On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 6:39 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>
> On 09 Dec 2011, at 19:47, Joseph Knight wrote:
>
> On Fri, Dec 9, 2011 at 3:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>>
>> On 09 Dec 2011, at 06:30, Joseph Knight wrote:
>>
>> Hi Bruno
>>
>> I was cruising the web when I stumbled upon a couple of PDFs by Jean-Paul
>> Delahaye criticizing your work. (PDF 
>> 1<http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/UDA2010.pdf>,
>> PDF 2 <http://www2.lifl.fr/~delahaye/dnalor/RefGraFil.pdf>). I don't
>> speak French, but google translate was able to help me up to a point. The
>> main point of PDF 1, in relation to the UDA, seems to be that there is not
>> necessarily a notion of probability defined for truly indeterministic
>> events. (Is this accurate? Are there any results in this area? I couldn't
>> find much.)
>>
>>
>> Jean-Paul Delahaye was the director of my thesis, and in 2004, when I
>> asked him why I did not get the gift (money, publication of the thesis, and
>> promotion of it) of the price I got in Paris for my thesis, he told me that
>> he has refuted it (!). I had to wait for more than six year to see that
>> "refutation" which appears to be only a pack of crap.
>>
>
> So you never got the money, publication, or promotion?
>
>
> I get only defamation.
>
>
>
>  Most objection are either rhetorical tricks, or contains elementary
>> logical errors. I will, or not, answer to those fake objections. I have no
>> clue why Delahaye acts like that. I think that if he had a real objection
>> he would have told me this in private first, and not under my back. He
>> showed a lacking of elementary scientific deontology. He might have some
>> pressure from Paris, who witnessed some pressure from Brussels to hide a
>> belgo-french academical scandal, but of course he denies this.
>>
>
>> So Delahaye is that unique "scientist", that i have mentionned in some
>> post, who pretend to refute my thesis. My director thesis!
>>
>>
>>
>> The translation of PDF 2, with regards to the Movie Graph argument, was
>> much harder for me to understand. Could you help me out with what Delayahe
>> is saying here, and what your response is? I am just curious about these
>> things :) I noticed some discussion of removing stones from heaps, and
>> comparing that to the removal of subparts of the filmed graph, which to me
>> seemed to be an illegitimate analogy, but I would like to hear your take...
>>
>>
>> The heap argument was already done when I was working on the thesis, and
>> I answered it by the stroboscopic argument, which he did understand without
>> problem at that time. Such an argument is also answered by Chalmers fading
>> qualia paper, and would introduce zombie in the mechanist picture. We can
>> go through all of this if you are interested, but it would be simpler to
>> study the MGA argument first, for example here:
>>
>> http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html
>>
>> There are many other errors in Delahaye's PDF, like saying that there is
>> no uniform measure on N (but there are just non sigma-additive measures),
>> and also that remark is without purpose because the measure bears on
>> infinite histories, like the iterated self-duplication experience, which is
>> part of the UD's work, already illustrates.
>>
>> All along its critics, he confuses truth and validity, practical and in
>> principle, deduction and speculation, science and continental philosophy.
>> He also adds assumptions, and talk like if I was defending the truth of
>> comp, which I never did (that mistake is not unfrequent, and is made by
>> people who does not take the time to read the argument, usually).
>>
>> I proposed him, in 2004, to make a public talk at Lille, so that he can
>> make his objection publicly, but he did not answer. I have to insist to get
>> those PDF. I did not expect him to make them public before I answered them,
>> though, and the tone used does not invite me to answer them with serenity.
>> He has not convinced me, nor anyone else, that he takes himself his
>> argument seriously.
>>
>> The only remark which can perhaps be taken seriously about MGA is the
>> same as the one by Jacques Mallah on this list: the idea that a physically
>> inactive material piece of machine could have a physical activity relevant
>> for a particular computation, that is the idea that comp does not entail
>> what I call "the 323 principle". But as Stathis Papaioannou said, this does
>> introduce a magic (non Turing emulable) role for matter in the computation,
>> and that's against the comp hypothesis. No one seems to take the idea that
>> comp does not entail 323 seriously in this list, but I am willing to
>> clarify this.
>>
>
> Could you elaborate on the 323 principle?
>
>
> With pleasure. Asap.
>
>
>
> It sounds like a qualm that I also have had, to an extent, with the MGA
> and also with Tim Maudlin's argument against supervenience -- the notion of
> "inertness" or "physical inactivity" seems to be fairly vague.
>
>
> I will explain why you can deduce something precise despite the vagueness
> of that notion. In fact that vagueness is more a problem fro a materialist
> than an immaterialist in fine.
>
> How so?

>
>
>
>
>> Indeed, it is not yet entirely clear for me if comp implies 323
>> *logically*, due to the ambiguity of the "qua computatio". In the worst
>> case, I can put 323 in the defining hypothesis of comp, but most of my
>> student, and the reaction on this in the everything list suggests it is not
>> necessary. It just shows how far some people are taken to avoid the
>> conclusion by making matter and mind quite magical.
>>
>> I think it is better to study the UDA1-7, before MGA, and if you want I
>> can answer publicly the remarks by Delahaye, both on UDA and MGA.
>>
>
> I feel quite confident with both the UDA and the MGA (It took me a little
> while).
>
>
> Nice.
>
>
> I read sane04, and quite a few old Everything discussions, including the
> link you gave for the MGA as well as the other posts for MGA 2 and 3.
>
>
>> I might send him a mail so that he can participate. Note that the two PDF
>> does not address the mathematical and main part of the thesis (AUDA).
>>
>> So ask any question, and if Delahaye's texts suggest some one to you,
>> that is all good for our discussion here.
>>
>
> My main question here would be: when Delahaye says you can't (necessarily)
> have probabilities for indeterministic events, is that true?
>
>
> Simplifying things a little bit I do agree with that statement. There are
> many ways to handle indeterminacies and uncertainty. Probability measure
> are just a particular case. But UDA does not rely at all on probability.
> All what matters to understand that physics become a branch of
> arithmetic/computer science is that whatever means you can use to quantify
> the first person indeterminacy, those quantification will not change when
> you introduce the delays of reconstitution, the shift real/virtual, etc.
> Formally, the math excludes already probability in favor of credibility
> measure. But for the simplicity of the explanation, I use often probability
> for some precise protocol. The p = 1/2 for simple duplication is reasonable
> from the numerical identity of reconstituted observers. We have a symmetry
> which cannot be hoped for any coins!
>
> Credibility measure? What's that?

>
>
>
>
> How would it affect the first few steps of the UDA if there were no
> defined probability for arriving in, say, Washington vs Moscow?
>
>
>
> Well, in that case, there are probability measure. In the infinite
> self-duplication, you can even use the usual gaussian. But even if there
> were no such distribution, the result remains unchanged: physics becomes a
> calculus of first person uncertainty with or without probability. As I
> said, only the invariance of that uncertainty calculus matter for the proof
> of the reversal.
>
> Tell me if this answer your question.
>

That seems to make sense. Thanks


> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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-- 
Joseph Knight

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