On 17 Dec 2011, at 21:29, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/17/2011 4:30 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

The thought experiment is that:

1- Computationalism is true.
2- So it means there exists conscious program.
3- You just stumble accros one.
4- You run it.
5- During the run you've seen that some parts are never accessed.
6- You remove those parts.
7- You run it again... it must still implement the conscious program (3) by points 1 and 2.
N- you can build a machine that implements and can only run 3 but that can't handle counterfactual, but as the computation is the same as 3, it must be as conscious as when it was running on a complete physical computer. N+1- you can restore the handling of conterfactual by adding inactive piece. But If N was not conscious, adding inactive pieces shouldn't render it conscious.


Yes, that's my understanding of the argument. But I find it curious that if we substitute "intelligent" for "conscious" it no longer seems paradoxical. We readily conclude that removing the ability to handle counterfactuals makes the machine unintelligent. Yet most people think a machine should be intelligent in order to be conscious. Bruno thinks it must understand finite induction.

Not really. Consciousness needs only universality, in some weak sense. Self-consciousness needs the induction beliefs. I am open that Robinson Arithmetic is conscious, and that Peano Arithmetic (and its sound extension) are self-conscious (Löbian). But consciousness is abstract/immaterial and concerns abstract/immaterial person. Not material relative token.

Yet there are very many people, whom we assume we are conscious, but have never heard of finite induction (their "finite induction" register is missing).

Not sure. all humans (if not all mammals or even much more) are Löbian. To grasp the meaning of word like "anniversary", "annual", "monthly", "death", "repetition", "constant", or any words with the prefix "able", you need implicitly some amount of induction.

Maudlin comments that "intelligence" is dispositional and so is different from consciousness. But why isn't a computation dispositional too?

It is. Even for Maudlin, I think. And consciousness might have a dispositional components, but it has also a factual (true) key components. (cf the difference between Bp and Bp & p).

If it were not then it seems that you run into the paradox of the rock that computes everything.

I think the paradox arises from neglecting the fact that intelligence, computation, and maybe consciousness are all relative to a context or environment.

I agree, for that paradox. But this does not make the immaterialist conclusion non valid. Just to be precise.

Intelligence is the ability to learn from interacting with the environment AND acting to some purpose in the environment.

OK. And consciousness is about the same together with some important true semantical fixed point.



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