On Dec 17, 2:58 pm, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > You didn't read, that's not the argument. > > > > It begins by *assuming we have a conscious program*. The argument is not > > > about what is consciousness, it's about assuming consciousness to be > > > computational and assuming physical supervenience thesis true and > > showing a > > > contradiction. > > > No, I read it, I just think the argument is broken from the start if > > you don't care what consciousness is in the first place. > > We care... The argument is about the computationalist hypothesis... in this > setting consciousness is a computatational thing, the computationalist > hypothesis is the hypothesis that you can be run on a digital computer.
Ok, so human consciousness. The program is nothing but digital instruction code but it thinks it's a human being in a universe as a human being experiences it regardless of whether it's running on a player piano or motorized Legos. Your argument then is that since the code supervenes upon the physical Legos, there is a contradiction to computationalism? I agree. Doesn't that contradiction point to non- comp? > > > What kind of > > consciousness are you assuming a program can have? Feeling? Sense of > > smell? > > Everything by hypothesis, talk about the argument... if you want to talk > about non-comp, open another thread. Some people are interested in understanding, others are interested in telling people what to do. The two approaches are mutually exclusive. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
