On 12/21/2011 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Dec 2011, at 18:30, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/21/2011 8:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This may require the input of random numbers on the synapses.
This, I think, would directly contradict computationalism (unless you mean
pseudo-random, or the randomness recoverable by the comp indeterminacy). By definition
of "correct level" you keep both of them "intact" through a single turing emulation in
your local "physical" reality.
If you rely on the thermal interaction with the environment, then you save comp at the
expense of enlarging the local reality to be simulated.
Not necessarily. If the dependence is statistical I am not obliged to emulate the exact
environment. But for some logical purpose we might imagine the foolish idea that our
consciousness depends on the computational precise state of some large environment. The
Heisenberg Matrix of our galaxies cluster at the level of M theory, for example.
That's demanding a lot to the doctor, of course. But the UD provides it in infinitely
many exemplars including the consistent extensions, for free (assuming 0, s(0), ... and
the laws of addition and multiplication, only).
It get trivial as explanations, but again, such view are proposed, I think, only through
attempts to invalidate the argument that comp leads to immaterialism, or to the
reduction of the mind-body problem to a body problem appearance in computer
It would only invalidate immaterialism in the sense that consciousness and matter would
both have to arise from something more basic, e.g. computation, and that you could not
generate one without the other - which seems likely to me. I doubt that consciousness
without a physical body/world to be conscious *of* is a coherent concept. Dreams are
cited as a counter example, but all of my dreams are built out of things in the world.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at