On Dec 14, 11:49 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 14 Dec 2011, at 04:56, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > I'm not sure I get it. I thought your position is that physics is a
> > computational simulation.
>
> That's not my position. My working hypothesis is that "I" am a
> machine, in the sense that I could survive with a copy of my brain
> done at some level.

Right but I thought your position is that matter is not primitive, so
that all of physics that pertains to matter is an epiphenomenon of the
underlying computation. I thought your view is that the brain itself
can be virtualized so that "I" can be run as purely digital
application in any computing machine with enough power.

>  From this I can show that whatever the physical universe can be, it
> cannot be a "computational object". Indeed it is only an appearance
> emerging from a non computational statistics on computations.
> Likewise, consciousness also is not a computational thing.

How do you know that it's not the computation which is only an
appearance emerging from the physical universe, which inherently
includes the potential for consciousness? If you ask computation which
is primitive, it can only tell you that it is because it has no
capacity to make sense of anything else. If you ask only myself what
is primitive, I say awareness. To me, the primitive is the symmetry of
the two and the function of that symmetry in influencing perspective -
which is to me, sense-making.

>
>
>
> >>> There is nothing logical about identifying
> >>> conscious experiences with computational states.
>
> >> Here I disagree with you.
> >> Although there is nothing sure from which we could deduce such a
> >> relationship, we might still *infer* or *believe* that the brain is a
> >> "natural" computer, (that is the truncation of you at the digital
> >> level is a universal machine (in the Post, Church, Turing sense)).
>
> > I think that the brain is a biocomputer, but it also hosts
> > consciousness. Consciousness uses the computing capacity of the brain,
> > but awareness itself is not a disembodied computational state.
>
> Why not?

Because awareness wouldn't be necessary for machine computation.
Computers require no monitor or keyboard to compute. Also, awareness
requires no familiarity with computation. We feel and see without
having to understand arithmetic, even indirectly. I don't need to know
that blue comes between green and violet on the spectrum or that is is
a primary color or it's the opposite of another color, I can see it
directly as a self-explanatory phenomenon.

>
> > It's
> > living cells. Their awareness scales up to our awareness.
>
> How?

By sharing the same history of being the same single cell and staying
in continuous contact I suppose. It's just how awareness works. It's
not like objects in space, it's subjects through time. They are
semantically entangled as a multi-leveled shared experience in the now
- a now which is the tip of the iceberg of all experience. It's like
this:

<Human-Primate> consciousness <Mammal-Vertebrate> awareness <Organism-
Body> perception <Organ-Tissue> feeling <Cell-Gene> sensation
<Molecule-Atom> detection <quantum-arithmetic*>

*quantum arithmetic embodiment is not a concrete realism but an
analytical interpretation. It’s just the sense that atoms make
together, not literal particle/waves flying through space
instantaneously.

>
> > It is driven
> > by their first person agendas as well as ours, which cannot be
> > accessed objectively.
>
> >> We can believe the brain is a computer like most of us would believe
> >> that the hart is a pump.
>
> > I understand, and I agree, the brain functions like a computer.
>
> Yes, there are many evidences, if only because locally everything
> does, as far as we know. Except for the collapse of the quantum waves
> (that nobody can explain, and that Everett explained away) we have not
> yet find anything in nature which is not Turing emulable. That might
> be a long term problem for comp, because comp predicts that the
> physical universe is NOT turing emulable, but it might be everywhere
> Turing emulable locally.

Actually, this article says recent neuroscience suggests the brain is
not a computer:

"The Cornell researchers found that the brain continuously shifts
between states rather than having internal "variables" that contain
discrete "values" that are updated as the result of calculation
processes. According to researcher Michael Spivey, "In thinking of
cognition as working as a biological organism does... you do not have
to be in one state or another like a computer, but can have values in
between -- you can be partially in one state and another, and then
eventually gravitate to a unique interpretation, as in finally
recognizing a spoken word." The brain is not composed of modules that
pass the results of calculations back and forth; there are no
"results," just continual modulation. "

http://www.kschroeder.com/archive/blog/1120137696/index_html.html

>
> > It
> > also functions like a pump,
>
> A brain? Why?

It's got ventricles that it's constantly filling with fluid that
circulates around CNS. It's got billions of cellular neurotransmitter
pumps that are associated with changes in consciousness.

>
> > a radio,
>
> Why?

Alpha, beta, gamma, delta waves. The brain broadcasts electromagnetic
signals in the radio frequency range (0.1-60Hz).

>
> > a coral reef,
>
> Why?

It's a collective colony of individual organisms that construct
persistent structures tying them together.

>
> > a pharmacy,
>
> OK.
>
> > a
> > library,
>
> OK.
>
> > a synaptic suburb,
>
> Why?

It's a vast manifold of individual nodes and pathways between them and
with electrochemical traffic circulating from node to node.

>
> > etc. Generally the brain is compared to
> > the most advanced technology of whatever era is considering it.
>
> Not at all. It is compared to machine only, and wisely so given the
> evidences.

