On 12/21/2011 6:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote:
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
Its the only way to get inactive parts, and so force the absurdum. The
assumption is not explicit in Maudlin's work, but its there.
Russell, isn't it central to the multiverse view that distinct,
univocal observer experiences supervene on each branch?
I think so. But I think that Russell's point is logical. He tries to imagine a notion of
physical reality which would make the MGA invalid.
So he imagines a notion of multiple worlds physical supervenience. But this would
contradict comp if the use of those other worlds is not Turing emulable. If it is, then
we can emulate it in a single reality, and MGA can be reapplied.
But then it seems the level of emulation will encompass all or most of the multiverse;
which is OK but seems almost trivial.
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