On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 09:06:10PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 20 Dec 2011, at 01:03, Russell Standish wrote: > > >Even though the parts may be distributed across multiple branches of > >the MV, and have different counterfactual histories? > > ? > > What is a branch of a W in a MW if you allow interaction between worlds?
Who said anything about interaction between the worlds? I assume by interaction, you mean the usual interaction physicists means (interference), or information being passed. > Comp, be it digital or quantum, makes classical computation non > interacting with parallel computation. Locally, if our brains were > quantum computers this would be locally false, but not in a relevant > way to contradict the MGA consequences, by the fact that if worlds > interfere that much still does not violate Church thesis, and > quantum computer are Turing emulable. We're not discussing quantum computers here. > > Are you arguing that comp does not entail the principle "323"? I don't believe so. > > > > > >Be careful of not including the conclusion in the definition of COMP. > > > >...snip... > > > >>> > >>>If the emulation is by means of dovetailing, then I think not. A > >>>dovetailer is not conscious. > >> > >>That is ambiguous. A dovetailer, like Robinson arithmetic (when > >>proving all its theorems) is not conscious, per se. But it > >>instantiates consciousness, indeed all possible machine's > >>consciousness. > >> > > > >Great. But this is more than mere terminological wrangling. To an > >observer of the dovetailer, no conscious processes are visible. > > No conscious processes are ever visible. > > > > > >To do > >that would require a means of determining whether a computation is > >conscious or not, something we don't have, and probably never will. > > That's always the case. You judge by chatting with person or by > observing them and recognizing yourself. > That's how I became open to the idea that all löbian entities > (machine or not machine) are conscious. > > > > > > >It is another manifestation of there being no God's viewpoint in a > >Multiverse. > > I am not sure about that. Many would say that the very idea of > "multiverse" is an attempt of describing "God's viewpoint". > With mechanism we have universal dreams and universal dreamers, > sharing, or not, dreams and subroutines. > It cannot be a God's point of view. The Multiverse is too simple to admit an observer... > > > > >I feel this invalidates applying Maudlin's argument to a > >dovetailer. > > Let me introduce a new definition. I define a closed generalized > brain (CGB) the portion of reality that you need to emulate a dream. This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses. It seems to me that dreams are the result of filtering and amplifying random thermal noise with the brain. It is just a theory, of course, but it would mean that the CGB is a Multiverse. > Many neurophysiologists would be that such a portion of reality is > in the skull, and that the process is Turing emulable (and I think > it your position). Sure, but the contents of the skull is an object that extends over multiple branches of the Multiverse. > Comp implies that such CGB exists. That CGM can > be emulated by a turing machine, why would it matter the emulation > is done by dovetailing from the first person point of view? Because in the 1st person POV, the "inert" parts are not inert. Only in the 3rd person dovetailed POV. And, I find it hard to think of the dovetailer as conscious. > > >But put another way, perhaps it means that consciousness > >cannot supervene on a physical implementation of a dovetailer. > >Which > >is probably what you're trying to get to. > > I just reason from the assumption. Consciousness would supervene on > the execution of a physical universal dovetailer. Why wouldn't it? Because the dovetailer is an incredibly simple program. It hardly seems conscious. If I ask it a question, it is mute, so the Turing test hardly helps. ...snip... > > > >It doesn't eliminate the supervenience of the consciousness on the > >simulated physics within the UD. It seems this is in accordance with > >Brent's comments too. > > > >Presumably you would argue that this is simulated matter, not > >primitive matter. Sure. > > You lost me here. The "primitive matter" in comp is not *a priori* > simulable, it appears below our sharable substitution level. > It may or may not be simulable a priori. Why would a materialist assume that primitive matter is necessarily nonsimulable? > > > >But what's to stop the primitive matter being > >multiversal - whether it can be simulated or not is a little beside > >the point. > > On the contrary it is crucial. It makes the difference between > emulable in one reality (in our branch of the quantum multiverse in > case we imagine a concrete one), which is equivalent with Turing > emulable, or necessitating Non Turing emulable interactions or > interferences with parallel realities. I don't expect there will be interference between the realities. Why does supervenience over multiple branches entail there must be interactions between realities? > The point is that if it is > Turing emulable, then the MGA applies. I don't see this. > You have then to believe that > a physical inactive piece has a physical activity relevant in a > particular computation. The physically "inactive" piece is only physically inactive in one branch. If the supervenience is across multiple branches, then the absurdum is no longer. ...snip... > If a dream can supervene on a closed generalized brain Turing > emulation, then it has to supervene to its emulation in one of its > classical instantiation, either in a concrete quasi-classical > (normal) history (or, after MGA, in arithmetic, or in the UD*). Why? > And > in that single reality emulation, MGA can be applied. If you give a > role to physically inactive, by making them active in some other > world you are forced to introduce a non Turing emulable *physical* > component in matter playing a role in consciousness, where comp show > that we get it for free below our substitution level. > Why? ...snip... > >> > >>The UD is not conscious, as a person, but once you add the > >>supervenience thesis, it instantiates consciousness at each moment > >>where it executes a conscious program (say Russell Standish's one, > >>then Bruno's one, etc). > > > >Why does this depend on supervenience? > > I meant "physical supervenience". It is just introduced to get the > contradiction. > MGA is a reductio ad absurdum. How does this work? > > > >Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics, > > Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty. Its the only way to get inactive parts, and so force the absurdum. The assumption is not explicit in Maudlin's work, but its there. ...snip... > > You might try to refute the 323 principle as clearly as possible by > using a *physical* multiverse. I think you will see by yourself that > you have to endow some primitive Matter with some non Turing > emulable processes at some point. I don't see the 323 principle as being relevant here - perhaps you can explain more why its needed. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. 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