Is there ever an advanced technology that isn't a machine?

"The seductiveness of the analogy between human neural activity and
digital symbol manipulators has proved irresistible. It has been
characteristic of Western thought throughout the modern period,
beginning with Lamettrie's L'Homme Machine in 1750. Seeing humanity in
the image of which ever machine most dominates contemporary life is
what might be called mechanemorphism. With Lamettrie it was the clock.
The combustion engine followed. Freud thought electromagnets were a
good metaphor for the brain. Today, this tendency finds its most
extreme expression with the computer, especially amongst the
proponents of 'strong' artificial intelligence. Mechanemorphism has
conditioned not only our overall attitude to computers but also the
very terminology that has arisen around them."

"Over at BLDGBLOG, Geoffrey makes an astute observation about how the
latest consumer technologies have a way of becoming metaphors for the
mind. Before the brain was a binary code running on three pounds of
cellular microchips, it was an impressive calculator, or a camera, or
a blank slate. In other words, we're constantly superimposing the
gadgets of the day onto the cortex. Geoffrey notes that a recent
article featured on the BBC on fMRI scans of taxicab drivers ("Taxi
drivers have brain sat-nav") is very similar to an earlier study,
except that the most recent article used satellite navigation as a
metaphor for the spatial memories storied in the hippocampus:"
http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2008/09/brain_metaphors.php

Here's a fun list for kids: http://faculty.washington.edu/chudler/metaphor.html

> Now, we have discovered universal machine, and the comparison just
> makes *much* more sense.
>
>
>
> >> We do have evidence that whatever the level we choose to look on,
> >> when
> >> we observe an heart or a brain, nothing seems to violate finite local
> >> deterministic rules (machine).
>
> > But when we observe our own interiority, nothing seems to follow
> > finite local determistic rules.
>
> I agree with you. But that's exactly what introspecting machine are
> saying, and can even explain.

Why do you believe that such introspections are dependent on
computation and not just as much the other way around?

>
> > We appear to be able to conjure an
> > infinite universal indeterminacy at will.
>
> Yes. And we still don't know exactly how a machine can do that, but
> their rich theology is promising with this respect.

Why make the machine the conjurer rather than the conjured?

>
> > We don't know what a heart
> > can imagine, but it doesn't seem to do exactly what a brain does, and
> > neither does anything else. A brain really cannot be compared to
> > anything else until we can get outside of a brain.
>
> We can compare the brain with anything. And the comparison with
> computer, especially in the mathematical original sense of the word,
> is worth to study. Universal machine or number are very rich objects.
> They are already able to defeat all universal theories.

How can we compare the brain with something else when the only
consciousness we have ever experienced is through our own brain? If we
compare the brain with anything else - like a loom, or a player piano,
or block of cheese, we know that those things don't have human
consciousness, so why would we be interested in treating them as part
of the same category? Consciousness is the only thing that is
important about the brain.

>
>
>
> >>> Pain is not a number.
>
> >> Sure.
>
> >>> Blue is not a an algorithm which can be exported to non-visual
> >>> mechanism.
>
> >> You assume non-comp. The fact that the experience of blueness is
> >> not a
> >> number does not make it impossible that "blueness" is "lived" through
> >> an arithmetical phenomenon involving self-reference of a machine with
> >> respect to infinities of machines and computations.
>
> > But the specificity of it would be unnecessary.
>
> Why?

Because comp would just assign a memory pointer that has no aesthetic
qualities at all, let alone a specific category of qualities and
associated semantic tonalities and textures. Blueness would be a
functionally redundant addition on top of the actual quantitative
label.

>
> > Why and how would
> > blueness be invoked just to set a self-referential equivalence?
>
> To accelerate decision.

Just the opposite. It slows it down. If you need a frequency-
wavelength quantity to begin with to assign blueness to, you already
have the precise criteria that is useful for decision. It would be no
faster to add on a flavor or color, and even if it were, where do you
get these flavors and colors from?

>
> > No
> > matter how powerful a computer we build, we're never going to need to
> > invent blue to perform some arithmetic operation,
>
> Why should we need to invent it? It is already there, in the relation
> in-between universal numbers.

Why do we need eyes to see blue if numbers already can see them and we
are a process of numbers?

>
> > and no arithmetic
> > operation is ever going to have blue as a solution.
>
> You are right. An arithmetic operation, like a physical event are just
> not the right type of object for seeing blue. Only person (including
> animals) can do that. But this does not contradict the fact that they
> might survive with a digital brain.

It could. If being me is more like seeing blue than it is like a
computer program, then a digital brain may very well not be the right
type of object for being me.

>
>
>
> >>> It's false.
>
> >> You don't know that. You assume non-comp. You have not produce a
> >> refutation of comp, as far as I know.
>
> > I am a refutation of comp.
>
> You are not a proof. Even from your own private point of view.

