On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King"<stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.
True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to some
supernatural soul stuff. It basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and
some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and exists. In the
latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff
as existing and the rest not.
To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at