On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King"<stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.
True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a mind, in contrast to some
supernatural soul stuff. It basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff exists and
some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that everything happens and exists. In
the latter case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some
stuff as existing and the rest not.
Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into, but ironically "stuff
whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not" and "everything
happens and exists" do not sleep together very well at all. The "everything happens and
exists" hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way of sorting the "Tom sees
this and not that" from the " from "Dick sees this and not that" and "Jane sees this and
not that", where as the "stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as existing and
the rest not" can be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and
do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers their operations there
exists some immaterial stratifying medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from
another. I am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had three sealed
jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die and the third contained
1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when we look at it closely
enough. But we might consider that just as it vanishes so too does the ability to
distinguish one set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from
that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist "independent of
Where did I claim that. I was just pointing out the genesis of "everything theories"; you
did notice that this is called the "everything-list" didn't you?
To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?
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