On 08 Dec 2011, at 14:25, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:



Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:


The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.

Explain this in detail. Please.
It just doesn't deal with non-platonic-immaterialism, that's all.

Why should it?




Bruno Marchal wrote:

The only work for
a certain kind of materialism, not for "sufficiently magical
materialism" or
non-platonic-immaterialism.

It can't work for everything which might make you doubt you will
survive a digital substitution qua computation, that is in virtue a
machine do the right corresponding computation.
But if your reaoning doesn't work for everything

The reasoning works from the assumption (comp) only.



then the conlusion doesn't
follow. I might doubt that I survive a substitution, but I don't have to if
I don't believe in what you refuted in your argument.

The points are that if you survive a material digital functional substitution, you get
- first person indeterminacy (OK?)
- the invariance of that indeterminacy for delays, real/virtual shift (OK?) - an explanation where the physical laws come from, no more relying on the assumption of a physical primary universe, and a partial explanation of what consciousness is and why it has to seem mysterious. (OK?) (and with occam razor we get a simple ontology, and a simple theory of everything (OK?))
And the proof is enough constructive to make already comp testable. OK?



So, you conclusion just follows if you believe only the alternatives you
find relevant can be true.

I don't think so. The conclusion follows from the mechanist assumption, and nothing else. I think you just miss the point, as you have only criticized step zero (the definition of comp) until now. You say it includes the conclusion, which it does not (the assumption makes sense a priori for materialists, not the conclusion). Of course the assumption includes the conclusion in the logical sense (if not the reasoning would not be a deductive reasoning, but a speculation).

I comment the other post here. I might repeat myself a little bit.

You smuggled in your own opinion through the backdoor (only my
favorite
mystery is acceptable).

This is only a negative ad hominem insult. Frankly I prefer your
enthusiast tone of your earlier posts.

I am not insulting you, I am just stating what you did. You invoke an
"occams razor",

After step 8.



which actually has nothing to do with eliminating
complicated theories

?



(since "it is just mysterious" is not complicated at
all),

This is not eliminated. I would say it is even justify, at different levels.



and is really your opinion of what alternatives are acceptable.

No alternatives to comp are eliminated. What is eliminated (epistemologically, and ontologically with Occam) is the aristotelian idea that there is a primary physical universe TOGETHER with the comp supposition. If someone comes up with a serious evidence that some *primary* matter exist, that would automatically be a serious evidence that comp is false.



You elimimate the primary mystery of matter and/or consciousness, but
abitrarily keep the mystery of computations.

Well, the mystery of computation *is* the mystery of numbers (by Church, Turing, Post, Gödel, ...). This one can be shown non eliminable in *any* theory, and is used in virtually all existing theories. Anyway, it is part of the assumption. By definition assumptions are not provable.





Bruno Marchal wrote:


A car pushed by invisible discrete
kangaroos
is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by
some
mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been
believed
for many centuries, and also is our actual experience.

I agree.
This is not jeopardized at all with comp. On the contrary it is shown
that all universal machines can see something mysterious and they can
realize their respective limitations, and transcend them in variate
ways. Of course this is more AUDA than UDA. (Some amount of
theoretical computer science is needed, but I can explain or give
references).
So we agree. But then you conlusion doesn't follow, since you failed to
eliminate the mystery beyond computations.

How is that relevant for the conclusion (that physics, actually both quanta and qualia, is, in the comp theory, a branch of number theory/ computer science)?



We are not only related to
infinity of computations, we are related to an infinite mystery (which
*also* includes an infinity of computation).

That might be. Even in the comp frame. But that is not relevant for the proof of the reversal point.





Bruno Marchal wrote:

Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious
things
at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the
very basis
of your theory.

It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply
eliminate all
possbilities that you don't like.

Proving eliminate possibilities by definition. In the frame of some
assumption.
That's not the problem, you are just avoiding my point. The problem is that your principle it totally ad-hoc. "Oh, that's not good, let's just eliminate
that".

Which principle? I use only comp, which is a one of the oldest theory of the materialists, both in the West and the East, since a long time. Now, the discovery of the universal machine has provide a tool for digging deeper. I eliminate only things which I prove to be inconsistent in the comp frame, that's all. I am not defending comp, just taking it seriously for the sake of the argument.




As said, you let your favorite mystery surivive

I did show, independently of comp, that the mystery of numbers is absolutely unsolvable. And it is unavoidable to build on it once we do computer science, or when we study the consequence of comp. You are again just criticizing the comp hyp.



and eliminate the one you
don't like.

I have no clue why you say so. The whole UDA eliminates only one alternative: the conjunction of mechanism and materialism. This is a useful work given that most scientist today still believe in both.


You keep the inherent primitive infinite mystery of numbers,

Yes, but it is a very common hypothesis, and, besides, it is part of the comp assumption. Comp = digital mechanism, and digital means number.



but
deny the *inherent/primitive* infinite mystery of matter

This one become explainable. I don't eliminate it, I reformulate it in the comp theory. I show that comp reduces the mind-body problem to a body problem appearance in arithmetic, and I provide a constructive proof. People are unusually aware that comp makes matter a mystery/ problem. So again, it is useful work.



or the *inherent*
primitive infinite mystery of consciousness, even though you have no
justification for that.

We have already discussed this. Consciousness becomes well explained, except for one feature, but the arithmetical version of the argument (AUDA) justifies why it has to be like that. So consciousness is 99% explained in arithmetic, and the last 1% is meta-explained in arithmetic + comp. To my knowledge, comp is the first theory explaining why a physical reality is observable, without presupposing it. I don't exclude any other possible (non-comp) theories.



You can say you don't like primitively mysterious
matter, but you can't derive that in a rational way.

I show, in the comp theory, that the notion of primitive matter cannot have any purpose to explain the physical laws. It is not a question of liking or disliking.

I try hard to understand your point, but you fail to convince me that you have a point. I really don't see it. Your only clear "mistake" up to now, has been to assume that comp asserts that "only abstract computation matter". But that is not part of the comp hyp., nor is that used anywhere in the proof. (Show me where if you believe the contrary). Up to step seven, the abstract/immaterial issue is not even addressed. Only the step 8 shows why primary matter is of no use in the comp theory.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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