On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 02:56:10PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 18 Dec 2011, at 23:27, Russell Standish wrote:
> >On Sun, Dec 18, 2011 at 12:46:10PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>Consciousness, with comp relies on interaction in a branch. The
> >I don't know what you mean by this.
> Assuming comp, consciousness can use a machine working only by
> interaction of parts. It does not need parallel universes, which
> will only change the relative statistics of consciousness content.
Even though the parts may be distributed across multiple branches of
the MV, and have different counterfactual histories?
Be careful of not including the conclusion in the definition of COMP.
> >If the emulation is by means of dovetailing, then I think not. A
> >dovetailer is not conscious.
> That is ambiguous. A dovetailer, like Robinson arithmetic (when
> proving all its theorems) is not conscious, per se. But it
> instantiates consciousness, indeed all possible machine's
Great. But this is more than mere terminological wrangling. To an
observer of the dovetailer, no conscious processes are visible. To do
that would require a means of determining whether a computation is
conscious or not, something we don't have, and probably never will.
It is another manifestation of there being no God's viewpoint in a
I feel this invalidates applying Maudlin's argument to a
dovetailer. But put another way, perhaps it means that consciousness
cannot supervene on a physical implementation of a dovetailer. Which
is probably what you're trying to get to.
> >In this case, the distinction is more than merely linguistic. Often
> >when you say PA is conscious, I translate your comment as above, and
> >continue on.
> When I say that PA is conscious, I mean it literally.
> When I say that RA is conscious, I mean "the universal machine RA"
> is conscious literally. But RA can also play the role of a universal
> dovetailer, which is not a person, and thus not conscious. RA can
> play both, somehow. Like any universal machine, even a Löbian one,
> can implement a universal dovetailing (if patient enough!).
I thought we agreed that these systems contained conscious structures,
not are conscious in themselves. I don't know otherwise how to
interpret "PA is literally conscious". It makes no sense...
> >But this can't be done here.
> I agree that the UD is not a person, and as such its consciousness
> is even non-sensical. But if you agree that the UD instantiates
> consciousness, then the MGA applies to it.
It doesn't eliminate the supervenience of the consciousness on the
simulated physics within the UD. It seems this is in accordance with
Brent's comments too.
Presumably you would argue that this is simulated matter, not
primitive matter. Sure. But what's to stop the primitive matter being
multiversal - whether it can be simulated or not is a little beside
> >The issue is misidentification of the dovetailer with one of the
> >programs it is executing.
> But as I just said, this is not relevant for the movie graph or
> Maudlin's argument.
This is what I'm having difficulty seeing...
> >It is the same mistake to say that the Library of Babel contains all
> >the wisdom of the ages just because one can find a copy of every
> >book that
> >has ever been written within its walls.
> Well, here there is also another mistake, which is that a library of
> Babel contains only description, where a universal dovetailer
> actually executes the 'descriptions'. The numbers, even with their
> order are not Turing universal. It is really the laws of addition
> and multiplication which gives rise to the genuine (universal)
> internal 'dynamics'.
Again, this is an analogy, like blocks of marble and David. Still, I
fail to see how instantiating all possible persons in all possible
environments actually creates a person at all. Just like instantiating
all possible books creates any particular book in the Library of Babel.
> >>My point is just that the use of the multiverse does not change the
> >>consequence of the MGA reasoning.
> >This we disagree on, clearly. However, I'm still failing to understand
> >your point of view, because ISTM you want to call the UD conscious,
> >when it surely can't be. Its as dumb as.
> The UD is not conscious, as a person, but once you add the
> supervenience thesis, it instantiates consciousness at each moment
> where it executes a conscious program (say Russell Standish's one,
> then Bruno's one, etc).
Why does this depend on supervenience?
> That is enough for applying the MGA
> argument. We don't have to execute all the UD, with aphysical
> supervenience thesis, "it" will instantiate consciousness after a
> finite time, and the MGA will be able to be applied on portion of
> its execution.
> >>>As I said above, in simulating the multiple branches of the
> >>>by dovetailing, we are no longer instantiating consciousness.
> >>I don't follow you on this. The first person is not even aware of
> >>the giant delays brought by the dovetailing procedure.
> >>The UD (at first concrete) does instantiate consciousness (and "at
> >>time" with the physical supervenience thesis). It is all what we
> >>need for getting the (epistemological) contradiction.
> >The UD runs all programs, including conscious ones, but is not
> >conscious in itself. Therefore, you cannot apply Maudlin/MGA to a
> >dovetailer - it makes no sense.
> I think that you have to elaborate on this. The MGA works for any
> single program generating (with supervenience) consciousness. Where
> do we use the fact that the program has to be conscious? Even with a
> brain, consciousness is attribute to some sub-program, and we cannot
> even know which one. I don't see your point.
Take the UD program, and unfold it into a list of all the states it
visits in its execution. Olympia is just the simple machine
that iterates over that list of states. Because the UD has no input, there
_are_ no counterfactuals, so there are no Klaras to be attached.
Is there any contradiction with the UD computation being instantiated
on a trivial physical process? No - because clearly it happens. But I
would argue that the UD is not conscious anyway, so its a rather
irrelevant point. I don't see what supervenience has to do with it, as
the supervenience is of the simulated conscious entities on the
simulated environments in which they're embedded.
> >>>This step is basically
> >>>invalid. It does not imply COMP is false, though.
> >>>Of course, if you can think of another way of simulating a
> >>>within a single universe, I wil naturally reconsider...
> >>The way of simulating it changes nothing. It is the point of the
> >>first six step of UDA.
> >Only the subjective view is unchanged. The 3rd person view is changed
> >utterly. In the 1st person view, we have conscousness supervening on a
> >multiverse, which doesn't change. But Maudlin's argument no longer
> >works in the 1st person view.
> I don't see why.
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics, and the 1st person
viewpoint is multiversal.
Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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