On 20 Dec 2011, at 01:03, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 02:56:10PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 18 Dec 2011, at 23:27, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Dec 18, 2011 at 12:46:10PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Consciousness, with comp relies on interaction in a branch. The
I don't know what you mean by this.
Assuming comp, consciousness can use a machine working only by
interaction of parts. It does not need parallel universes, which
will only change the relative statistics of consciousness content.
Even though the parts may be distributed across multiple branches of
the MV, and have different counterfactual histories?
What is a branch of a W in a MW if you allow interaction between worlds?
Comp, be it digital or quantum, makes classical computation non
interacting with parallel computation. Locally, if our brains were
quantum computers this would be locally false, but not in a relevant
way to contradict the MGA consequences, by the fact that if worlds
interfere that much still does not violate Church thesis, and quantum
computer are Turing emulable.
Are you arguing that comp does not entail the principle "323"?
Be careful of not including the conclusion in the definition of COMP.
If the emulation is by means of dovetailing, then I think not. A
dovetailer is not conscious.
That is ambiguous. A dovetailer, like Robinson arithmetic (when
proving all its theorems) is not conscious, per se. But it
instantiates consciousness, indeed all possible machine's
Great. But this is more than mere terminological wrangling. To an
observer of the dovetailer, no conscious processes are visible.
No conscious processes are ever visible.
that would require a means of determining whether a computation is
conscious or not, something we don't have, and probably never will.
That's always the case. You judge by chatting with person or by
observing them and recognizing yourself.
That's how I became open to the idea that all löbian entities (machine
or not machine) are conscious.
It is another manifestation of there being no God's viewpoint in a
I am not sure about that. Many would say that the very idea of
"multiverse" is an attempt of describing "God's viewpoint".
With mechanism we have universal dreams and universal dreamers,
sharing, or not, dreams and subroutines.
I feel this invalidates applying Maudlin's argument to a
Let me introduce a new definition. I define a closed generalized brain
(CGB) the portion of reality that you need to emulate a dream. Many
neurophysiologists would be that such a portion of reality is in the
skull, and that the process is Turing emulable (and I think it your
position). Comp implies that such CGB exists. That CGM can be emulated
by a turing machine, why would it matter the emulation is done by
dovetailing from the first person point of view?
But put another way, perhaps it means that consciousness
cannot supervene on a physical implementation of a dovetailer.
is probably what you're trying to get to.
I just reason from the assumption. Consciousness would supervene on
the execution of a physical universal dovetailer. Why wouldn't it?
In this case, the distinction is more than merely linguistic. Often
when you say PA is conscious, I translate your comment as above, and
When I say that PA is conscious, I mean it literally.
When I say that RA is conscious, I mean "the universal machine RA"
is conscious literally. But RA can also play the role of a universal
dovetailer, which is not a person, and thus not conscious. RA can
play both, somehow. Like any universal machine, even a Löbian one,
can implement a universal dovetailing (if patient enough!).
I thought we agreed that these systems contained conscious structures,
not are conscious in themselves.
RA and the UD. They are computationnally equivalent (to be short). RA
is a bit richer as a person, but still very shy in its provability
means. RA, as a computer, is Turing universal, but as a prover, is
very weak. Not Löbian. Probably conscious but not yet self-conscious.
RA does not know her limit. It is innocence age. Principia
Mathematica, Peano Arithmetic (PA), Zermelo Fraenkel Set Theory, knows
their limits. They are Löbian, they obey to the *modesty* law (B(Bp-
I don't know otherwise how to
interpret "PA is literally conscious". It makes no sense...
PA is a classical believer in elementary arithmetic, close for the
induction principle for its expressible formula, in his language.
Its metamathematics shows that it is vertiginous all what you can talk
with PA, including the proposition self-referential modal
"tautolotogies", which tell us something about them. It is a
scientific talk on all points of view, including the intensional
nuances (forced by the incompleteness phenomenon).
By being very simple, PA is closer to the idea of universal person,
but PA, ZF, PM, etc have already quite different character, the
coinsciousness of the Löbian machines is bound to differentiate.
But this can't be done here.
I agree that the UD is not a person, and as such its consciousness
is even non-sensical. But if you agree that the UD instantiates
consciousness, then the MGA applies to it.
It doesn't eliminate the supervenience of the consciousness on the
simulated physics within the UD. It seems this is in accordance with
Brent's comments too.
Presumably you would argue that this is simulated matter, not
primitive matter. Sure.
You lost me here. The "primitive matter" in comp is not *a priori*
simulable, it appears below our sharable substitution level.
