On 18 Dec 2011, at 23:27, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sun, Dec 18, 2011 at 12:46:10PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Consciousness, with comp relies on interaction in a branch. The

I don't know what you mean by this.

Assuming comp, consciousness can use a machine working only by interaction of parts. It does not need parallel universes, which will only change the relative statistics of consciousness content.

other branch can change statistics on the computations/continuation,
but on the presence of other branch, unless the brain is a quantum
computer, but this only means that the level is lower than usual,
and we have to simulate it in a single branch to do the MGA or
Olympia reasoning again.

I am not considering the case of the brain being a quantum computer
(eg Penrose's idea). As you say, it wouldn't make much difference anyway.



Either the mutiverse needed for that type of physical supervenience
is Turing emulable, or it is not.
If it is, we can do the MG reasoning, if it is not, comp is false.

If the emulation is by means of dovetailing, then I think not. A
dovetailer is not conscious.

That is ambiguous. A dovetailer, like Robinson arithmetic (when proving all its theorems) is not conscious, per se. But it instantiates consciousness, indeed all possible machine's consciousness.

Nor is Peano arithmetic for that

PA is a Lobian machine, and I think it is as conscious as you and me. It has the same Löbian theology (the 8 hypostases), and thus it has even the same physics (but that's another topic).

Some structures within these might be consious however (by
COMP, necessarily so).

So we agree. The confusion is that something (a brain, a universe, a universal dovetailer) can instantiate consciousness without being conscious. For MGA the boolean graph needs to instantiate conciousness. It does not need to be conscious (a good thing given that we don't know our substitution level: we never know which program we are).

In this case, the distinction is more than merely linguistic. Often
when you say PA is conscious, I translate your comment as above, and
continue on.

When I say that PA is conscious, I mean it literally.
When I say that RA is conscious, I mean "the universal machine RA" is conscious literally. But RA can also play the role of a universal dovetailer, which is not a person, and thus not conscious. RA can play both, somehow. Like any universal machine, even a Löbian one, can implement a universal dovetailing (if patient enough!).

But this can't be done here.

I agree that the UD is not a person, and as such its consciousness is even non-sensical. But if you agree that the UD instantiates consciousness, then the MGA applies to it. I can say yes to a doctor because it takes a much lower level than the correct one, putting much to much in the artificial brain. And you were saying MGA does not work in case of a physical supervenience based on a multiverse. That is why I put the level so down so that I emulate that multiverse, making MGA working on that structure. An infinitely low level can only force me to implement (as my brain) a multiverse, or even the universal dovetailing itself. This will subsumes all multi-multi-multi- multi .... (^alpha) universes (alpha constructive ordinal).


The dovetailer instantiates consciousness in exactly the same way that
a random block of marbles instantiates the statue of David.

The dovetailer generates precise programs, and run it in the precise
computer science sense. Nobody has ever show me one instance of a
program executed by a rock, except for little trivial program.
Actually, nobody has succeeded to tell me what a rock is, or in what
sense that exists.
The universal dovetailer generates immensely big programs, which
does not make sense in most possible conception of rocks that I
know. That the statue of David is in a random marble of block is
irrelevant for the issue of consciousness relate to program

Actually, I wasn't alluding to computing rocks (in spite of a certain
simularity) ).

The issue is misidentification of the dovetailer with one of the
programs it is executing.

But as I just said, this is not relevant for the movie graph or Maudlin's argument.

It is the same mistake to say that the Library of Babel contains all
the wisdom of the ages just because one can find a copy of every book that
has ever been written within its walls.

Well, here there is also another mistake, which is that a library of Babel contains only description, where a universal dovetailer actually executes the 'descriptions'. The numbers, even with their order are not Turing universal. It is really the laws of addition and multiplication which gives rise to the genuine (universal) internal 'dynamics'.


My point is just that the use of the multiverse does not change the
consequence of the MGA reasoning.

This we disagree on, clearly. However, I'm still failing to understand
your point of view, because ISTM you want to call the UD conscious,
when it surely can't be. Its as dumb as.

The UD is not conscious, as a person, but once you add the supervenience thesis, it instantiates consciousness at each moment where it executes a conscious program (say Russell Standish's one, then Bruno's one, etc). That is enough for applying the MGA argument. We don't have to execute all the UD, with aphysical supervenience thesis, "it" will instantiate consciousness after a finite time, and the MGA will be able to be applied on portion of its execution.

As I said above, in simulating the multiple branches of the Multiverse
by dovetailing, we are no longer instantiating consciousness.

I don't follow you on this. The first person is not even aware of
the giant delays brought by the dovetailing procedure.
The UD (at first concrete) does instantiate consciousness (and "at
time" with the physical supervenience thesis). It is all what we
need for getting the (epistemological) contradiction.

The UD runs all programs, including conscious ones, but is not
conscious in itself. Therefore, you cannot apply Maudlin/MGA to a
dovetailer - it makes no sense.

I think that you have to elaborate on this. The MGA works for any single program generating (with supervenience) consciousness. Where do we use the fact that the program has to be conscious? Even with a brain, consciousness is attribute to some sub-program, and we cannot even know which one. I don't see your point.

like all blocks of marble are not David.)

It is different. There is no supervenience of experience in this case.

It was an analogy. The analogue of consciousness was form in this case.


This step is basically
invalid. It does not imply COMP is false, though.

Of course, if you can think of another way of simulating a multiverse
within a single universe, I wil naturally reconsider...

The way of simulating it changes nothing. It is the point of the
first six step of UDA.

Only the subjective view is unchanged. The 3rd person view is changed
utterly. In the 1st person view, we have conscousness supervening on a
multiverse, which doesn't change. But Maudlin's argument no longer
works in the 1st person view.

I don't see why.



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