On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 11:57 am, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/8/2011 7:41 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 9:33 am, Quentin Anciaux<allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
The UD argument is not a proof of computationalism being true, is an
argument that shows computationalism (I can be run on a digital computer)
is not compatible with materialism. It shows that to be able to predict
your next moment (if computationlism is true) then the primitive material
world is of no use (if there is one).
Computationalism can be false, but the argument is not about it being true,
it is about considering it true and see the implications.
Doesn't computationalism already imply independence from materialism
No. Most people suppose that computation can only be realized by material
there is no Platonia. Go back and read the arguments with Peter D. Jones.
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at