On 12/17/2011 8:24 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com <mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com>>
On Dec 17, 7:30 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com
> N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but that
> can't handle counterfactual, but as the computation is the same as 3, it
> must be as conscious as when it was running on a complete physical
> N+1- you can restore the handling of conterfactual by adding inactive
> piece. But If N was not conscious, adding inactive pieces shouldn't render
> it conscious.
Conscious of what? It sounds like this assumes that consciousness is a
You didn't read, that's not the argument.
It begins by *assuming we have a conscious program*. The argument is not about what is
consciousness, it's about assuming consciousness to be computational and assuming
physical supervenience thesis true and showing a contradiction.
But it seems like a play on our intuition as to what constitutes a computation. We
hypothesize consciousness supervenes on computation because computation is the kind of
thing needed to make intelligent (and therefore "conscious") acting machines. But then
there is a subtle shift from computation as the basis of intelligent action, to
computation as a sequence of physical states to sequence of physical states as the
playback of a recording. Then we intuit that something as simple as a playback can't be a
computation that would support consciousness - but why should we still regard it as a
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