On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:
On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciaux<allco...@gmail.com>    wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).
Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.
Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
by definition?
No.  Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material 
there is no Platonia.  Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.

To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?


Hi Craig,

Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting computations from not having a physical component but would not specify which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.



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