On 21 Dec 2011, at 18:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 8:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.
This, I think, would directly contradict computationalism (unless
you mean pseudo-random, or the randomness recoverable by the comp
indeterminacy). By definition of "correct level" you keep both of
them "intact" through a single turing emulation in your local
If you rely on the thermal interaction with the environment, then
you save comp at the expense of enlarging the local reality to be
Not necessarily. If the dependence is statistical I am not obliged to
emulate the exact environment. But for some logical purpose we might
imagine the foolish idea that our consciousness depends on the
computational precise state of some large environment. The Heisenberg
Matrix of our galaxies cluster at the level of M theory, for example.
That's demanding a lot to the doctor, of course. But the UD provides
it in infinitely many exemplars including the consistent extensions,
for free (assuming 0, s(0), ... and the laws of addition and
It get trivial as explanations, but again, such view are proposed, I
think, only through attempts to invalidate the argument that comp
leads to immaterialism, or to the reduction of the mind-body problem
to a body problem appearance in computer science/arithmetic.
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