On 21 Dec 2011, at 18:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 6:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 14:06, David Nyman wrote:
On 21 December 2011 09:58, Russell Standish
Because Maudlin assumes a single universe physics,
Where? It assumes only the Turing emulabilty.
Its the only way to get inactive parts, and so force the
assumption is not explicit in Maudlin's work, but its there.
Russell, isn't it central to the multiverse view that distinct,
univocal observer experiences supervene on each branch?
I think so. But I think that Russell's point is logical. He tries
to imagine a notion of physical reality which would make the MGA
So he imagines a notion of multiple worlds physical supervenience.
But this would contradict comp if the use of those other worlds is
not Turing emulable. If it is, then we can emulate it in a single
reality, and MGA can be reapplied.
But then it seems the level of emulation will encompass all or most
of the multiverse; which is OK but seems almost trivial.
I think so. The goal is just to trying to invalidate MGA or "323".
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