On 13 Dec 2011, at 18:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/13/2011 4:11 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
It doesn't take information from it's environment, learn, and act on
On Dec 12, 11:43 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
On 12/12/2011 6:28 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't think a cartoon is conscious either. But I was just
pointing out that "keep going
by itself" can't the be critereon since things we think are
conscious don't keep going *by
It doesn't have to be *the* criterion but I think it's a valid
counterfactual. We have oxygen, food, water and our consciousness
keeps going, ie experiencing and generating both novelty and
continuity. A cartoon doesn't end because it's deprived of film or
pixels. You can provide extra blank frames which contain the same
elements, paper and ink, pixels of certain colors, etc, but no
extension of any pattern of the cartoon will occur.
What is your criterion for thinking that a cartoon isn't conscious?
Nor does it take information from itself, learn, and act on itself.
A movie of a computation is not a computation, like a movie of a
murder is not a murder.
So you can attribute a consciousness to the (abstract) person having
that filmed computation, but enacting the movie or not will not change
the measure on computational histories, unless you reconnect the movie
to the boolean graph, in which case you are re-instantiating the
person's ability to manifest its experience relatively to you (and
makes its experiences differentiating again in the relative way).
In a movie of a computation, there are just no computation, nor
running of the program filmed. It would be like confusing the number
denoted by the string "IIIIIIIIIIIII" and the string itself
But if you believe in comp, and in the physical supervenience thesis
(linking consciousness to the *physical activity* of a digital
machine) you are lead to such an absurdity.
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