On 13 Dec 2011, at 18:50, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/13/2011 4:11 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Dec 12, 11:43 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:
On 12/12/2011 6:28 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I don't think a cartoon is conscious either. But I was just pointing out that "keep going by itself" can't the be critereon since things we think are conscious don't keep going *by
themselves*.

It doesn't have to be *the* criterion but I think it's a valid
counterfactual. We have oxygen, food, water and our consciousness
keeps going, ie experiencing and generating both novelty and extending
continuity. A cartoon doesn't end because it's deprived of film or
pixels. You can provide extra blank frames which contain the same
elements, paper and ink, pixels of certain colors, etc, but no
extension of any pattern of the cartoon will occur.

What is your criterion for thinking that a cartoon isn't conscious?
Craig

It doesn't take information from it's environment, learn, and act on the environment.


Nor does it take information from itself, learn, and act on itself.


A movie of a computation is not a computation, like a movie of a murder is not a murder.

So you can attribute a consciousness to the (abstract) person having that filmed computation, but enacting the movie or not will not change the measure on computational histories, unless you reconnect the movie to the boolean graph, in which case you are re-instantiating the person's ability to manifest its experience relatively to you (and makes its experiences differentiating again in the relative way).

In a movie of a computation, there are just no computation, nor running of the program filmed. It would be like confusing the number denoted by the string "IIIIIIIIIIIII" and the string itself "IIIIIIIIIIIII".

But if you believe in comp, and in the physical supervenience thesis (linking consciousness to the *physical activity* of a digital machine) you are lead to such an absurdity.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to