On 12/21/2011 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Dec 2011, at 18:30, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/21/2011 8:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.

This, I think, would directly contradict computationalism (unless you mean pseudo-random, or the randomness recoverable by the comp indeterminacy). By definition of "correct level" you keep both of them "intact" through a single turing emulation in your local "physical" reality.

If you rely on the thermal interaction with the environment, then you save comp at the expense of enlarging the local reality to be simulated.

Not necessarily. If the dependence is statistical I am not obliged to emulate the exact environment. But for some logical purpose we might imagine the foolish idea that our consciousness depends on the computational precise state of some large environment. The Heisenberg Matrix of our galaxies cluster at the level of M theory, for example. That's demanding a lot to the doctor, of course. But the UD provides it in infinitely many exemplars including the consistent extensions, for free (assuming 0, s(0), ... and the laws of addition and multiplication, only).

It get trivial as explanations, but again, such view are proposed, I think, only through attempts to invalidate the argument that comp leads to immaterialism, or to the reduction of the mind-body problem to a body problem appearance in computer science/arithmetic.

It would only invalidate immaterialism in the sense that consciousness and matter would both have to arise from something more basic, e.g. computation, and that you could not generate one without the other - which seems likely to me. I doubt that consciousness without a physical body/world to be conscious *of* is a coherent concept. Dreams are cited as a counter example, but all of my dreams are built out of things in the world.


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