On Dec 17, 2:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > You didn't read, that's not the argument.
> > > It begins by *assuming we have a conscious program*. The argument is not
> > > about what is consciousness, it's about assuming consciousness to be
> > > computational and assuming physical supervenience thesis true and
> > showing a
> > > contradiction.
> > No, I read it, I just think the argument is broken from the start if
> > you don't care what consciousness is in the first place.
> We care... The argument is about the computationalist hypothesis... in this
> setting consciousness is a computatational thing, the computationalist
> hypothesis is the hypothesis that you can be run on a digital computer.
Ok, so human consciousness. The program is nothing but digital
instruction code but it thinks it's a human being in a universe as a
human being experiences it regardless of whether it's running on a
player piano or motorized Legos. Your argument then is that since the
code supervenes upon the physical Legos, there is a contradiction to
computationalism? I agree. Doesn't that contradiction point to non-
> > What kind of
> > consciousness are you assuming a program can have? Feeling? Sense of
> > smell?
> Everything by hypothesis, talk about the argument... if you want to talk
> about non-comp, open another thread.
Some people are interested in understanding, others are interested in
telling people what to do. The two approaches are mutually exclusive.
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