On 12/19/2011 11:16 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


2011/12/19 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>

    On 12/19/2011 5:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

            In this case, the distinction is more than merely linguistic. Often
            when you say PA is conscious, I translate your comment as above, and
            continue on.


        When I say that PA is conscious, I mean it literally.
        When I say that RA is conscious, I mean "the universal machine RA" is 
conscious
        literally. But RA can also play the role of a universal dovetailer, 
which is not
        a person, and thus not conscious. RA can play both, somehow. Like any 
universal
        machine, even a Löbian one, can implement a universal dovetailing (if 
patient
        enough!).




            But this can't be done here.


        I agree that the UD is not a person, and as such its consciousness is 
even
        non-sensical. But if you agree that the UD instantiates consciousness, 
then the
        MGA applies to it. I can say yes to a doctor because it takes a much 
lower level
        than the correct one, putting much to much in the artificial brain. And 
you were
        saying MGA does not work in case of a physical supervenience based on a
        multiverse. That is why I put the level so down so that I emulate that
        multiverse, making MGA working on that structure. An infinitely low 
level can
        only force me to implement (as my brain) a multiverse, or even the 
universal
        dovetailing itself. This will subsumes all multi-multi-multi-multi .... 
(^alpha)
        universes (alpha constructive ordinal).


    This is related to my point that consciousness is relative to some context. 
 ISTM
    that pushing the substitution level down so low that you are emulating the 
physics
    of the environment as well as the brain vitiates the argument.  If I 
emulate a
    universe or multiverse in order to instantiate consciousness then I have 
not shown
    consciousness to be independent of physics.  I've only shown that 
consciousness
    supervenes on the physics of the emulated multiverse.

    Brent


Also I can't see how the view that the physics emerge from invariance of infinities of interfering computations allows physics to be entirely simulated in one computation (ultra low substitution level).

ISTM that if the level is that low... then comp is false, because physics utlimately must be not computable... digital physics is not compatible with computationalism, but, an ultra low level is digital physics and that's contradictory.

But I think that's where our intuition misleads us. It seems very likely that part or even all of one's brain could be replaced by computer; and that computer could be emulated by a universal digital computer. But this overlooks the essential part played by the rest of the world and its interaction with your brain. This passed over by saying the environment and it's interactions can be simulated as well. But now you are committed to a simulated consciousness that is dependent on simulated physics.

Brent


And also, ISTM that a substitution level embedding all the multiverse is *infinite* hence not turing emulable.




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