Why not? Or say blue is a refutation of comp instead.

>
> > That's how I know it.
>
> Comp, nor non-comp, is not the kind of thing we can *know*. We can
> assume them and reason. besides in science we *know* nothing for sure.
> Even if God appears to you and tell you that you are not a machine,
> that will prove nothing, even to you. using that argument shows only
> that you are influenceable through authoritative argument (the worst
> possible kind of argument in fundamental science).

I would agree with you in any other area other than consciousness.
Subjectivity can only be 'proved' by authoritative argument. The fact
that we are able to locate our own authority is itself a refutation of
comp. A machine cannot do that.

>
> > I can care about
> > things and have preferences, computation cannot.
>
> But why could not people do that, when incarnated relatively through
> computations (note the plural).
> If you just say that machine cannot have preference, you are just
> begging the question.

Because the preferences come out of the sense and motive of the body
it is being incarnated into. We are not the music, we are the musician
and the audience. It's not necessarily transferable, and if we
discovered how to make it so, there might not be any point in playing
the human game any more in the first place.

>
> > Computation has
> > instructions and parameters, variables, and functions, but no
> > opinions, no point of view.
>
> I have displayed the math of the 8 types of opinion/points of view
> that *any* sound machine canNOT NOT discover by introspection. One of
> them is the physical modalities, making comp + the classical theory of
> knowledge testable.

How can they be called opinions if there are 8 fixed possibilities?
Opinions aren't multiple choice variables, they are created
subjectively.

>
> Computer science explains very well were does the opinion, knowledge,
> sensation, observation of machines comes from.

I don't think computers or machines have any of those things except to
us. I can connect a fire extinguisher to a computer and it's still not
going to have the sense to activate it if I set the computer on fire.
It doesn't matter if it's Watson or Deep Blue, it's going to sit there
and burn down to a heap of molten slag, flashing 'Fire extinguisher
connected and ready' until the very end. If an entity can't muster an
opinion about it's own existence, if it has to be told how to act as
if it cared, then how can we really consider its intelligence
mimicking algorithms 'opinions' or points of view?

>
> It might not be the correct explanations, but correct machines already
> provide them. We might listen to them.

I agree, we can learn a lot a lot from them and we should listen to
them. I think we can learn even more if we adjust our expectations so
that we understand that machines tell us about the exterior of the
universe and the opposite of the interior.

>
>
>
> >>> A hopelessly unrecoverable category error which
> >>> is nonetheless quite intellectually seductive.
>
> >>> I agree that physics applies to everything, including us, which is
> >>> why
> >>> the logical conclusion is:
>
> >> We can enlarge the sense of the word physics, but currently, in the
> >> Aristotelian physicalist tradition, this is a form of reductionism.
> >> Physics assumes special universal machine, where the digital
> >> mechanist
> >> assumption force to take them all in consideration, and extract the
> >> one, or the cluster of "one" justifying the local possible
> >> truncations. But like in Mitra, and in Everett, "we" are always "in"
> >> an infinity of one. (And that's indeed the natural place where the
> >> counterfactuals can get some meaning and role, without attributing a
> >> physical activity to a physically inactive piece of primitive matter.
>
> > Hmm. I lost you in there with the cluster or infinity of one. I get
> > that physics at this time is limited to external objects, and my first
> > premise in Multisense Realism is that this limitation is not rooted in
> > science. Its invaluable for engineering of course, but it's an
> > insurmountable obstacle I think in understanding consciousness.
>
> I was alluding to the movie graph argument (or Maudlin's one) which
> shows that if we are machine, consciousness cannot be attributed to
> the physical activity of that machine, but only to the causal
> (arithmetical, with comp) dependencies. We can come back on this.
>
>
>
> >>> 1.  What and who we are, our feelings and perceptions, apply to (at
> >>> least parts of) physics.
>
> >> That's coherent with your non-comp assumption.
>
> > Even if it were comp. if a certain color or texture has an arithmetic
> > function associated with it, then doesn't that mean that function also
> > has at least the possibility of that color or texture within it?
>
> It has not. Physical (and persistent) objects exist only in the
> (sharable) dream of numbers.

See that's the crazy part though. Why do numbers have dreams? Do their
dreams help them calculate? If anything, the dreamers should dream
numbers and not the other way around.

>
>
>
> >>> It goes both ways. The universe feels. We are
> >>> the evidence of that.
>
> >> Which universe? All the universal being can feel.
> >> But the big whole, from inside, is just so big that it is not
> >> unnameable, so I will not dare to address the question of "its"
> >> thinking.
>
> > I was meaning more that the possibility of feeling exists within the
> > universe.
>
> Which universe? The arithmetical one? The physical one? The
> theological one?

How can it be the universe if it doesn't encompass all of those? The
one and only uni-verse.

>
> > Feeling is one of the things that the universe knows how to
> > physically produce.
>
> ?

If I take an aspirin, have I not physically produced analgesia?

