Re: Movie Graph Argument

```On 12/14/2011 2:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote:
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On Wed, Dec 14, 2011 at 1:51 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
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On 12/14/2011 10:40 AM, Joseph Knight wrote:
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On Tue, Dec 13, 2011 at 11:32 PM, Kim Jones <kimjo...@ozemail.com.au
<mailto:kimjo...@ozemail.com.au>> wrote:

Any chance someone might prĂ©cis for me/us dummies out here in maybe 3
sentences
what Tim Maudlin's argument is? Nothing too heavy - just a quick
refresher.

I'll try, but with a few more than 3 sentences. Suppose the consciousness
of a
machine can be said to supervene on the running of some program X. We can
have a
machine run the program but only running a constant program Y that gives
the same
output as X for one given input. In other words, it cannot "handle"
counterfactual
inputs because it is just a constant program that does the same thing no
matter
what. Surely such a machine is not conscious. It would be like, if I decided
"I
will answer A B D B D D C A C..." in response to the Chemistry test I am
run off and take, and happened to get them all correct, I wouldn't really
know
Chemistry, right?
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But I think Russell has reasonably questioned this.  You say X wouldn't know
chemistry.  But that's a matter of intelligence, not necessarily
consciousness.  We
already know that computers can be intelligent, and there's nothing
intelligence "supervening" on machines.  Intelligence includes returning
appropriate
outputs for many different inputs.  But does consciousness?

```
I was really just using my Chemistry test as an imperfect analogy to the machine running Y being conscious (or not), so it doesn't affect the rest of the argument. But I see your point. Would you argue that a constant program (giving the same output no matter the input) can be conscious in principle?
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I don't think something can be conscious in the human sense unless it is intelligent. The question is can something be intelligent without being conscious. I incline to not, but I'm not sure. I think the interesting point is that there tends to be a unjustified slip from consciousness to intelligence in some arguments. In particular the "323" argument implicitly assumes that not-intelligent=>not-conscious.
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Brent

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Maudlin assumes that such a program cannot be conscious, in his words, "it would make a mockery of the computational theory of mind." I am agnostic. In my opinion the Filmed Graph argument is more convincing than Maudlin, because with Maudlin one can still fall back to the position "consciousness can in principle supervene on a constant program".
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(For those interested, here is the article itself <http://www.finney.org/%7Ehal/maudlin.pdf>)
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Brent

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So consciousness doesn't supervene on Y. But Maudlin (basically) shows that
you can
counterfactuals as
needed. These extra parts don't actually do anything, but their "presence"
means
the machine now could exactly emulate program X, i.e., is conscious. So a
computationalist is forced to assert that the machine's consciousness
supervenes on
the presence of these extra parts, which in fact perform no computations at
all.

extra parts
are doing things, so consciousness then appears at the scale of the
multiverse --
is fascinating. But I am out of time. Hope this helped. I would recommend
the original paper for the details.
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