But what's to stop the primitive matter being
multiversal - whether it can be simulated or not is a little beside
On the contrary it is crucial. It makes the difference between
emulable in one reality (in our branch of the quantum multiverse in
case we imagine a concrete one), which is equivalent with Turing
emulable, or necessitating Non Turing emulable interactions or
interferences with parallel realities. The point is that if it is
Turing emulable, then the MGA applies. You have then to believe that a
physical inactive piece has a physical activity relevant in a
particular computation. I can't figure out what that could mean.
The issue is misidentification of the dovetailer with one of the
programs it is executing.
But as I just said, this is not relevant for the movie graph or
This is what I'm having difficulty seeing...
If a dream can supervene on a closed generalized brain Turing
emulation, then it has to supervene to its emulation in one of its
classical instantiation, either in a concrete quasi-classical (normal)
history (or, after MGA, in arithmetic, or in the UD*). And in that
single reality emulation, MGA can be applied. If you give a role to
physically inactive, by making them active in some other world you are
forced to introduce a non Turing emulable *physical* component in
matter playing a role in consciousness, where comp show that we get it
for free below our substitution level.
It is the same mistake to say that the Library of Babel contains all
the wisdom of the ages just because one can find a copy of every
has ever been written within its walls.
Well, here there is also another mistake, which is that a library of
Babel contains only description, where a universal dovetailer
actually executes the 'descriptions'. The numbers, even with their
order are not Turing universal. It is really the laws of addition
and multiplication which gives rise to the genuine (universal)
Again, this is an analogy, like blocks of marble and David. Still, I
fail to see how instantiating all possible persons in all possible
environments actually creates a person at all. Just like instantiating
all possible books creates any particular book in the Library of
The instantiation of all persons in all *relatively* possible
environment, for example in UD*, gives the domain of your (hopefully
us) first person (plural) indeterminacies.
That's UDA1-7, in case the UD is physically executed, in a steady
growing physical "?"verse.
MGA just show that the steady growing universe or multiverse is red
My point is just that the use of the multiverse does not change the
consequence of the MGA reasoning.
This we disagree on, clearly. However, I'm still failing to
your point of view, because ISTM you want to call the UD conscious,
when it surely can't be. Its as dumb as.
The UD is not conscious, as a person, but once you add the
supervenience thesis, it instantiates consciousness at each moment
where it executes a conscious program (say Russell Standish's one,
then Bruno's one, etc).
Why does this depend on supervenience?
I meant "physical supervenience". It is just introduced to get the
MGA is a reductio ad absurdum.
That is enough for applying the MGA
argument. We don't have to execute all the UD, with aphysical
supervenience thesis, "it" will instantiate consciousness after a
finite time, and the MGA will be able to be applied on portion of
As I said above, in simulating the multiple branches of the
by dovetailing, we are no longer instantiating consciousness.
I don't follow you on this. The first person is not even aware of
the giant delays brought by the dovetailing procedure.
The UD (at first concrete) does instantiate consciousness (and "at
time" with the physical supervenience thesis). It is all what we
need for getting the (epistemological) contradiction.
The UD runs all programs, including conscious ones, but is not
conscious in itself. Therefore, you cannot apply Maudlin/MGA to a
dovetailer - it makes no sense.
I think that you have to elaborate on this. The MGA works for any
single program generating (with supervenience) consciousness. Where
do we use the fact that the program has to be conscious? Even with a
brain, consciousness is attribute to some sub-program, and we cannot
even know which one. I don't see your point.
Take the UD program, and unfold it into a list of all the states it
visits in its execution. Olympia is just the simple machine
that iterates over that list of states. Because the UD has no input,
_are_ no counterfactuals, so there are no Klaras to be attached.
Is there any contradiction with the UD computation being instantiated
on a trivial physical process? No - because clearly it happens. But I
would argue that the UD is not conscious anyway, so its a rather
irrelevant point. I don't see what supervenience has to do with it, as
the supervenience is of the simulated conscious entities on the
simulated environments in which they're embedded.
We might agree. I am just introducing a notion of *physical*
supervenience to get the absurd conclusion: physically inactive piece
of matter are physically active with respect to a computation.
This step is basically
invalid. It does not imply COMP is false, though.
Of course, if you can think of another way of simulating a
within a single universe, I wil naturally reconsider...
The way of simulating it changes nothing. It is the point of the
first six step of UDA.
Only the subjective view is unchanged. The 3rd person view is
utterly. In the 1st person view, we have conscousness supervening
multiverse, which doesn't change. But Maudlin's argument no longer
works in the 1st person view.
I don't see why.
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
and the 1st person
viewpoint is multiversal.
Yes, but with comp that's the result of the first person
indeterminacies. The first person cannot be a entity making
interacting those many branches in a non Turing emulable way. It seems
enough to me, to make the physical supervenience thesis devoid of any
You might try to refute the 323 principle as clearly as possible by
using a *physical* multiverse. I think you will see by yourself that
you have to endow some primitive Matter with some non Turing emulable
processes at some point.
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