>
>
>
> >>> 2. Feeling is not a computation,
>
> >> Right. But this does not mean that it cannot related to self-
> >> referential truth about a universal machine relatively to other
> >> universal machines and infinities of computations, random noise
> >> oracle, etc.
>
> > I agree, it could be related to different arithmetic consequences but
> > that is still not sufficient to explain the experience of feeling
> > itself. It's like saying that typing is related to language and
> > communication so therefore a keyboard must understand what you are
> > typing on it - that keystrokes inherently produce whatever meaning is
> > present in words.
>
> Feeling are explained by the fact that machine can refer entirely to
> their own body (at some level), and this in different ways from
> different points of view which obeys different logics. In particular
> qualia correspond to available non communicable truth. They do have a
> role by speeding up relative computation and decision. In fact the
> more a machine introspect, the bigger is the set of non communicable
> truth.

Why do they speed up computation and decision? Isn't that like saying
it's faster to run a program in a high level programming language than
compile it into machine language? Even if they did, why generate these
elaborate aesthetics, and most of all how? Are numbers omnipotent? If
they need to tell the difference between one thing and another can
they just invent whole new palettes of primary colors and novel
dimensions of sensation? To me it's like saying, 'hmm, these filing
cabinets are getting pretty full, maybe I'll reinvent space in a way
that it appears to be concretely charged with emotion, yet clearly
communicates an intention towards non-subjectivity.'

>
>
>
> >>> otherwise it would be unexplainable
> >>> and redundant.
>
> >> Yes. An epiphenomena.
>
> > I think an epiphenomena just has to be non causally efficacious.
>
> I agree. That is why I like comp: it prevents consciousness and
> private life to be epiphenomena. They are just real and very useful
> (for just surviving for example) phenomenon. Stephen would add here
> that comp makes primitive matter epiphenomenal, but that is a
> nonsense: primitive matter just goes away.

Sense does that too, but it doesn't require that things be useful to
be real.

>
> > I run
> > my car engine and the heat and exhaust are epiphenomena. Feeling makes
> > no sense as a possible exhaust of computation.
>
> Right. But that's a consequence of comp. feeling is not a computation.
> What happens with comp is that a feeling is a truth about a person
> incarnated at once by an infinity of computations.

What incarnates them and why? Why not just have the infinity of
computations?

>
> > The whole point of
> > computation is it's normalized, parsimonious integrity.
>
> Hmm... You might confuse machine before and after Gödel. We have
> learned something fundamental about machine: we have learned that we
> cannot know what they are capable of (and this can be justified
> entirely if we assume we are machines ourselves).

If you define machine that broadly though, you aren't really saying
anything about anything. If we can't know what they are capable of,
then we can't be sure that we should call them machines. It's
tautological to say we know that machines can be like us because if we
assume we are machines then machines would be doing what we do. If we
assume that we are weapons then we can say that we cannot know what
weapons are capable of. Maybe computation is just means to an end of
weaponry? It's somewhat of a sophist position, but really no more than
comp to me. Hence the term 'rocket science'. Where did computers and
networks come from? The military.

>
> > Where does a
> > picture of a nonexistent palm tree come from in the f(x)?
>
> By the unboudable imagination of the universal machines, especially
> when they are glued in long and deep sharable histories.

I do doubt their imagination though. My computer doesn't have an
imagination. The whole internet has no imagination. Just users of
brains. I'm willing to accept that computing is in it's infancy so I
would set the bar pretty low, but I have seen nothing yet which
strikes me as having an authentic voice. Computer music is the music
of plastic. It can be pretty, but it's not an expression of creative
teleology, it's just abstract noodling. It is the magnificence of the
human imagination, for better or worse, that is able to derive such
knowledge, insight, and power out of what I consider to be the
immaculate sterility of machine intelligence.

>
>
>
> >> It is the same error of formalism and
> >> reductionism trying to eliminate truth in favor of forms. This can
> >> only exist by a misunderstanding of Gödel and Tarski theorem. Even in
> >> math we cannot eliminate truth and intuition, and assuming comp, and
> >> *some amount* of self-consistency, we can "know" why.
>
> > I like this whole direction of mathematics, and even though my mind
> > isn't well suited to it, I do respect the importance of the
> > contribution.
>
> Nice.
>
> > Turing too. I think the whole self-referential
> > revelation is the functional skeleton of the most literal, objective
> > sense of the cosmos.
>
> Nice.
>
> > There is intelligence and wisdom there,
> > unquestionably.
>
> OK.
>
> > I just think that it's only *almost* the secret of the
> > universe. To get the whole secret, we have to bring ourselves all the
> > way into the the laboratory. Everything that arithmetic is, the
> > universe also is not.
>
> We don't know what arithmetic is.

Then why not call it sense?

