On 17 Dec 2011, at 22:05, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/17/2011 8:24 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/17 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
On Dec 17, 7:30 am, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:
> N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but
> can't handle counterfactual, but as the computation is the same
as 3, it
> must be as conscious as when it was running on a complete
> N+1- you can restore the handling of conterfactual by adding
> piece. But If N was not conscious, adding inactive pieces
> it conscious.
Conscious of what? It sounds like this assumes that consciousness
You didn't read, that's not the argument.
It begins by *assuming we have a conscious program*. The argument
is not about what is consciousness, it's about assuming
consciousness to be computational and assuming physical
supervenience thesis true and showing a contradiction.
But it seems like a play on our intuition as to what constitutes a
computation. We hypothesize consciousness supervenes on computation
because computation is the kind of thing needed to make intelligent
(and therefore "conscious") acting machines. But then there is a
subtle shift from computation as the basis of intelligent action, to
computation as a sequence of physical states to sequence of physical
states as the playback of a recording. Then we intuit that
something as simple as a playback can't be a computation that would
support consciousness - but why should we still regard it as a
To save the physical supervenience thesis, some people does that. But
it is a confusion between a computation and a description of a
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