2011/12/21 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

>
> On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
>
>  On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>
>> wrote:
>>
>>  Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Its the only way to get inactive parts, and so force the absurdum. The
>>> assumption is not explicit in Maudlin's work, but its there.
>>>
>>
>> Russell, isn't it central to the multiverse view that distinct,
>> univocal observer experiences supervene on each branch?
>>
>
> I think so. But I think that Russell's point is logical. He tries to
> imagine a notion of physical reality which would make the MGA invalid.
> So he imagines a notion of multiple worlds physical supervenience. But
> this would contradict comp if the use of those other worlds is not Turing
> emulable. If it is, then we can emulate it in a single reality, and MGA can
> be reapplied.
>
> Bruno
>

Hi Bruno,

what about the fact that a generalized brain which would need all the
universe to be simulated seems contradictory to what you say about digital
physics being false if comp is true ? That move (ultra low substitution
level) seems an invalid move to keep comp.

Regards,
Quentin

>
>
>  In which
>> case, isn't it correct to apply Maudlin's argument to each branch
>> separately?  If so, to oppose the conclusion by appealing to all the
>> branches simultaneously might seem like wanting to have your cake and
>> eat it too.
>>
>> David
>>
>>
>>  On Tue, Dec 20, 2011 at 09:06:10PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 20 Dec 2011, at 01:03, Russell Standish wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  Even though the parts may be distributed across multiple branches of
>>>>> the MV, and have different counterfactual histories?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ?
>>>>
>>>> What is a branch of a W in a MW if you allow interaction between worlds?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Who said anything about interaction between the worlds? I assume by
>>> interaction, you mean the usual interaction physicists means
>>> (interference), or information being passed.
>>>
>>>  Comp, be it digital or quantum, makes classical computation non
>>>> interacting with parallel computation. Locally, if our brains were
>>>> quantum computers this would be locally false, but not in a relevant
>>>> way to contradict the MGA consequences, by the fact that if worlds
>>>> interfere that much still does not violate Church thesis, and
>>>> quantum computer are Turing emulable.
>>>>
>>>
>>> We're not discussing quantum computers here.
>>>
>>>
>>>> Are you arguing that comp does not entail the principle "323"?
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't believe so.
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Be careful of not including the conclusion in the definition of COMP.
>>>>>
>>>>> ...snip...
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the emulation is by means of dovetailing, then I think not. A
>>>>>>> dovetailer is not conscious.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That is ambiguous. A dovetailer, like Robinson arithmetic (when
>>>>>> proving all its theorems) is not conscious, per se. But it
>>>>>> instantiates consciousness, indeed all possible machine's
>>>>>> consciousness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> Great. But this is more than mere terminological wrangling. To an
>>>>> observer of the dovetailer, no conscious processes are visible.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No conscious processes are ever visible.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  To do
>>>>> that would require a means of determining whether a computation is
>>>>> conscious or not, something we don't have, and probably never will.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That's always the case. You judge by chatting with person or by
>>>> observing them and recognizing yourself.
>>>> That's how I became open to the idea that all löbian entities
>>>> (machine or not machine) are conscious.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> It is another manifestation of there being no God's viewpoint in a
>>>>> Multiverse.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am not sure about that. Many would say that the very idea of
>>>> "multiverse" is an attempt of describing "God's viewpoint".
>>>> With mechanism we have universal dreams and universal dreamers,
>>>> sharing, or not, dreams and subroutines.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> It cannot be a God's point of view. The Multiverse is too simple to
>>> admit an observer...
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> I feel this invalidates applying Maudlin's argument to a
>>>>> dovetailer.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Let me introduce a new definition. I define a closed generalized
>>>> brain (CGB) the portion of reality that you need to emulate a dream.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses. It seems
>>> to me that dreams are the result of filtering and amplifying random
>>> thermal noise with the brain. It is just a theory, of course, but it
>>> would mean that the CGB is a Multiverse.
>>>
>>>  Many neurophysiologists would be that such a portion of reality is
>>>> in the skull, and that the process is Turing emulable (and I think
>>>> it your position).
>>>>
>>>
>>> Sure, but the contents of the skull is an object that extends over