>
> > Figurative, semantic, poetic, intuitive,
> > sensorimotive, sentient, etc. These aspects of our realism cannot be
> > meaningfully reduced to arithmetic,
>
> You might be confusing a theory of arithmetic with arithmetic itself.
> Today we know those things are far apart.
> A theory of arithmetic is just a universal machine, or a Löbian
> machine. Arithmetical truth is *far* beyond any machine.

It sounds like logos to me. Which is ok, but even that is not juicy
enough for biological realism. You need techne too.

>
> > nor can arithmetic be understood
> > by wishes and fiction. What they can be reduced to is the sense of
> > order and symmetry which unites and divides them.
>
> >>> If physics were merely the enactment of automatic
> >>> algorithms, then we would not be having this conversation.
>
> >> OK. But I dare to insist that if we assume mechanism, physics is
> >> everything but an enactement of an algorithm. Comp makes digital
> >> physics wrong, a priori. I think that the DU even diagonalizes
> >> 'naturally" against all possible computable physics. But if that is
> >> not the case, comp still force to extract the special physical
> >> universal machine from the first person experience measure problem.
>
> > Hard for me to follow. Why doesn't physics include enactment? I
> > thought comp makes physics digital?
>
> A lot of people develop that confusion, that is why I insist so much
> that comp is in opposition to digital physics, at least as a
> fundamental theory.
>
>
Isn't a digital brain a kind of digital physics?

>
> >>> Nothing
> >>> would be having any conversation. What would be the point? Why
> >>> would a
> >>> computation 'feel' like something?
>
> >> Well, a computation does not feel, like a brain does not feel. But a
> >> person (a Löbian self-referential being) can, and thanks to
> >> relatively
> >> stable computations emulating the self relatively to other machine,
> >> that person can manifest herself through computations. Then that
> >> person can be aware of the impossibility to communicate that feeling
> >> to any probable universal neighbors in case it is unwilling to do
> >> that.
>
> > How do you know that a Löbian being isn't just a simulation of a self-
> > referential being?
>
> It is, in the trivial sense that you light consider the number one
> being a simulation of itself. But that is rather misleading, and
> certainly false if "simulation" is taken in the computer science
> sense. In that case a Löbian machine is only a simulation (emeuation)
> of some other universal system (mike arithmetic). In that sense we are
> simulations too.

But what if the quality of Löbian self reference is not authentic?
What if it just behaves as if it is referencing itself because that's
what our interpretation has led us to expect?

>
> > It's only our sense of self projecting it's own
> > image onto a generic arithmetic process, like a cartoon.
>
> The cartoon lacks everything making it a computation. At best, it
> gives a description of computation.
> The Gödel number of a computation is not a computation. A computation
> is a complex relation between numbers and a universal number. the
> Gödel number of a computation is just a number.

A cartoon is different in it's behavioral capacities from an
interactive program, but that just strikes me as a degree of
sophistication and not an indicator that a program is any more likely
to develop its own sense of self. I can make a cartoon where the
characters act like they are talking to the audience. All I have to do
is select my audience members carefully and my cartoon could address
audience members by name.

>
> > Does acting
> > like a self automatically make it a self?
>
> Yes. Or you get zombie.

What about a ventriloquism dummy or actor on a movie screen? Those are
real things that seem to us like they might have a self, but they do
not. Their selfhood is an extension of a human agent, just as a
machine is an extension of a group of programmers or engineers.

>
> > What if you intentionally
> > want to make a Löbian being that only seems like it is self-
> > referential but actually is not?
>
> Then it will fail on some self-referential task.

Like failing to try to put itself out if you set it on fire?

>
>
>
> >>> 3. Physics is feeling as well as computation.
>
> >> ?
>
> > It relates to phenomena in the universe which is ultimately tangible
> > or has tangible consequences. It's not just computation for the sake
> > of computation.
>
> I guess you mean "physical universe". I don't believe that exist in
> any ontological sense. Physical reality is a (non arithmetical)
> projection made by  non arithmetical being emerging from infinities of
> arithmetical relations.

I think it's just the opposite. Physical reality is a concrete
singularity, it is the divisions of that singularity which are
diffracted as object surfaces in 'space' and subject depths through
'time'. What you are talking about is true too, but it's inside out.
You're trying to model the outside of the universe when it can't have
an outside by definition. Matter is the stuff. That's where the action
is. Inside of matter. Like our brain. As a primitive, it's not matter,
because it's the divisions that make it matter. The divisions create
the realism.

