On 10 Dec 2011, at 07:23, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Dec 09, 2011 at 12:47:32PM -0600, Joseph Knight wrote (to Bruno):

Could you elaborate on the 323 principle? It sounds like a qualm that I
also have had, to an extent, with the MGA and also with Tim Maudlin's
argument against supervenience -- the notion of "inertness" or "physical
inactivity" seems to be fairly vague.


I discuss this on page 76 of my book.

AFAICT, Maudlin's argument only works in a single universe
setting. What is inert in one universe, is alive and kicking in other
universes for which the counterfactuals are true.

If that was true, I am not sure a quantum computer could still be emulable by a classical computer, but QM contradicts this. Nowhere does Maudlin postulate a single universe. But he postulates that a computation can be done in one single universe (but that is correct, even a quantum computation can be done in a single universe).



So it seems that COMP and single world, deterministic, materialism are
incompatible, but COMP and many worlds materialism is not (ie
supervenience across parallel worlds whose histories are compatible
with our present).

I am not sure about that. You might elaborate, or I might try to explain directly why "materialist many-worlds" cannot work, even in the case we have a quantum algorithm working in the brain. I mean, in a sense of making physics again fundamental/primary.
I have to think about how to explain this.



But then the UDA shows that parallel realities must occur, and
consciousness must supervene across all consistent histories, and that
the subjective future is indeterminate.

OK.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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