On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 6:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

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> > On 09 Dec 2011, at 19:47, Joseph Knight wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 09 Dec 2011, at 06:30, Joseph Knight wrote: >> >> Hi Bruno >> >> I was cruising the web when I stumbled upon a couple of PDFs by Jean-Paul >> Delahaye criticizing your work. (PDF >> 1<http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/UDA2010.pdf>, >> PDF 2 <http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/RefGraFil.pdf>). I don't >> speak French, but google translate was able to help me up to a point. The >> main point of PDF 1, in relation to the UDA, seems to be that there is not >> necessarily a notion of probability defined for truly indeterministic >> events. (Is this accurate? Are there any results in this area? I couldn't >> find much.) >> >> >> Jean-Paul Delahaye was the director of my thesis, and in 2004, when I >> asked him why I did not get the gift (money, publication of the thesis, and >> promotion of it) of the price I got in Paris for my thesis, he told me that >> he has refuted it (!). I had to wait for more than six year to see that >> "refutation" which appears to be only a pack of crap. >> > > So you never got the money, publication, or promotion? > > > I get only defamation. > > > > Most objection are either rhetorical tricks, or contains elementary >> logical errors. I will, or not, answer to those fake objections. I have no >> clue why Delahaye acts like that. I think that if he had a real objection >> he would have told me this in private first, and not under my back. He >> showed a lacking of elementary scientific deontology. He might have some >> pressure from Paris, who witnessed some pressure from Brussels to hide a >> belgo-french academical scandal, but of course he denies this. >> > >> So Delahaye is that unique "scientist", that i have mentionned in some >> post, who pretend to refute my thesis. My director thesis! >> >> >> >> The translation of PDF 2, with regards to the Movie Graph argument, was >> much harder for me to understand. Could you help me out with what Delayahe >> is saying here, and what your response is? I am just curious about these >> things :) I noticed some discussion of removing stones from heaps, and >> comparing that to the removal of subparts of the filmed graph, which to me >> seemed to be an illegitimate analogy, but I would like to hear your take... >> >> >> The heap argument was already done when I was working on the thesis, and >> I answered it by the stroboscopic argument, which he did understand without >> problem at that time. Such an argument is also answered by Chalmers fading >> qualia paper, and would introduce zombie in the mechanist picture. We can >> go through all of this if you are interested, but it would be simpler to >> study the MGA argument first, for example here: >> >> http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html >> >> There are many other errors in Delahaye's PDF, like saying that there is >> no uniform measure on N (but there are just non sigma-additive measures), >> and also that remark is without purpose because the measure bears on >> infinite histories, like the iterated self-duplication experience, which is >> part of the UD's work, already illustrates. >> >> All along its critics, he confuses truth and validity, practical and in >> principle, deduction and speculation, science and continental philosophy. >> He also adds assumptions, and talk like if I was defending the truth of >> comp, which I never did (that mistake is not unfrequent, and is made by >> people who does not take the time to read the argument, usually). >> >> I proposed him, in 2004, to make a public talk at Lille, so that he can >> make his objection publicly, but he did not answer. I have to insist to get >> those PDF. I did not expect him to make them public before I answered them, >> though, and the tone used does not invite me to answer them with serenity. >> He has not convinced me, nor anyone else, that he takes himself his >> argument seriously. >> >> The only remark which can perhaps be taken seriously about MGA is the >> same as the one by Jacques Mallah on this list: the idea that a physically >> inactive material piece of machine could have a physical activity relevant >> for a particular computation, that is the idea that comp does not entail >> what I call "the 323 principle". But as Stathis Papaioannou said, this does >> introduce a magic (non Turing emulable) role for matter in the computation, >> and that's against the comp hypothesis. No one seems to take the idea that >> comp does not entail 323 seriously in this list, but I am willing to >> clarify this. >> > > Could you elaborate on the 323 principle? > > > With pleasure. Asap. > > > > It sounds like a qualm that I also have had, to an extent, with the MGA > and also with Tim Maudlin's argument against supervenience -- the notion of > "inertness" or "physical inactivity" seems to be fairly vague. > > > I will explain why you can deduce something precise despite the vagueness > of that notion. In fact that vagueness is more a problem fro a materialist > than an immaterialist in fine. > > How so? > > > > >> Indeed, it is not yet entirely clear for me if comp implies 323 >> *logically*, due to the ambiguity of the "qua computatio". In the worst >> case, I can put 323 in the defining hypothesis of comp, but most of my >> student, and the reaction on this in the everything list suggests it is not >> necessary. It just shows how far some people are taken to avoid the >> conclusion by making matter and mind quite magical. >> >> I think it is better to study the UDA1-7, before MGA, and if you want I >> can answer publicly the remarks by Delahaye, both on UDA and MGA. >> > > I feel quite confident with both the UDA and the MGA (It took me a little > while). > > > Nice. > > > I read sane04, and quite a few old Everything discussions, including the > link you gave for the MGA as well as the other posts for MGA 2 and 3. > > >> I might send him a mail so that he can participate. Note that the two PDF >> does not address the mathematical and main part of the thesis (AUDA). >> >> So ask any question, and if Delahaye's texts suggest some one to you, >> that is all good for our discussion here. >> > > My main question here would be: when Delahaye says you can't (necessarily) > have probabilities for indeterministic events, is that true? > > > Simplifying things a little bit I do agree with that statement. There are > many ways to handle indeterminacies and uncertainty. Probability measure > are just a particular case. But UDA does not rely at all on probability. > All what matters to understand that physics become a branch of > arithmetic/computer science is that whatever means you can use to quantify > the first person indeterminacy, those quantification will not change when > you introduce the delays of reconstitution, the shift real/virtual, etc. > Formally, the math excludes already probability in favor of credibility > measure. But for the simplicity of the explanation, I use often probability > for some precise protocol. The p = 1/2 for simple duplication is reasonable > from the numerical identity of reconstituted observers. We have a symmetry > which cannot be hoped for any coins! > > Credibility measure? What's that? > > > > > How would it affect the first few steps of the UDA if there were no > defined probability for arriving in, say, Washington vs Moscow? > > > > Well, in that case, there are probability measure. In the infinite > self-duplication, you can even use the usual gaussian. But even if there > were no such distribution, the result remains unchanged: physics becomes a > calculus of first person uncertainty with or without probability. As I > said, only the invariance of that uncertainty calculus matter for the proof > of the reversal. > > Tell me if this answer your question. > That seems to make sense. Thanks > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.