>
>
>
> >>> We know that we can tell
> >>> the difference between voluntary control of our mind and body and
> >>> involuntary processes.
>
> >> Partially, yes.
>
> >>> My feeling and intention can drive
> >>> physiological changes in my body and physiological changes in my
> >>> body
> >>> can drive feelings, thoughts etc. If it were just computation, there
> >>> would be no difference, no subjective participation.
>
> >> OK.
> >> But comp does not say that we are computation. It says only that we
> >> are only *relatively* dependent on some universal computation going
> >> on
> >> relatively to some probable computations. The subjective machine will
> >> speed up, because it bets on its consistency, on the existence of
> >> itself relatively to the possible other machines. Memories become a
> >> scenario with a hero (you).
>
> > I'm not opposed to the idea of us being relatively dependent on some
> > universal computation, but not in a strictly epiphenomenal way.
>
> I agree with you.

ok

>
> > The
> > universal computations are also influenced by us directly, our sense
> > and motive on the macro-person level.
>
> Some are, locally and relatively, but most are not. You cannot change
> at will the additive/multiplicative structure of numbers.
>

Ok I am getting more the difference between universal computations and
computations, but I think that the universality is sort of like sense
spread out to it's thinnest possible layer so that in order to apply
to everything, it must mean nothing but what it literally refers to.
In this way it's not truly universal because it's only true in this
one narrowly defined generic sense. Arithmetic is sense with all of
the significance boiled off, leaving you with the essence of a-
signifying semiotics. In this way, arithmetic truths trace a boundary
around where significance is supposed to be, revealing it by making
it's absence clear. You can't change the structure of numbers because
only the formalism of their intent is real. I can make one drop of
water by adding four smaller drops together. That contradicts
universal numbers, but it doesn't make the truths it contradicts any
less true. What is real is the human sense and motive behind the
numbers, not the numbers themselves.

>
>
> >>> 4. Computation is not primitive.
>
> >> You get computation quickly. Universality is cheap. Assuming
> >> elementary arithmetic (like everyone does in high school, notably)
> >> makes it already there.
>
> > Quickly, yes. Universal, sure, at least as far as objects go.
>
> As far as computation go. Not sure what you mean by "objects" here.

As opposed to subjects. You can be alive as a person for years without
having to consciously compute anything.

>
>
>
> >> Its immunity for diagonalization makes it the most transcendental
> >> mathematical reality, and yet still effective.
>
> > I believe it. There is almost certainly no more powerful tool to
> > manipulate our environment. It's just that the thing that wants to
> > exercise power and manipulate the environment in the first place has
> > to precede the tool, if we are talking about a Theory of Everything.
> > If it were a Theory of Engineering, I would bet on computation every
> > time.
>
> Diagonalization exists in arithmetic, out of time and space. Time and
> space comes from the number ability to diagonalize and refer to
> themselves.
> When I wrote "Amoeba, Planaria and dreaming machine" I thought
> engineers would jump on that, and some did, but unfortunately, the
> technics is still waiting more powerful hardware to do that.
>
> And then it will not work for the reason that nobody want clever
> machines (who could be choosy about their users and destiny), for the
> same reason that nobody really want children to be educated and free.
> Humans love to chat on freedom, but I think they really hate that in
> their heart.
>
> I don't think the machines will ever be intelligent thanks to the
> humans, they will be intelligent *despite* the humans. We want slaves,
> not competitors.
>

Definitely. That's why computationalism is really kind of a minor
point from an engineering perspective. We don't want real AGI so
knowing that the way we are trying to get it is wrong should free us
to make better servants.

>
>
> >>> It is a higher order sensorimotive
> >>> experience which intellectually abstracts lower order sensorimotive
> >>> qualities of repetition, novelty, symmetry, and sequence. When we
> >>> project arithmetic on the cosmos, we tokenize functional aspects
> >>> of it
> >>> and arbitrarily privilege specific human perception channels.
>
> >> You lost me. I guess it makes sense with some non-comp theory.
>
> > In a material metaphor, I'm saying that plastic is a higher order
> > phenomenon of synthetic organic chemistry, not a molecular primitive.
> > Even though it's utility and flexibility in simulating almost any kind
> > of material to our eyes, it's actually the deeper qualities underlying
> > the plastic which gives it it's pseudo-universality. When we mistake
> > plastic for the root of all matter, we focus on it's plasticity as it
> > serves us (rather than questioning the underlying chemistry which
> > gives plastic it's qualities).
>
> Plastic sucks. We should use renewable plants instead!

Absolutely. All I want for Christmas is a flying solar yurt made of
water harvesting plant skin and with an internet connection.

>
>
>
> >>> 5. Awareness is not primitive.
>
> >> I agree.
>
> >>> Awareness does not exist absent a
> >>> material sensor.
>
> >> That's locally true. It might be necessary, but that's an open
> >> problem.
>
> >>> Some might argue for ghosts or out of body/near death
> >>> experiences, but even those are reported or interpreted by living
> >>> human subjects. There is no example of a disembodied consciousness
> >>> haunting a particular ip address or area of space.
>
> >> How do you know that? I guess you are right today, but "human made"
> >> machines, programs and bugs are still very young, yet they grows
> >> explosively on the net.
>
> > They still have to have a material net to grow on though.
>
> Even if that would exist, it cannot help. That is the point of the 
> MGA:http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html
>
> > You can't
> > catch a programming bug from your computer. It seems like comp would
> > have a hard time explaining why that is - harder than it is for a six
> > year old to observe that it obviously can't happen.
>
> A six years old child has a brain which is the product of millions
> years of evolution. Give time to (human made) machines, the human made
> computer are in their infancy, and 99,9999 % of applied computer
> science consist in controlling them, not in letting them controlling
> themselves.
>

You could just as easily say that computers are the product of all of
the millions of years of evolution of all of the computer scientists
and programmers.

