On 09 Dec 2011, at 20:06, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/9/2011 4:34 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/9/2011 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 09 Dec 2011, at 08:47, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:35 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 9:01 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 5:48 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 12/8/2011 6:45 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/8/2011 3:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King"<stephe...@charter.net>
True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but
On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
To suppose computation requires a material process would be
materialism, wouldn't it?
Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form
process occur for computations and would go even further in
computations from not having a physical component but would
which it was. This way we preserve computational
having to drift off into idealism and its own set of
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
You might if you thought that's all that was needed to make a
mind, in contrast to some supernatural soul stuff. It
basically boils down to whether you suppose there are some
things that are real (e.g. some things happen and some don't,
or some stuff exists and some doesn't) and some aren't or you
suppose that everything happens and exists. In the latter
case there's really no role for ur stuff whose only function
is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not.
Interesting role that you have cast the physical world into,
but ironically "stuff whose only function is to mark some
stuff as existing and the rest not" and "everything happens
and exists" do not sleep together very well at all. The
"everything happens and exists" hypothesis has a huge problem
in that is has no way of sorting the "Tom sees this and not
that" from the " from "Dick sees this and not that" and "Jane
sees this and not that", where as the "stuff whose only
function is to mark some stuff as existing and the rest not"
can be coherently defined as the union of what Tom, Dick and
Jane see and do not see.
The idealists would have us believe that along with numbers
their operations there exists some immaterial stratifying
medium that sorts one level of Gedel numbering from another. I
am reminded of a video I watched some time ago where a girl
had three sealed jars. One contained nothing, one contained 4
6-die and the third contained 1,242,345,235,235 immaterial 6-
The physical world is very much real, even if it vanishes
when we look at it closely enough. But we might consider that
just as it vanishes so too does the ability to distinguish one
set of numbers from another. If the ability to distinguish
this from that itself vanishes, how are we to claim that
computations exist "independent of physics"? Seriously!?!
Where did I claim that. I was just pointing out the genesis of
"everything theories"; you did notice that this is called the
"everything-list" didn't you?
I commented on what you wrote. Care to respond or will you beg
my question? How does immaterial based "everything theories"
deal with this problem that I just outlined?
You should ask a proponent of such theories; like Bruno. But as
I understand it, the ultimate application of Ocaam's razor is to
refuse to make any distinctions, so that we theorize that
everything exists. But the unqualified everything doesn't seem
to be logically coherent. So Bruno backs off to an "everything"
that is well defined and still possibly comprehensive, i.e.
everything that is computable. Within this plenuum there are
various states (numbers in arithmetic) and some principle will
pick out what part we experience. Computation includes an
uncountable infinity of states and relations between states - so
whatever we experience must be in there somewhere.
Good answer. The distinction asked by Stephen King are done, in
the relative way, by the universal numbers themselves.
Hi Bruno and Brent,
Sorry, I do not accept that as a "good answer" since it would be
cut to shreds by the razor itself. Postulating that everything
exists without a means to even demostrate necessity is to postulate
an infinite (of unknown cardinality!) of entities, in direct
contradiction to Occam's razor.
I think you have a mistaken conception of Occam's razor. Although
Occam may have had physical objects in mind when he enunciated his
principle, no one uses that razor any more. Occam's razor advises
to make one's *theory* as simple as possible. For example the
atomic theory of matter entails an enormous number of objects - but
it is a simple way to explain the existent of different materials,
thermodynamics, fluid dynamics, bio-energetics,...
Even when we reduce this to a countable infinite of entities, the
need for necessitation remains unanswered. Why do numbers exist?
Why numbers and not Nothing?
Bruno's theory doesn't depend on numbers; it only assumes
computation. Arithmetic is a convenient and familiar example for
purposes of exposition.
At least with the Stone-type dualism we have a way to show the
necessity of numbers via bisimulations between different instances
of Boolean algebras and, dually, via causality between Stone spaces
and thus do not violate Occam blindly.
Which seems to me a more complex structure than arithmetic.
Comprehensability requires the co-existence of that which is
comprehended with that which is doing the comprehension, that
numbers can comprehend themselves without additional structure seem
to me to be ruled out even by your result.
I don't understand how comprehension is modeled in Bruno's theory.
It's unclear to me whether it a relation of deducing one number from
You can intuit it with comp, or even the weaker "strong AI" thesis.
Comprehension is in the finite piece of computation involving that
comprehension, and arithmetic contains all such finite piece of
My point is that we cannot tacitly assume the existence of entities
that can make the distinctions (for example, between difference
Goedelian numberings) and thus the insistence that the physical not
exist at the same level as numbers seems to be an error.
I'm intrigued by David Deutsche's assertion that different
physics implies that different things are computable, but I'm
doubtful that it's true.
I agree, it is total non sense. Not only it would contradict
Church thesis and the immunity of computability for
diagonalization, but thanks to David Deutsch quantum computer, it
does not even make sense with what we know currently believed in
physics, and such a position is a sort of revisionist definition
of what is a computation. That's is why I prefer to call Deutsch's
"Church Turing principle" the "Deutsch's thesis". And it is an
open problem if such a thesis is compatible with Church's thesis.
You are not even showing a valid proof here. Refuting Deutsch's
assertion would effectively make Yes Doctor vanish, leaving your
result vacuous. Removing all traces of the physical world removes
all possibility of distinguishing a false proof from a true proof.
That was essentially Peter Jones argument, except he argues that
some things exist and some don't and "matter" is marker of what
To contradict this one must show how a "theory of abstract theorem
proving" is self-consistent in the absence of a means to
distinguish one proposed proof from another. Only the physical
world with its chalkboards, computer screens sound waves, etc.
offers a medium on and in which we can communicate abstract ideas
and concepts such as your result.
To believe otherwise is to similar to the belief in perpetual
motion machines as it would allow us to do work in contradiction to
thermodynamics. The acquisition of Knowledge, via computation or
other, requires the generation of entropy. Information is not
gained for free. If numbers have a unique and a priori existence
and the physical world emerges from it then even thermodynamics
itself is emergent but this still does not allow us to get 0 to
I am sorry to seem so harsh in my critique but this problem that
I am pointing out is far to obvious to be so lackadaisically
dismissed. I believe in your result, but it does not prove the
physical world to not exist as it requires the existence of the
physical world to be communicated. That fact alone should be clear.
Although Bruno often talks as though he has proved matter doesn't
I insist that I alway mean "primitive matter". I am not as foolish as
pretending that appearance of matter is unreal.
his theory is just that it is not fundamental, that it can be
explained in terms of universal computation, i.e. it can be picked
out of the computational everything along with why we have
experience of it.
However, I don't think he has shown how that can be done.
? AUDA explains that. UDA explains WHY we have to do that once we say
yes to the doctor for the comp reason, and AUDA explains the
*complete* HOW. And a tiny part of physics has been derived and
justifies already most of quantum (and quale) weirdness. The rest are
difficult open mathematical problem.
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