>>> multiple branches of the Multiverse.
>>>
>>>  Comp implies that such CGB exists. That CGM can
>>>> be emulated by a turing machine, why would it matter the emulation
>>>> is done by dovetailing from the first person point of view?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Because in the 1st person POV, the "inert" parts are not inert. Only
>>> in the 3rd person dovetailed POV. And, I find it hard to think of the
>>> dovetailer as conscious.
>>>
>>>
>>>>  But put another way, perhaps it means that consciousness
>>>>> cannot supervene on a physical implementation of a dovetailer.
>>>>> Which
>>>>> is probably what you're trying to get to.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I just reason from the assumption. Consciousness would supervene on
>>>> the execution of a physical universal dovetailer. Why wouldn't it?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Because the dovetailer is an incredibly simple program. It hardly
>>> seems conscious. If I ask it a question, it is mute, so the Turing
>>> test hardly helps.
>>>
>>> ...snip...
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> It doesn't eliminate the supervenience of the consciousness on the
>>>>> simulated physics within the UD. It seems this is in accordance with
>>>>> Brent's comments too.
>>>>>
>>>>> Presumably you would argue that this is simulated matter, not
>>>>> primitive matter. Sure.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You lost me here. The "primitive matter" in comp is not *a priori*
>>>> simulable, it appears below our sharable substitution level.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> It may or may not be simulable a priori. Why would a materialist
>>> assume that primitive matter is necessarily nonsimulable?
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>  But what's to stop the primitive matter being
>>>>> multiversal - whether it can be simulated or not is a little beside
>>>>> the point.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On the contrary it is crucial. It makes the difference between
>>>> emulable in one reality (in our branch of the quantum multiverse in
>>>> case we imagine a concrete one), which is equivalent with Turing
>>>> emulable, or necessitating Non Turing emulable interactions or
>>>> interferences with parallel realities.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't expect there will be interference between the realities. Why
>>> does supervenience over multiple branches entail there must be
>>> interactions between realities?
>>>
>>>  The point is that if it is
>>>> Turing emulable, then the MGA applies.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't see this.
>>>
>>>  You have then to believe that
>>>> a physical inactive piece has a physical activity relevant in a
>>>> particular computation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The physically "inactive" piece is only physically inactive in one
>>> branch. If the supervenience is across multiple branches, then the
>>> absurdum is no longer.
>>>
>>>
>>> ...snip...
>>>
>>>  If a dream can supervene on a closed generalized brain Turing
>>>> emulation, then it has to supervene to its emulation in one of its
>>>> classical instantiation, either in a concrete quasi-classical
>>>> (normal) history (or, after MGA, in arithmetic, or in the UD*).
>>>>
>>>
>>> Why?
>>>
>>>  And
>>>> in that single reality emulation, MGA can be applied. If you give a
>>>> role to physically inactive, by making them active in some other
>>>> world you are forced to introduce a non Turing emulable *physical*
>>>> component in matter playing a role in consciousness, where comp show
>>>> that we get it for free below our substitution level.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Why?
>>>
>>> ...snip...
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> The UD is not conscious, as a person, but once you add the
>>>>>> supervenience thesis, it instantiates consciousness at each moment
>>>>>> where it executes a conscious program (say Russell Standish's one,
>>>>>> then Bruno's one, etc).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Why does this depend on supervenience?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I meant "physical supervenience". It is just introduced to get the
>>>> contradiction.
>>>> MGA is a reductio ad absurdum.
>>>>
>>>
>>> How does this work?
>>>
>>>
>>>>> Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Its the only way to get inactive parts, and so force the absurdum. The
>>> assumption is not explicit in Maudlin's work, but its there.
>>>
>>> ...snip...
>>>
>>>
>>>> You might try to refute the 323 principle as clearly as possible by
>>>> using a *physical* multiverse. I think you will see by yourself that
>>>> you have to endow some primitive Matter with some non Turing
>>>> emulable processes at some point.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I don't see the 323 principle as being relevant here - perhaps you can
>>> explain more why its needed.
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>>> ----------------
>>> Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
>>> Principal, High Performance Coders
>>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
>>> University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
>>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>>> ----------------
>>>
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