>
>
> >>> 6. Sense is primitive.
>
> >> Not with comp. Sense are primitive only form the first person
> >> perspective, but not in "gods eyes" (The unnameable arithmetical
> >> truth
> >> talk to the machines).
>
> > What is arithmetical truth if it doesn't make sense?
>
> Nothing. It does make sense. That's the whole point: it makes sense to
> the universal numbers inhabiting (in some sense) arithmetical truth.
>

For it to make sense, the sensemaking has to already be possible in
the universe.

>
>
> >>> Everything that can be said to be real in any
> >>> sense has to make sense.
>
> >> Ah! In that sense? Then I am OK.
> >> 0=1 is fase independently of me or anything.
>
> > Yes! Well yes in the literal sense that you intend.
>
> OK.
>
> > It could be said
> > that the 'knowledge of the nothingness of death' = the 'singularly
> > human experience' or something like that...1=0 in the sense 'each
> > thing begins from no thing'.
>
> Hmm... Then we would write 0 => 1. Not 0 = 1.

sounds reasonable. still there's other examples for 0 = 1. Having No
answer for a test question can be One headache, etc.

>
>
>
> >>> The universe has to make sense before we can
> >>> make sense of it.
>
> >> Probable with "we" = "humans".
> >> false with "we" = "the universal beings", and universe meaning
> >> physical universe.
>
> > How can sense arise from a universe which doesn't make sense? The
> > possibility of sense is itself sense.
>
> Yes. And the arithmetical universe makes sense, to us, but also to a
> vast class of (relative) numbers (that is a shorthand for "people
> incarnated in infinities of numbers relations").

Wouldn't they be enumerated rather than incarnated? I guess I agree
but I would say that there is a vast class of sense which we can make
which is not arithmetic and we do not share with numbers. If
arithmetic is that thin layer of sense stretched out to embrace as
much machine (external) truths as possible, then the psyche is a
towering pillar of sense reaching upward and inward to non-machine
experiences.

>
>
>
> >>> The capacity for being and experiencing inherently
> >>> derives from a distinction between what something is and everything
> >>> that is it isn't. The subject object relation is primary - well
> >>> beneath computation. Subjectivity is self-evident. It needs no
> >>> definition statement and no definition statement can be sufficient
> >>> without the meaning of the word 'I' already understood.
>
> >> Here you make a subtle error. You are correct (telling truth), but
> >> incorrect to assume that we cannot explains those truth (self-
> >> evidence, no possible definition) when doing some assumption (like
> >> mechanism, and the non expressible self-referential correctness on
> >> the
> >> part of the machine).
>
> > It's not that I assume that we cannot explain those truths in other
> > ways, just that I don't assume that those other explanations can
> > dilute or negate the naive subjective orientation.
>
> And you are right on this. That's my whole point. We cannot and should
> not discard the subjective feeling of 'numbers' and machines. That
> would be an error, even for engineers.
>
> > Just because the
> > map is not the territory doesn't mean that map is not a phenomenon in
> > it's own right. It doesn't mean that map-making is an emergent
> > property of the territory.
>
> OK. But yet that might still be possible..

But the map makes changes to the territory.

>
>
>
> >>> If something
> >>> cannot understand 'I', it cannot ever be a subject.
>
> >> Self-reference is the jewel of computer science. machine can easily
> >> understand the third person I, and experience the first person I. And
> >> the first is finitely describable, and the second is only a door to
> >> the unknown.
>
> > How can you tell the difference between a machine reflecting our sense
> > of I and a first person experience of I? What gives us reason to think
> > a digital I is genuine?
>
> The richness of machine's introspection, and notably the difference
> between what a machine can take as true and what she can justified
> rationally. That might make comp as being the fertile simplest
> explanation of the consciousness/realities coupling.

How do you know a machine's introspection is rich?

>
>
>
> >>> I cannot be
> >>> simulated, digitized,
>
> >> Relatively? That's your non-comp assumption.
>
> > The simulation would have to turn me into someone else and still be
> > me. A simulation could act like me in every way, but the I that I am
> > now would not be extended into that simulation.
>
> You can't be sure of that.

Brain-conjoined twins can refer to themselves as I, but identical
twins don't. That suggests that neurological connection is the basis,
not identical similarity.

