# Re: Movie Graph Argument

```2011/12/17 Pierz <pier...@gmail.com>

>
>
> On Dec 17, 4:39 pm, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 16, 2011 at 08:26:21PM -0800, Pierz wrote:
> >
> > ...snip...
> >
> > > The problem is even deeper than this, however. How does the system
> > > ‘know’ when two locations should be bilocated? This works OK for a
> > > single copy of Klara, since she is a static system. But if she must
> > > physically interact with all the previous editions of herself further
> > > back in the calculation chain, then she will be forced to ‘build’
> > > pipes on the go, a ridiculously contrived procedure that totally
> > > vitiates the idea of a mindlessly proceeding, inert system. And how
> > > does Klara (or rather, Olympia) remember which path she has followed
> > > in order to know which trough to drain? New mechanisms must be devised
> > > which effectively mean retaining the activity of previous Klaras in
> > > the chain and are no different from a form of backtracking.
> >
> > My understanding is that to construct Olympia, we take n copies of
> > Klara, and run each copy to step i of the program, where i=1..n-1. The
> > construct the sequence of water troughs such that they are equal to
> > that of K_i at step i. We also connect K_i to Olympia at that point,
> > ready to take over in the event of a counterfactual being true.
> >
> > I don't think the issue of pipes is a problem - we can assume each
> > trough in state i is connected to the troughs of states i-1 such
> > that when the armature moves through to state i, it closes a valve
> > connecting the troughs to the previous state's troughs.
> >
> > It may seem complex, but it is mere complication, not complexity, if
> > you understand the difference.
> >
> > > If Maudlin’s argument is a foundation of the UDA, then it seems to me
> > > the UDA is on shaky ground, though I have yet to investigate the MGA
> > > in depth. People talk about the Movie Graph Argument, but the links
> > > provided refer to Alice and a distant supernova with lucky rays that
> > > substitute for functional neurons. I don’t see a connection to the
> > > idea of a recording or a filmed graph. Can someone enlighten me?
> >
> > Maudlin's argument has been compared with the MGA, which is step 8 of
> > the UDA. The previous steps are independent of Maudlin.
> >
> > Olympia can be compared with a recording of the computation. That is
> > the "filmed graph" (aka movie graph).
> >
> > --
> >
> >
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
> > Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> > Principal, High Performance Coders
> > Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> > University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> >
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
> -
>
> > Maudlin's argument has been compared with the MGA, which is step 8 of
> > the UDA. The previous steps are independent of Maudlin.
>
> I understand that, but all the steps are necessary to support the
> argument. If consciousness supervenes only on physical computation,
> then one requires a physical instantiation of the UD, not a purely
> arithmetical one.
>
> > My understanding is that to construct Olympia, we take n copies of
> > Klara, and run each copy to step i of the program, where i=1..n-1. The
> > construct the sequence of water troughs such that they are equal to
> > that of K_i at step i. We also connect K_i to Olympia at that point,
> > ready to take over in the event of a counterfactual being true.
>
> Invalid because of the infinite regress problem. How can we run the
> program on the individual Klaras without connecting them to the
> Olympia in the first place? The Klaras cannot calculate anything
> without the counterfactual mechanism of all the other Klaras ensuring
> they don't go wrong. If all the Klaras have already been run somehow
>```
```
The thought experiment is that:

1- Computationalism is true.
2- So it means there exists conscious program.
3- You just stumble accros one.
4- You run it.
5- During the run you've seen that some parts are never accessed.
6- You remove those parts.
7- You run it again... it must still implement the conscious program (3) by
points 1 and 2.
...
N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but that
can't handle counterfactual, but as the computation is the same as 3, it
must be as conscious as when it was running on a complete physical computer.
N+1- you can restore the handling of conterfactual by adding inactive
piece. But If N was not conscious, adding inactive pieces shouldn't render
it conscious.

Quentin

> so the troughs prior to the branch onto the active Klara contain the
> calculated values then there is no need to run Oylmpia at all. The
> state of the last Klara already contains the output of the calculation
> and we can discard Olympia and just say that we already calculated the
> value in the past. This makes a mockery of the entire elaborate
> mechanism Maudlin postulates and the business about inert parts and so
> on is irrelevant. I don't think that saying that a live calculation
> can always be replaced by one that was completed in the past solves
> anything. Certainly consciousness (or a computer) may draw on the
> results of completed calculations in order to speed up its work (a
> computer doesn't need to recalculate the value of pi every time it
> needs that constant), but it cannot solve every problem that way,
> obviously! A computer game may pre-render an explosion made by
> computing hundreds of thousands of particles, as a shortcut, but it
> cannot pre-render every possible game and just branch into the
> relevant branch of that movie as required. Unless you grant it
> infinite calculation resources in the past and none in the present, an
> abject sophistry.
>
> I can't find anything in Maudlin's paper that suggests the method you
> propose - pre-running every copy of Klara as if it had dealt with all
> prior counterfactuals. Each copy is merely another dumb Klara ready to
> wrong the next instant. That is both essential to the argument, and
> its fatal flaw.
>
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