On 14 Dec 2011, at 06:32, Kim Jones wrote:
Any chance someone might précis for me/us dummies out here in maybe
3 sentences what Tim Maudlin's argument is? Nothing too heavy - just
a quick refresher.
Jolly kind of you,
On 12/12/2011, at 10:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
Maudlin's argument relies on the absurdity the the presence or
of inert parts bears on whether something is consious.
If nobody answers this I will answer asap. It is not an easy task.
Maudlin's paper is an (independent) variant of the Movie-Graph
Those arguments show the difficulty (if not the impossibility) to keep
the physical supervenience thesis (the idea that consciousness is
produced by the *physical activity* of a computer) with mechanism. It
is the key to understand why keeping comp leads to immaterialism, or
idealism (of the objective kind).
Both argument shows that the physical activity related to a particular
computation can be changed arbitrarily. Maudlin restores
counterfactualness (the fact that the computation will handle
correctly possibly different inputs) by adding inactive pieces of
machinery, for the particular computation (say a "conscious one").
COMP + physical supervenience forces to give a physical activity
relevant for a computation to a piece of matter which has no physical
activity relevant for that computation.
Maudlins' argument assumes that comp necessitates the "323" principle,
and we will come back on this, soon or later. MGA necessitates a
plausible active equivalent form of the 323 principle, I am not sure
of that. I will try a "layman-sum up" when I have more time.
MARCHAL B., 1988, Informatique théorique et philosophie de l'esprit.
Actes du 3ème colloque international de l'ARC, Toulouse, pp.
193-227. (explanation in english: http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html)
MAUDLIN T., 1989, Computation and Consciousness, The Journal of
Philosophy, pp. 407- 432.
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