On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King"<stephe...@charter.net>
True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form
process occur for computations and would go even further in
computations from not having a physical component but would
which it was. This way we preserve computational universality
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff. It basically
boils down to whether you suppose there are some things that are
real (e.g. some things happen and some don't, or some stuff
exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you suppose that
everything happens and exists. In the latter case there's
really no role for ur stuff whose only function is to mark some
stuff as existing and the rest not.
Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into,
but ironically "stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff
as existing and the rest not" and "everything happens and exists"
do not sleep together very well at all. The "everything happens
and exists" hypothesis has a huge problem in that is has no way
of sorting the "Tom sees this and not that" from the " from "Dick
sees this and not that" and "Jane sees this and not that", where
as the "stuff whose only function is to mark some stuff as
existing and the rest not" can be coherently defined as the union
of what Tom, Dick and Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying medium
that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I am
reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl had
three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4 6-die
and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-die. ...
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes when
we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that just as
it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one set of
numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish this from
that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that computations exist
"independent of physics"? Seriously!?!
Where did I claim that. I was just pointing out the genesis of
"everything theories"; you did notice that this is called the
"everything-list" didn't you?
I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg
my question? How does immaterial based "everything theories" deal
with this problem that I just outlined?
You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno. But as I
understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that everything
exists. But the unqualified everything doesn't seem to be logically
coherent. So Bruno backs off to an "everything" that is well
defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e. everything that is
computable. Within this plenuum there are various states (numbers
in arithmetic) and some principle will pick out what part we
experience. Computation includes an uncountable infinity of states
and relations between states - so whatever we experience must be in
Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in the
relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.
I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different physics
implies that different things are computable, but I'm doubtful that
I agree, it is total non sense. Not only it would contradict Church
thesis and the immunity of computability for diagonalization, but
thanks to David Deutsch quantum computer, it does not even make sense
with what we know currently believed in physics, and such a position
is a sort of revisionist definition of what is a computation. That's
is why I prefer to call Deutsch's "Church Turing principle" the
"Deutsch's thesis". And it is an open problem if such a thesis is
compatible with Church's thesis.
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