (UDA)

2) This can be verified (making comp testable) by deriving physics from a translation of UDA in the language of a universal number. (AUDA). Then you can compare that physics with the observation inferred physics.

"1)" needs a passive understanding of how a computer work (if only to grasp the universal dovetailer)

"2)" needs some amount of mathematical logic.


(*) I don't pretend Brent is entirely glad with this, and for those who really want kill the proof, at step 8, they might think about the question: does comp really implies the "323 principle"? So I am willing to admit that in step 8, some improvement could be done, but I am not sure. Even Brent seems to accept that comp implies "323", if I remember well. Jacques Mallah seemed to kill the argument exactly there (323). He believes that matter might be so strange that even when unemployed in a computation it has some physical activity relevant in the computation. I think that this a key for making more precise the "qua computio" notion.

I recall that the 323-principle asserts that if consciousness supervenes on the physical activity of a computer not using the register n° 323, then the same consciousness will supervene on the physical activity of the same computer when its register n° 323 is removed.


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