>
> > Only I am I (how could
> > I not 'be'? Everywhere I go, there I am...)
>
> >>> decohered, or reduced to an 'identification with
> >>> computation'.
>
> >> Well, as paradoxical it might soon, you are provably right when we
> >> assume comp. If you are a machine, then no one can reduce you to any
> >> particular knowable machine, and no one can do any thinking at your
> >> place (but you can delegate thinking by yourself).
>
> > my only problem with being a machine is that since we are as close as
> > you can get to being the opposite of a machine, so that the term loses
> > all meaning if it encompasses everything. If a machine can make
> > choices based on preference rather than instructions as we can, what
> > does it serve to use the term machine?
>
> Machine means only that the local behavior follows local computable
> laws. Arithmetical truth is full of machines, but also full of
> entities which cannot be emulated by any machines. Not everything is
> machine. And the behavior of most machines is beyond what machine can
> handled and prove. The very notion of machine is already beyond
> machines. A bit like it can be proved that the notion of finite number
> is beyond what finite number/theory/machine can explain or justify.
> Mathematical logic shows that the notion of finite, machines, etc. are
> very tricky. It looks simple for us, but that simplicity is a delusion.
> At the beginning of last century, Hilbert was hoping for a proof of
> consistency of math in arithmetic, but Gödel showed that even the
> consistency of arithmetic is beyond arithmetical means. Tarski showed
> that arithmetical truth is not even definable in arithmetic. This
> limitation, and the awareness of this limitation, extends to machines.
>

It would seem that through volition, we generate some of our own
computable laws...which I think makes them not particularly lawful or
computable.

>
>
> >>> I may be computation in part, but then computation is
> >>> also me. Arithmetic must have all the possibilities of odor and
> >>> sound.
> >>> Numbers must get dizzy and fall down.
>
> >> Not numbers, but the hero appearing in the numbers' dreams.
>
> > What are those dreams made of?
>
> They are only relational. Nothing is "made of" something.

They could serve the same relational functions and not be dreams. Why
should they be dreams?

>
>
>
> >>> 7. Mistaking consciousness for computation has catastrophic
> >>> consequences. It is necessary to use computation to understand the
> >>> 'back end' of consciousness through neurology, but building a
> >>> worldview on unrealism and applying it literally to ourselves is
> >>> dissociative psychosis.
>
> >> Not only you will not give a steak to my son in law, but I see you
> >> will try to send his doctor in the asylum.
> >> Well, thanks for the warning.
>
> > What would be the difference between an asylum and anywhere else?
>
> In an asylum you are forced to take toxic harmful drugs. Less so,
> anywhere else (especially jail).

I think there's actually a lot of drugs in jail.

>
> > Can't numbers dream just as well in an asylum?
>
> Not with the kind of medication you get in an asylum. You can't even
> dream there.

Medication is just physical matter though. Surely not a problem for
numbers?

>
>
>
> >>> Even as a semi-literal folk ontology, the
> >>> notion of automatism as the authoritative essence of identity has
> >>> ugly
> >>> consequences.
>
> >> Automata are below universality.
>
> > Are they below identity?
>
> ?

Automatism as the essence of identity. You say identity is the
phenomenon or just an expression of a deeper essence which is
automatic?

>
>
>
> >>> Wal Mart. Wall Street. The triumph of quanitative
> >>> analysis over qualitative aesthetics is emptying our culture of all
> >>> significance, leaving only a digital residue - the essence of
> >>> generic
> >>> interchangeability - like money itself, a universal placeholder for
> >>> the power of nothingness to impersonate anything and everything.
>
> >> I am as much sad about that than you, but your reductionist view on
> >> machine will not help.
>
> > Are you sure? What is economics but socially enforced
> > computationalism?
>
> I really don't see the relation. In a democracy, economics is a way to
> distribute money and enrich everyone, but only if bandits are not
> perverting it for their own special interest.

What is money though? Computation enacted socially. All goods and
services reduced to interchangeable digital quantities.

>
>
>
> >>> Just
> >>> as alchemists and mystics once gazed into mere matter and
> >>> coincidence
> >>> looking for higher wisdom of a spiritual nature, physics and
> >>> mathematics now gazes into consciousness looking for a foregone
> >>> conclusion of objective certainty.
>
> >> No. The point is that we cannot do that even with machine.
>
> > Certainty of uncertainty.
>
> Absolutely.
>
>
>
> >>> It's a fools errand. Without us,
> >>> the brain is a useless organ.
>
> >> You can say that.
>
> >>> All of it's computations add up to
> >>> nothing more or less than a pile of dead fish rotting in the sun.
>
> >> Without us? Sure.
>
> >> But who us?
>
> > Us natural persons.
>
> Nooooo.... us the Löbian Universal Number. They are the one given
> internal sense to "everything". They always fill the gaps. That makes
> them wrong almost all the time, but that gives their meaning, learning
> abilities and purposes also.

?

>
> > Human beings extending psychologically into
> > autobiographical experience with historical context and corporeal
> > bodies with cells and molecules inside and cities, planets, and
> > galaxies outside.
>
> Locally.

Locally in two opposite senses. Local to the body and local to the
subject. My experiences are local to me in my memory, but not to my
body. My cells and organs are local to my body bit not my psyche
directly.

Craig

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